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ABSTHACT
This thesis examines the information about international
affairs that was transmitted by the leaders of the Amalgamated
Engineering Union (AEU) in the years 1945-1951. In general the study
confirms suggestions derived from a review of the literature in the
fields of communication, organization and the international behaviour
of trade unions. AEU leaders did not proffer their interpretations of
the world outside the United Kingdom and of Britain's place in that
world out of a disinterested wish to impart information or out of
ideological or nationalistic zeal, leather, such messages tended to be
part of arguments about the leaders' basic organizational concerns:
goal attainment, organizational maintenance and power. The selection of
information for transmission was thus a function of the suitability of
a datum of international affairs to the leaders* argument. Consequently,
a negative image of a certain country might be useful in one context,
while a positive image of the same country might be useful in another.
Nevertheless, various other factors could impose a degree of internal
coherence on the resulting world image and could also result in a
measure of agreement between this image and the one projected by other
sources in the UK.
The ABJ's leaders painted a picture of a world hostile to Britain
and to its prosperity in order to obtain the members' support for their
policy of cooperation with the State and the employers. The image of a
hostile outside world was a particularly notable feature of the ASu
Executive's arguments on behalf of wage restraint. During the period
under review, the images of the United States and the Soviet Union
shifted in accordance with changes in the leaders' understanding of
how important to their objective of maintaining full employment in an
expanding economy those countries and/or certain images of those
countries were. As the focus of discussion with regard to economic
development and reconstruction shifted from trade to aid and producti¬
vity to rearmament, the AW leaders presented the Soviet Union in an
increasingly negative and hostile manner and the United States in an
ever more positive way. Very particularistic motives led the Engineer¬
ing Union's leaders to become propagandists of the Cold War, exponents
of anti-Soviet ism and pro-Americanism,
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ORGANIZE ION AND THE SHAPING OF INFORMATION:
A GENERAL FRAMEWORK AID GUIDELINES FOR STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
The subject of this thesis is how the leaders of a voluntary
organization interpreted the world outside their own country to their
constituentso It deals with the image of the early postwar
international situation projected by the leaders and spokesmen of a
1
British trade union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AZU), in
speeches, statements and publications aimed at the members,, We shall
be looking not only at the contents of the images but at their context
as well. The object of this study is to try to understand why the
leaders of the AEU adopted specific public stances on specific issues
and imparted specific information to their members. We may thus be
able to learn something about the ways in which ideas about foreign
affairs are spread, about the formation of public images, attitudes and
opinions about international affairs and the place of one's own country
in the world.
The period under review here, 1945 to 1951, was that of the
first majority labour Governments in Britain. It v?as also one of sharp
economic and political retrenchment for the country. The UK had been in
1. After a series of amalgamations and some name changes this has
become the Engineering Section of the Amalgamated Union of
Engineering Workers.
relative economic and political decline for many years before this time,
but the decline had not been so precipitous as it was no?.- to become.
The United Kingdom may well have been adjusting its own international
behaviour and activities to take account of the growing power of the
2
United States since the early nineteenth century. It was quite
another matter, however, for the UK to begin divesting itself of its
non-white empire and of other overseas economic, political ana military
commitments and to become in its turn economically and militarily
dependent on the United States,
Many people seem to have regarded those years as a mere interlude
at worst a period of convalescence from the shocks of war. Once Britain
and the rest of the war-ravaged world had recovered, it was thought, the
UK would resume its leading role among the nations. To be sure, some
aspects of the country's decline may have been obscured for many indi¬
viduals by the improvement in their personal well-being as a result of
the expansion of the social services and the maintenance of full
employment. The far greater damage suffered by the countries of the
Continent ray also have blurred certain underlying long-term trends.
Yet those who should have known better and, indeed, sometimes
indicated that they were well aware that Britain had more to contend
with than simply recovering from the war ■ sven they aid not always
offer a sustained corrective analysis of the country's situation. If
2, Compare Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance (London, 1964), pp. 10-14
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one 3cans the parliamentary debates and examines Government policies of
the period, the overwhelming image one discovers is that of a Britain
3
which had suffered certain short-tern setbacks which could be overcome.
Those who contended instead that the nation's problems were structural
as well as cyclical, that the nation's decline was in some measure
irreversible and that the Government should adapt its policies to the
4
new economic and political realities were in a distinct minority.
Britain, it was generally agreed, v/ould take its rightful place in the
world again, if, indeed, it could ever be said to have left it.
The reason for the projection of this latter image was not that
the national elite were engaged in a massive plot to hoodwink the
people. It is more likely that they could not understand the country's
problems and the nature of developments elsewhere or make the leap from
an awareness of these trends to a comprehension and belief in their
significance, reality or magnitude. In any event, if evidence be needed
about how widespread and deep-rooted these views were, one need only
look at the policies pursued and propounded by the political leadership
in government and opposition , in Parliament and outside it, during and
after this period. It is this fundamental belief in Britain's rightful
role which makes understandable the "global posturing" of later years
when policies were conceived of independent action for the UK in each
3. See below, Chapter II.
4. For an illustration of the minority position of such views in the
context of Britain's atomic programme, see Kargaret Gowing,
Independence and Deterrence, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1545-1552,
Volume I, Policy llaking (London, 1974), pp. 224-34,
and all of the three Churchillian circles of the Empire and
5
Commonwealth, the North Atlantic and Europe.
As we shall see below, the AID leaders, too, projected such an
image of Britain in messages to their constituents. Tfnile they
probably believed what they were saying and may have believed it for the
reasons just outlined, that does not explain why they said it, why they
publicized this image. After all, it is not generally considered a
primary function of trade union leaders to educate their members about
international affairs. Vihen they do take a public stance on an issue
of foreign policy, that stance is often ascribed to factors and reasons
which are not directly related to the basic functions and ©Derations of
6
trade unions. It is contended here, however, that the leaders' state¬
ments about international affairs and the images of international
affairs that they projected stem directly from the organizational
context, and can be understood and explained more fully in terms of the
basic functions of the organization, of relations within it and between
it and other bodies.
This means, in short, that communication must be studied in terms
of its social context. Thi3 statement seems so obvious as to be trite.
5. The phrase "global posturing" is from Tom Nairn, "The Left Against
Europe?", New Left Review. 75 (1972), 20. Compare F.S. Northedge,
Freedom and Necessity in British Foreign Policy (London, 1972),
p. 25.
6. See, for example, V.L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership (London, 1957),
p. 295; Roger Eatwell, The 1945-1951 Labour Governments (London,
1979), p. 135; Martin Harrison, Trade Unions and the labour
Ihrty since 1945 (London, 1960), pp. 144-45, 217-20, 225-24.
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Communication theorists, however, on the whole have not locked at the
social context and have tended to abstract the communication process
from its social setting. It has thus been noted that "perusal of the
communication literature, at least prior to the 1970's, would almost
lead one to assume that social structure does not affect human
7
communicat ion".
Yet a survey of research in the field shows that, insofar as
communication has been related to social structure, studies have dealt
with problems of technique, that is, with the ways in which structure
8
can support or impede the efficient transmission of a message. The
question of the contents of communication, of the determination of what
goes into the message in the first place, has received rather less
attention from scholars in the field. Their concentration on
"engineering" has gone hand in hand with an indifference to these
9
so-called "semantic aspects". This neglect of contents, thus, was
due not to the insidious effects of a concern for quantification and
quantifiable phenomena but to a simple and basic prior lack of interest
10
in the issue.
7. Everett M. Sogers and Hekha Agarwala-Sogers, Communication in
Organizations (New York, 1976), p. 2.
8. Sogers and Agarwala-Sogers provide such a survey. See too Lyman W.
Porter and Karlene H. Roberts, editors, Communication in Organiza¬
tions (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977); Karlene H. Roberts and
Charles O'Reilly III, "Measuring Organizational Communication",
Journal of Applied Psychology. 59 (1974), 321-26 (p. 321).
9. C.E. Shannon, quoted by Wuif D. Eund, Ware Nachricht una Informations-
fetisch (Darmstadt and Neuwied, 1976), p. 15.
10. Hund, p. 14.
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The attempts cf Bund and others to carry communi cat ions theory
beyond its usual constraints are thus southing of a breakthrough for
11
the field. These scholars, however, have brought the approach to
bear on an area of communication studies in which empirical research
has dealt with problems of content and sought to relate it to social
12
setting namely, to studies of the press. Students cf other
types of communication have been more restricted by the traditional
limitations of the field, in part, perhaps, because of the
Business and Management ana Diffusion of Innovation orientations of
much of the empirical research in the discipline. The problem, thus,
has been less often "What does one tell the workers (or peasants or
whomever) ?" than "How does one tell then a given thing so that they do
13
what one wants them to do?".
To return to our study, in order to understand how the social
11. Huna summarizes many of the more interesting attempts.
32, For a summary of this type of research on the press published in
English before 1976 see Denis McQuail, Review of Sociological
Writing on the Press. Royal Commission on the Press, Working
Paper No. 2 (HMSO, 1976), pp. 59-4S. See also, Oliver Boyd-
Barrett, Colin Seymour-Ure and Jenny Tunstall, Studies in the
Press. Royal Commission on the Press, Working Paper No. 3 (KMSC,
1977); Denis HcQ,uail, Analysis of Newspaper Content. Royal
Commission on the press, Research F&per No. 4, Gmnd. 681G-4
(HUSO, 1977)
13. Rogers ana Agarwale-Rogers summarize the work which shows the
Business Studies orientation. Everett k. Rogers with F. Floyd
Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations, second edition (New
York, 1971) summarizes the work with the Diffusion orientation.
There have, of course, been exceptions to this trend. For
example, Employee Communication. Policy and Tools. Studies in
Personnel Policy, No. 200 (New York, 1966); Fritz Steele, The
Open Organization (Reading, Massachusetts, 1975)
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setting of the leaders of the ASO shaped the contents of their
communications with their constituents, it would be useful tc step back
to examine the process in more general terms.
3.. Comnuni cat i on
For our purposes, communication is defined as the transmission of
a message through a channel or medium from one actor, the source, to
another, the receiver, with the intention on the part of the source of
bringing about a change in the receiver's knowledge, attitudes and/or
14
overt behaviour.
The message itself is an idea or information and is "nroduced by
15
selection from the variety of objective reality". The selection of
information for transmission will clearly be affected by the other four
factors in the communication process. The channel used may range from
any type of direct personal contact through the mass media, and different
channels affect the form and content of messages in different ways. One
need only think of the constraints we all feel in composing a telegram
to understand this. On another level, there is the oft-cited difficulty
16
of using television to transmit complex, detailed information.
14. See Sogers and Agarwala-Sogers, pp. 9-10.
15. This is Eund's conception of "social information". See Hund,
p. 24. Liy translation. Italicised in the original.
16. It has been a recurrent theme in Chris Dunkley's column in the
Financial Times. See also Lichael Tracey, The Production of
Political Television (London, 1977), pp. 91-104; Jay G. Blunler,
"The Political Effects of Television", in The Effects of
Television, edited by James D. Ealloran (London, 1970), pp. 70-
101 (pp. 96-98).
The source's personality, background and perceptions are also
important in shaping the contents of communications. The source is,
after all, the selector of the information to be transmitted, and what
he selects will be limited by what he sees and knows. One cannot, for
example, expect someone with no knowledge of nineteenth century Trench
literature to illustrate his statements with quotations from Biy Bias.
The capacities, background and personality of the potential and
intended receiver of the message also shape the content of the message,
albeit, for the most part, indirectly. His impact- is generally mediated
by what the source knows ana expects of him. The source cuts his
message to what, he expects his receiver to understand or to what he
17
thinks the receiver needs to know. Thus, if he wants the receiver to
understand the allusion, rather than merely to be impressed, he will,
even if he has studied French literature, not quote Huy Bias in the
original to a unilingual English-speaker.
Finally, the purpose of the message is crucial in determining its
consents. This point should be obvious. A message intended to
encourage saving, for instance, will not deal with the ease and joys of
hire purchase. Clearly, moreover, the purpose of a message is
inseparable from its source. Why, however, should a source have a
purpose with regard to a certain receiver? Why should he care what the
receiver thinks, knows or does? The obvious answer is that the intended
17. Compare Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administra¬
tion of Production", in Comparative Organizations: The Results
of Tknpirical Research, edited by Wolf D. Heyaebrand (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973), pp. 476-506.
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reeeiver's attitudes, knowledge and behaviour may somehow affect the
source's interests and concerns. Such an effect implies a social
relationship between the source and the receiver, or more precisely,
implies that they are both located in a single social system, an
agglomeration of interdependent groups and individuals, The purpose of
communication thus stems from this setting. The social setting,
furthermore, provides channels for communication and determines access
to them. 'Telegrams are hard to compose because access to them is
controlled by the Post Office, which charges for them by the word.
Depending on one's position in the distribution of income in a society,
moreover, one can be more or less constrained than another
person by the requirement of payment . In addition, the social setting
establishes a framework according to which the communicators may
assess themselves and their relationship to each other. Social setting
thus moulds their mutual perceptions which in turn shape the contents of
the message.
None of the above means that idiosyncratic factors are unimpor¬
tant; even a rich person may avoid sending telegrams if he is stingy.
Nevertheless, the importance of the social setting for communication
within it is undeniable.
2. Organization
In the case to be studied here the most obvious social relation¬
ship between the communicators the leaders of a trade union and
their constituents — is their common membership in the union and their
relative positions in it. For our purposes it is useful to regard a
-14-
union as a specific type of organization, that is, as a specific kind
of "stable system of individuals who work together to achieve, through
18
a hierarchy of ranks and division of labor, common goalsIn an
organisation, "divisions of labor, power and communication responsibi¬
lities ... (are) deliberately planned to enhance the realisation of
(the organization's) specific goals ... (while) one or more power
centers ... control the efforts of the organization and direct them
19
taward it s goals".
An organization can thus be distinguished by four basic charac¬
teristics: l) its goals; 2) the means it uses to achieve them;
3) the subdivision of these means into tasks for the various members,
that is, the division of labour; and 4) the hierarchical distribution of
power, that is, the subordination of some of the members to the
decisions and directives of others.
3. Trade Unions
A trade union is distinguished from other organizations, first
and foremost, by the nature of its objectives. Many organizations
exist in order to offer goods and services to non-members. A union, on
the contrary, is intended to provide specific services to its own
members. The services involved are well-summarized by the Webbs'
definition of a trade union as a "continuous association of wage earners
for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their
18. Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, p. 6. Compare John Child, Roy Loveridge
and Malcolm 'Warner, "Towards an Organizational Study of 'Trade
Unions", Sociology. 7 (1973), 71-91,
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working lives", Llembers may join for a variety of reasons, and a
union's goals may be interpreted in different ways at different times,
while new goals may sometimes be adopted and others may be abandoned as
circumstances change. Still, it seems fair to say that the provision
of certain services to the members, services pertaining to the
maintenance and improvement of the conditions of their working lives
interns of employment, earnings, hours and the physical conditions
under which they labour have constituted the hard core of union
activity in Britain.,
4. Organizational Complexity and Leadership
Another feature of trade unions distinguishes them from other
kinds of organizations ana places them firmly in the category of
voluntary organizations. In voluntary organizations membership is not
generally a function of legal constraints, and -participation does not
normally involve remuneration. There is also the (at least formal)
complexity of the power distribution within the organization. In a
"simple" organization the power relationship is consistent throughout,
and the hierarchy admits no exceptions, While there may be a number of
levels in the decision-making and instruction-giving hierarchy, member A
19, Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1964), p. 5.
20, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, revised
edition (London, 1920), p. 1,
21, E. Wight Bakke, "To Join or Not to Join", in Industrial Relations
and the Wider Society: Aspects of Interaction, edited by B.
Barrett, E. Rhodes and J. Beishon (London, 1975), pp. 43-52,
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who takes decisions and gives orders to member B is never himself sub¬
ject to B's decisions so long as they maintain their respective
positions *
In more complex organizations, and voluntary ones tend to fall
into this category, the relationship between A and B may well be
inconsistent, so that B sometimes may take decisions and give orders to
A. Such a reversal occurs most obviously when an elected official
stands for re-election by the rank-and-file members# Congresses of
rank-and-file members able to take decisions and issue instructions to
office-holders may also take place. In these circumstances it is
evident that the term "leaders" is only a very loose designation for
those who more properly might be called the "incumbents of high
official positions in the organizational hierarchy". It is not meant as
a precise definition of the link between the communicators or to imply
22
that the rank and file are mere "followers".
The organizational behaviour of the leaders is guided by three
main concerns: goal attainment, organizational growth and maintenance
and power. It is the task of the leaders, by virtue of their office, to
"control the efforts of the organization and direct them toward its
23
goals". Their behaviour is thus animated by a concern for achieving
the organization's goals and for managing the operations of the
organization. This managerial concern in turn involves a desire to
22. See Murray Sdelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics lUrbana, Illinois,
1964), p. 75. Compare Etzioni, p. 61. Note that in this
discussion of "complexity" I am dealing with lines of authority,
not with patterns of control; contrast Etzioni, p. 60.
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ensure that the organization is functioning well enough to achieve its
24
goalsf This latter interest nay also involve a concern for the
functioning and maintenance of the lines of authority, or of the power
distribution, within it. The leaders* behaviour may also be based on
somewhat more selfish motives, too. Thus, their concern.for the dis¬
tribution of power may stem from a desire to maintain or enhance their
own position in the organizational hierarchy. Indeed, personal
ambition may be the prime motive for all of a leader's organizational
25
behaviour. He may try to further the interests of the union and its
members because he deems it necessary to advancing his oivn interests,
power and standing.
It is thus evident that the behaviour of the leaders of an
organization is not governed solely by its formal constitution or by a
set of rules. Idiosyncratic factors may also be important. Even in
terms of role-determined behaviour, that is behaviour determined by the
leaders*s place in the hierarchy, formal structures are not reliable
guides. For an organization and relations within it are by no means
fixed, all-encompassing and all-defining. Relationships evolve over
23. Etzioni.p. 3.
24. Compare Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing
(Reading, Massachusetts, 1969), pp. 36-37. V/eiek's analysis of
the place of goals in organizations is different from the one
used here. Nevertheless, he points out that in order for an
organization to continue to accomplish whatever it is it does,
the "processes involved in organizing (itself) must continually
be reaccomplished". (p. 36)
25. Bakke, pp. 45-43.
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time, partly as a result of cumulative idiosyncratic changes effected
by officials, partly as adaptive responses to changes in the organiza¬
tion itself (e.g. growing membership) and in the organization's setting.
Thus the power of full-time officials may grow simply because they are
on hand to deal with problems as they arise, when strict adherence to
rules about consulting the rani: and file would lead to delay and
inefficiency.
Consequently, in examining the workings of an organization, due
attention must be paid such informal and customary developments, struc¬
tures and modes of behaviour. One should not, however, ignore the
formal structures and rules, for even when robbed of substance they may
still shape attitudes and the forms of behaviour, whether out of habit
or a concern to keep up appearances, to make it seem, for example, that
the powers of the rank and file have not been usurped.
5. The External Setting
Special attention too must be paid the relationship of the
organization with its social setting, for it3 structure, goals and. modes
of behaviour are themselves affected, if not determined, by the world
that envelops it. The problems, needs and wants that the organization
is meant to remedy or supply arise in the external setting and can
change as the setting changes. Thus the postwar extension of social
welfare and health care by the State led to a concomitant reduction in
26
the friendly society functions of the AEC. The American YMCA adjusted
26. See below, Chapter IV-B-2.
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to changes in its social setting by devoting "increasing attention to
its physical and social goals, and less attention to the original
27
religious and spiritual aims".
On another level the values, customs and laws of the external
setting determine what means are available, practicable and effective.
For example, in a society in which freedom of association is severely
restricted, the instrument of organization itself may not even be
.28
available. Moreover, an organization dra^-vs the resources it needs
for its operations money, personnel, information and the like
from the external setting. Its relationship with other organizations
and groups in the society can constrain its access to these resources
and will then influence its policy choices and determine its ability to
29
pursue its goals.
27. David L. Sills, "The Succession of Goals", in A Sociological
Header on Complex Organizations, edited by Amitai Etzioni,
second edition (Dew York, 1969), pp. 175-87 (p. 179).
28. Compare H. jr. Moorhouse, "The Political Incorporation of the
British Working Class: An Interpretation", Sociology. 7 (1973),
341-59; James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational
Goals and Environment", in A Sociological Reader .... pp. 187-96.
29. J. Kenneth Benson., "The Interorganizational Network as a Political
Economy", in Organization and Environment, edited by Lucien
Karpik (London, 1978), pp. 69-101.
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B. COMMUNICATION HI ORGANIZATIONS
Communication is vital to the operation of an organization. It
is both a condition and a tool of organization. Communication is
necessary if decisions are to be taken and instructions given about the
execution of certain tasks and the adaptation, adoption and abandonment
of others. Reports must be made to the fomulators of policies and the
givers of orders to provide them with the data they need to make their
30
decisions. In order to ensure that the necessary information can be
transmitted and the flow of unnecessary information inhibited, the
structure of the organization must provide for the opening of some
31
channels and the blocking of others for certain sources and receivers.
Who may or may not send what type of message by what means to
whom is a function of the relationship between the members in the
overall scheme of the organizational division of labour and distribution
of power. Katz ana Kahn suggested five types of "downward" organiza¬
tional communication, from those higher in the organizational hierarchy
to those lower down:
1. Specific task directives: .job instructions.
2. Information designed to produce understanding of the task and
its relationship to other organizational tasks : job rationale.
3. Information about organizational procedures and practices.
4. Feedback to subordinates about (their) performance.
5. Information of an ideological character to indoctrinate a
sense of mission: indoctrination of goals. (32)
30. Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, p. 7.
31. Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers, pp. 77-101.
32. Daniel Katz and Robert E. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organiza¬
tions, second edition (New York, 1978), p. 440.
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Not all organizational leaders always or ever send messages of all
these types. For example,
It is often assumed that an emphasis on information about full
job understanding will conflict with strict allegiance to
specific job instructions. If workers think they know a certain
thing they may attempt to do it in other than the specified
fashion and the organizational leaders may not want to tolerate
the variability of behaviour this entails, (55)
The apparent purpose of these five types of message is fulfilment
of the leaders' main responsibilities of ensuring the attainment of the
organization's goals and the maintenance and enhancement of the
organization itself. The third possible concern of the leader •— the
distribution of power —- may also affect the transmission of such
messages. The reluctance to tolerate "variability of behaviour" may be
due to a fear of disruption of the organization's operations and lines
of authority and/or a fear of challenges to the leaders' personal
position in the power distribution.
Katz and Kahn's classification of downward communication is an
adequate representation of leader-to-rank-and-file communication in
what I have called simple organizations. In a complex body, however,
allowance must be made for leader-to-rank-and-file communication when
decision-making responsibility rests with the latter. In these circum¬
stances the leadership would, in effect, send messages "up the line".
Katz and Kahn discerned four types of communication of this kind : "what
people say (1) about themselves, their performance and their problems,
(2) about others and their problems, (5) about organizational policies
-22-
and practices, and (4) about what needs to be done and how it can be
54
done
The apparent and ostensible purpose of this upward communication
is to provide the policy-makers with the data they need to carry out
their duties. An office-holder may thus conscientiously select and
transmit information which will enable the decision-makers to make
their own reasoned choices. Since, however, much of this upward
communication concerns the office-holders themselves, their colleagues
and proteges and potential rivals and their ideas and
performance, personal considerations are even more likely to intrude
here than in downward communication. The data the leaders select and
transmit to the rank-and-file decision-makers may thus be geared to
guide the latter to issue the orders that the leaders want to carry
out. An official may thus be concerned to prevent the rank and file
arriving at a decision which would damage his own position in the
organizational hierarchy, whether through election or the allocation of
duties. Katz and Kahn write in this regard:
The boss is not likely to be given information by subordinates
that will lead to decisions affecting them adversely. It is not
only that they tell the boss what he or she wants to hear. In a
study of upward communication Head ... reported less accuracy
for subordinates with strong upward mobility than for those less
ambitious. (35)
35. Katz and Kahn, p. 441.
34. Eatz and Kahn, p. 446.
55. Katz and Kahn, p. 447. See too Sidney Hosen and Abraham Tesser,
"On Reluctance to Transmit Undesirable Information: The
MUM Effect", Sociometry. 33 (196S), 253-635 Charles A. O'Reilly
III and Karlene H. Roberts, "Information Filtration in Organize-
In a complex body the "boss" may be the rank and file and the "subor¬
dinates" the officials.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL CGLLTJNIGATION AND THE INTEHHATIONAL SETTING
1. The International Setting as s .Resource for Argument
Given what we have learned about the bases of organizational
communication, how do aspects of international affairs come to figure in
statements made by a trade union leader to his constituents? The obviou
answer is that the international setting is somehow related to 1) the
fulfilment of the organization's goals , 2) the maintenance and enhance¬
ment of the organization and 3) the maintenance and enhancement of the
power distribution and of the leader's position in it. We have already
seen how closely the external setting is linked with the development
and operation of an organization, and so it is logical that aspects of
the setting should figure in internal communications, This answer,
however, is too vague to be satisfactory.
In an American study Chittiek found that leaders of unions and
other voluntary organizations were willing to disseminate among their
members propaganda provided by the State Department, He suggests that
the parties were engaged in a mutually beneficial exchange. The State
Department got a way of spreading its propaganda, and the organization
tions : Three Experiments", Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance. 11 (1974), 253-65,
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gct the information it wants ana needs to conduct its own "information-
education programs". These are programs intended to increase the mem¬
bers' awareness of international affairs and thus to mobilize their
support for the organization's international activities. What is more,
"many ... groups acknowledge a responsibility for educating their mem-
56
bership on foreign affairs".
Why, however, should State Department propaganda meet the needs
of the organization's education programme? Why should both groups wish
to project the same image cf the outside world? Onofri suggests that
something like this may occur when an ostensibly independent organiza¬
tion is in fact an offshoot or dependent of another 'decision centre",
that is, when it is a front organization. It may then propagate the
37
centre's views and values among its members and the general public.
Links between groupings may be of a broader type than those
suggested by Chittick and Onofri. Instead of merely offering informa¬
tion, one decision centre may offer another group and/or its leaders
prestige, material benefits, statutory rights and so on. The leaders of
an organization may court or return the centre's favour by transmitting
among their members information favourable to the centre or by refrain¬
ing from transmitting information abhorrent to it. The exchange need
not be explicit, but it may nonetheless be real.
36. William 0. Chittick, State Department, Press and Pressure Groups
(New York, 1970), pp. 220-27.
37. Fabrizio Onofri, Potere e strutture 3QCia.li nella societa
industrial^ di massa (.bologna, 1976 ), pp. 125-27.
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What, however, if no such links or exchanges can be discerned?
What if the organizational leaders transmit information which contra¬
dicts government policy? now does one explain why information about
international affairs is being transmitted in that case? One should
then, logically, begin to examine the organization itself, its internal
workings and its relationship with its setting far more closely. Thus,
Hero and Starr, in their analysis of the foreign affairs education pro¬
gramme of the United Automobile Workers of America a programme often
very critical of US Government policy , ascribe prime importance to
the history of the union and to the personal background of its leaders
the "traditions and history" of the UAW and the "psychological and
38
ideological roots of the Heuther brothers".
Other scholars have suggested that "public relations" of
an "interest group" should he understood in terms of the leaders1
conception of their audience, their organization and the "magnitude" of
the organizational "public relations function" and of the group's
39
access to the mass media.
In his study of postwar Italian trade unions Cavalii suggested
that in order to understand their organizational behaviour and develop¬
ment which one might expand to include communication behaviour
one should look at a number of variables "international conditions,
38. Alfred 0. Hero and Enil Starr, The Reuther-heany Foreign Policy
Dispute (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1970), pp. 22-24.
39. Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the
Political Process", American Political Science Hevieyj. 52 (1958),
270-82 (p. 274).
the economy and the (class structure), its leaders, oligarchies and
(opposition groups) ... who ... are in competition for control of the
40
masses".
All of these approaches are suggestive, but given what we have
learned about intra-organizational communication none seems to offer
more than a very partial explanation. A much more useful guide would
come from a combination of Harrod's analysis of the bases of trade
union foreign policy and the general statements about organization
and communication developed earlier. Harrod suggests five possible
incentives for a union to engage in international activities, the first
three of which coincide roughly with the three organizational concerns
of leaders noted above: goal attainment, organizational maintenance
41
and the distribution of power. Firstly, international activities
may stem from "direct international links with the welfare of union
members", through trade, migration and investment. Secondly, foreign
activities may be seen as a way of obtaining "prestige, acceptance or
power" for the organization, or of underlining the influence of rivals
and opponents. The prestige such activities bestow on the organization
may thus help to reinforce the members' pride in and commitment to it.
Thirdly, these "accessory functions" may be used for "internal political
40. Luciano Cavalli, "II sinaacato cone agente di mutamento", in
Hateriali sull'Italia in trasfonaazione. edited by Luciano
Cavalli (Bologna, 1973), pp. 11-44 (p. 11). My translation.
41. Jeffrey Harrod, Trade Union Foreign Policy (London, 1972), pp. 38-
54.
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and personal reasons". International activities may endow a leader
with prestige and increase the members' support for him.
•The fourth and fiftn incentives suggested by Harrod do not fit
as easily into the schema of the three principal leadership concerns,
particularly if we are dealing with a trade union which is but little
concerned with matters other than the core issues of the conditions of
the members' working lives. According to Harrod international
activity may be motivated by support for the nation and its foreign
policy and/or by a wish to promote or defend a political movement or
group ideology. To the extent that neither patriotism nor ideology
figure among an organization's main concerns , they are likely to be
less important in motivating action than the other three factors.
Even if they are deemed important organizational values, an active con¬
cern with them is likely to be considered a luxury in comparison with
the pursuit of the other three types of objective. Nevertheless, grave
crises and a sense that the pursuit of ideological and power goals will
somehow contribute to the attainment of other goals may make them
weightier incentives to international action. In these circumstances,
however, they are, strictly speaking, means not ends. In general the
fourth and fifth incentives are likely to act as inhibitors or catalysts
of action stemming from the first three considerations. Thus a union
may derive "tangible benefits and assistance in performing basic func¬
tions" if it supports the state's foreign policy. (It is evident how
this approach can subsume types of transactions in addition to those
mentioned earlier.) On the other hand, a socialist ideology may
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legitimate foreign actions stemming from other concerns, or may make
such actions more difficult,,
In any event, it is clear that, insofar as a union may engage
in a foreign policy of its own, references to that policy will appear in
upward and downward communications of the types listed by Eatz and Eahn,
messages about goal attainment, organizational maintenance and the
internal power distribution. These factors, however, need not lead to
action in order to produce the transmission of messages about inter¬
national affairs. If the international setting is linked directly with
the members' welfare, that setting may figure in messages involving
instructions and statements or explanations of policy, or as part of the
data transmitted to policy-makers in order to provide background for
their decisions. This general relevance is an important, but not
necessarily the only or even a necessary factor in the selection of
information about the outside world for transroission. If, for example,
a leader wants to justify, argue or persuade the rank and file to adopt
a specific policy, the selection of information will be governed also by
the extent to which this information supports his argument. In that
42
case, selection may involve conscious or unconscious distortion. The
link with the international setting thus need not he real or even per¬
ceived as real by the source; it is necessary only that it be possible
to represent it as real. Nor need the link with the international set¬
ting be direct : the external system may simply serve as a source of
42. Unconscious distortion may result from seeing what one wants or
hopes to see.
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parables, a resource for argumentation and a reservoir of examples and
models which can be used to support one policy or to attack another.
An organization may not be able to enhance its own prestige,
acceptance or power merely by its leaders making statements about
international affairs, but it might be able to undermine support for
rival groups. To this end the international setting may again be used
as a resource. For example, a splinter group may be attacked by
pointing to the harmful effects of the splintering of labour organi¬
zations in other countries. A group espousing certain policies may be
attacked by demonstrating the haiui caused by groups pursuing similar
policies abroad. Links and parallels of other kinds may be drawn
between rival groups in the United Kingdom and evil, harmful and
subversive elements elsewhere.
Such parallels and links may be drawn -when the rival is inside
the organization as well, that is when it is competing with the current
leadership for power within the union or is otherwise trying to change
or disrupt the lines of authority. The leader thus may try to undermine
support for the rival in order to protect the existing distribution of
power and/or his own position in it. On the other hand, if there is a
group within the organization which has international links and if the
leaders need that group's support, they may try to curry favour with it
by drawing flattering pictures of the foreign actor or grouping involved.
The international setting also may further the leaders' ambitions by
serving as a scapegoat; setbacks suffered by the organization can be
blamed on international factors in order to shift responsibility from
-30-
the leadership.
Support for the nation and ideological propaganda are unlikely to
be major conscious bases for statements about foreign affairs, though
they may well be important subconscious factors. This is especially true
insofar as they are not among the primary concerns of the leaders
acting in the organizational context. Moreover, it must be remembered
that the leaders do not have unlimited access to their members0
Maintaining and using a communication channel costs money, time and
effort, and these are subject to competing claims among both union
officials and the rank and file. Consequently, messages based on the
leaders main concerns are far more likely to figure prominently in
communication with the members. This does not mean that patriotism and
ideology can be ignored. They may be the subconscious basis for state¬
ments about the international setting, and they may also be the explicit
proximate cause of such statements when they can be used to advance the
other objectives.
2. Internal Consistency and Societal Conformity
.References to the international setting thus are likely to be
governed by how well they fit into and serve arguments and explanations
concerning the interests of the members, the union and the leaders.
Therefore, the image of the outside world that is projected may v/ell be
inconsistent and incoherent. One argument may he better supported by a
negative image of the United States, for example, while another may be
helped by a positive one. Patriotism and ideology, in these circum-
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stances, can constitute limiting factors. They may predispose the
leaders to take a favourable view of one country and an unfavourable
view of another. If a leader cannot say anything good (or bad) about
a country in whose favour (or against which) he is prejudiced, he iaay
say nothing about it at all. Or, given a variety of foreign models, he
may be drawn to one more than to the others. Ideological leanings and
support for the nation thus may impose a measure of consistency and
coherence on images which otherwise would be subject to the whims of
logical argument,
Students of the mass media have often remarked that despite the
multiplicity and apparent variety of sources of information in a
society, the images which these sources project tend to be rather
uniform, Rather than provide a variety of viewpoints and interpreta¬
tions of their society, different sources will merely reinforce and
confirm one another. This uniformity of the press may stem, inter alia,
from the "currency of common news values, or ... other processes of
standardisation", like the pervasive influence of the wire services, the
national media, the "upmarket" press and so on. Moreover,
given the dominance of the British press by a single set of
market imperatives, it is plausible that the convergence of the
press in defining the problems of society and finding remedies
has something to do with market forces as with inescapable
truths that all agree on,
43
the basic values of the society,
43, McQ.ua il, Review of Sociological Writing on the Press, p. 48,
Trade union leaders are members of a larger society and are
subject to many of the same processes and pressures as anyone else in
that society. They are, therefore, likely to share, to some degree at
least, in the prevailing social consensus. Perhaps more importantly,
the values, interests and concerns of the organization may well be a
particularized form of the societal ones. As we have seen, en organi¬
zation is a product, of its society and is in constant interaction with
it. The mere fact that an organization persists should indicate that it
is behaving according to criteria or that it stands for something at
least partly acceptable in the society. Messages from the leaders to
the rank and file may therefore reflect this consensus. This agreement,
consequently, may impose a measure of consistency on leadership communi¬
cation, not only between one message and another, but also between the
messages transmitted by the leaders and those sent by other sources,
like the political leadership.
The contents of messages may also be subject to certain '^market
forces". An organization, it must be remembered, competes for resources
with other groups and organizations, and the leaders may have to
compete with challengers to their position. In order to retain the
support of the members against other groups and leaders, or to obtain
the favour of those in control of some other resource, organisational
officials may adopt stances that they see are "selling" well. If it is
popular or worthwhile to say nice things about the USSR, they may there¬
fore say them. This can be another source of uniformity.
rz rz
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Finally, uniformity can be accidental and stem from the simple
convergence of interests and purposes between the organizational
sources and others in the society. They may propound the same views
for different reasons and thus come to project similar images. Such
convergence may well be based on a far more fundamental, if not so
readily evident, community of values and interests between the organi¬
zation and the society. Nevertheless, arguments based on purely
particularistic premises may lead to agreement with policies derived
from very different concerns.
D. SUIviliART id© CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have explored in very general terms the
relationship between the contents of messages from organizational
leaders tc members, on the one hand, and the internal (intracrganization-
al) and external (extraorganizational) settings, on the other. In the
following chapters we shall examine the contents of real eommunications
in a real organization. The foregoing discussion will guide us in the
attempt,
We shall look at the factors of the communicaticn process deemed
to shape the contents of the message -— the source, channel, receiver
and purpose and see to what extent these contents actually were
governed by the purposes, concerns, needs and structures of the AHJ in
the years 1945 tc 1951, To understand this relationship, we must
understand what the purposes, concerns, needs and structures of the A5U
were in those years. "We shall have to consider to what extent they
were determined by the incumbents of high organizational office at the
time or were the result of the Union's historical development and of
responses to changes in the external setting. The preceding discussion
would lead one to expect that organizational variables were rather more
important than idiosyncratic ones. We shall also try to determine the
relative importance of ideological, patriotic and other concerns in the
activities of the Union and the leadership.
In locking at the bases and reasons for the contents of the
messages, we shall also look at the bases and reasons for their internal
consistency and societal conformity or for the absence of these traits.
In order to provide a basis for determining the extent of any conformity,
Chapter II will summarize the development of the policies of the Labour
Governments and Party during this period. We shall examine to what
extent this conformity was based on a community or convergence of
interests or on some manner of exchange. Chanter II will serve also as
an outline of the external setting in which the APU had to operate and
with which it had to contend, and will help us to avoid too many
digressions later.
Chapters III and 17 will examine the internal setting of communi¬
cation. They will look at the ends, means, division of labour and
distribution of power in the organization to see how they developed and
how the Union adapted to changes in the external setting. They will
examine the role of the communication process in the organization; how
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end to what ends certain channels of comrnunication from the leadership
to the rank and file were used. Finally, Chapters V and 71 vri.il
explore the messages about international affairs that were transmitted




EXTERNAL SETTINGS: THE CONTEXT OE ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION AND THE BASES
OF GOTEHNMENTAL POLICY
In this chapter we shall examine economic, social and political
developments in Britain the years 1945 to 1951 „ This will help to
provide a basis for determining the extent of community or convergence
of interests between the A5U leadership and the labour Government ana
will also help to establish the wider context in which the Union
operated. The interaction between the organization and its setting
will be studied later0 Here we are more concerned with setting the
1
scene.
The policies of Britain's Governments in the early postwar
period were marked most strongly by a concern for reconstruction and
restoration both at home and abroad. The Labour Party had come to
power in the summer of 1945 pledged to extend and expand the social
services, to take into public ownership a number of Britain's basic,
troubled and/or failed industries and to maintain high levels of employ¬
ment, While it set about fulfilling these problems, however, there
were a number of other problems it had to resolve,
1, I am indebted to Andrew Glyn and his colleagues at the Oxford
University Institute of Economics and Statistics for allowing
me to 3&e some of their unpublished material on the period of
reconstruction. This material was extremely valuable in helping
me reach an understanding of the period.
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Britsin emerged from the war battered and bruised but in far
better condition than much of the rest of the world, certainly better
than most of its continental neighbours which had served as battle¬
fields for foreign amies. In fact, although civilian casualties were
far higher than they had been during the 1914-1918 war, deaths among
the troops were much lower. Small comfort though this may have been to
the bereaved, Britain was at least spared decimation of its manpower
and distortion of the structure of its population. Physical damage,
2
especially to housing, was high. Furthermore, housing and industrial
plant suffered from neglect; the diversion of men, money and material
to other more urgent needs during the war meant that there was a lot to
3
be replaced and refurbished.
For an industrial power, Britain was notably poor in natural
resources, with the exception of coal and people. It had always
imported raw materials of all kinds, and, as the population grew, it-
required more and more food to be supplied from abroad. These imports
were paid for only partly by the exports of British manufactures.
Trade slumps and exclusion from foreign markets by protectionist
2, For casualties and physical damage in western Europe, see Georges
Dupeux, "la reconstruction de 1'Europe occiderrtale", in Histoire
economique et sociaie du monde, Tome V, Guerres et crises, 1914-
1S47. edited by Georges Dupeux (Paris, 1977), pp. 509-31 (pp. 510-
516) .
3. See ft.G. Hawtrey, The 3alance of Payments and the Standard of Living
(London, 1350), pp. 34-36. See also C.H. Feinstein, Statistical
Tables of National Income. Expenditure and Output of the U.K.,
1855-1965 (Cambridge, 1972), T86, T89, especially the figures for
gross domestic fixed capital formation for 1938-1945.
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governments aggravated the difficulties faced in trying to compete
with the later industrial developers, principally Germany, the United
States and Japan; but British goods fared little better as compared
with foreign products even when world trade was bouyant. This was due,
in part, to an overvalued currency and to the nature of the overseas
markets that Britain had access to. It derived, also, from the very
basic relative inefficiency of British industry. Some of the older,
traditional main industries, such as coal and shipbuilding, were most
vulnerable, but even the newer sectors automobiles, electrical
4
goods and chemicals tended to lag behind their foreign competitors.
During the war exports were cut back sharply as resources were
diverted to the war effort. After the war world trade was severely
hampered by the disruption everywhere of transportation and
production. Such trade as could take place after the liberation of the
Continent often placed Britain in the position of having to sell its
goods to countries which had nothing to sell or whose goods and
currencies the British neither wanted nor needed. On the other hand,
the countries producing what Britain did need, chiefly the US and other
American countries, neither -wanted nor needed much of what Britain (or
5
most of the other European states) had to offer,
4, P.D, Henderson, "Britain's International Position", in The British
Economy. 1945-1350. edited by G.D.N. Worsvjick and P. E. Ady
(Oxford, 1952), pp. 62-71 (p. 63). See also H.S. Booker, The
Problem of Britain's Overseas Trade (London, 1948), pp. 37-48.
5, On one aspect of this problem, see Hawtrey, pp. 47-49. See too
M Ji. Fitzsimons, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Govern¬
ment, 1945-1951 (Notre Dams, Indiana, 1953), pp. 92-93.
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Uxrtil the 1930s Britain had usually been able to make up its
deficit on visible trade through the sale of services, like banking,
insurance and shipping, and through the income from overseas invest¬
ments. For most of the decade before the war, however, as the world
foundered in depression, even these sectors could not cover the cost
6
of foreign spending. The war aggravated this problem too, as it had
that of trade. Ships were sunk and the service industries disrupted.
Over £1000 million worth of British investments abroad were sold to
obtain the foreign currency to buy needed supplies; the income was now
gone forever. Nearly £3000 million was run up in new overseas liabili¬
ties, mainly in the Sterling Area, as supplies for troops stationed
there and for the home market were bought and payment, in effect, was
deferred. In 1945 Britain's net foreign non-trade income was
7
estimated to be a paltry £97 million.
Another economic problem that Britain faced at the end of the
war was how to avoid inflation. Earnings and profits had accumulated
during the war years when there had been little to spend them on.
If the flow of this money into the market were not checked, it would
drive up the prices of goods of all kinds, thus affecting the com¬
petitiveness of exports and the standard of living of the people,
8
divert production from the export market and suck in imports too.
6. See Feinstein, T82.
7. Statistical Material Presented During the Washington Negotiations.
Grand. 6707 (HNS0, 1945).
8. The policy-makers' understanding of the inflation problem is
discussed by C.A.R. Crosland, Britain's Economic Problem (London,
1953), especially pp. 11-12,
In short, when it came to power in 1945, the Attlee Government
faced economic problems exacerbated by the war but from which the
country, or parts of it, had suffered throughout the interwar period.
It is not clear, however, that the Government was aware of the two
aspects of the question. In practice it stressed the effects of the
war and embarked on policies at home and abroad which gave priority
to paying for essential exports and to developing the capacity to con¬
tinue to do so in the longer tern. This next section will deal first
with home policy.
Since income from invisible exports was low and was likely to
remain low for some time to come, it was considered that visible
trade would have to bear the lion's share of the burden; as high a
proportion as possible of the nation's manufactures would have to be
exported. The priority given to exports was intended not only to
cover the short-term balance of payments deficits but also to
recapture markets which had been lost or which had contracted during
the war, so that the UK might- continue to pay its own way. It was
estimated that, to fulfil these objectives, exports would have to
surpass their prewar level by 75 per cent, even assuming stable import:
prices. To achieve this, not only the proportion of manufactures
exported but the total volume of production would have to be expanded.
Investment would have to be geared to this end, but increased production
would have to be sought mainly through more efficient use of existing
plant and, in particular, through higher labour productivity. Again,
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this was seen to have long-term benefits in ensuring continued com¬
petitiveness.,
The priority given to export meant that limitations would have
to be imposed in other spheres. The re-equipment of industry would
have to be limited or at least directed so that investment was concen¬
trated in exporting industries. Disturbances to the balance of payments,
as in 1947 and 1949, would lead to even greater restrictions on invest¬
ment. Consumption would have to take a place even further down the
queue. The restraint of investment and consumption, of course, was
also consistent with the Government's anti-inflation policy.
The mechanisms for achieving these aims were, at first, mainly
direct controls and later, increasingly, fiscal measures. Most of the
controls were retained, from the war years. Some, like the direction
of manpower were dropped quickly. Construction, imports, exports,
raw materials, the production and distribution of consumer goods,
currency transactions and so on were all subject to varying degrees
of control and decontrol through direction, licensing, allocation and
rationing systems.
The Government was fairly successful in achieving its ends.
9
Manufacturing and industrial output in general increased rapidly,
10
while employment in these sectors rose far more slowly. There was
9. Dudley Seers, "National Income, Production and Consumption", in
Worswick and Ady, pp. 35-61 (p. 38).
10. G.D.N. Worswick, "The British Economy, 1945-50", in Worswick and
Ady, pp. 1-34 (p. 3); Seers, p. 38.
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thus a clear trend towards higher productivity. Exports climbed in
volume to levels much higher than they had been before the war, 'while
11
imports did not surpass their prev/ar volume until 1954. Prices too
12
were kept under control as investment and consumer spending rose
13
only slowly after a sharp increase during 1S45. When, from mid-1947,
the Government began to present as the major inflationary factor not
the by-now largely dissipated pent-up demand of wartime but the wage
demands of workers under conditions of full employment, they had little
difficulty in obtaining trade union support for a policy of wage
restraint. It was not until 1950 that ollaboration in this matter
14
broke down.
In large measure the Labour Government's success in its policies
was due to a national and international setting that was in some ways
net. only less hostile than it first seemed but was even positively
congenial. One factor has already been mentioned the willingness
of the trade unions to cooperate„ Cooperation was made easier by the
formal and informal links between the Labour Party and most of the
trade unions. Another factor, however, was that even into 1947 the
potentially disruptive communist elements among the workers were among
the most active in pressing for collaboration with the Government's
11. See Roy Harrod, The British Economy (Hew York, .1953), p. 31,
12. See Feinstein, T140; Dupeux, pp. 519- 22.
.13, See Feinstein, T22, T89-90.
14. From 1946 to 1950 average weekly wage rsis3 rose by only 14$ while
wage earnings rose by only 28$. In 1951 alone they rose by some
7.75$ and almost 10$ respectively; Feinstein, T140.
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axport and production drives. Worker and union collaboration, no
doubt, were further facilitated by the Government*s nationalization,
full-employment and social welfare policies. Success in limiting
unemployment was particularly marked as, to the surprise of many,
the switchover from war to peace production turned out to be rapid
and smooth. Demobilized troops, who could look for work while still
officially in the armed forces, quickly found jobs, since there was a
15
shortage of workers in certain sectors. Thus, full employment was
maintained,
While these policies may have had a particular appeal for the
unionized working class they were not really a challenge to the national,
16
or perhaps more correctly, the national elite, consensus. It was
not only that Labour's policies were largely unexceptionable; so too
was the way they were carried out. The national social services, for
instance, had been abuilding since before the First World War. Their
further development, as well as the maintenance of full employment, was
(despite differing definitions of what these might actually entail)
accepted by all parties during the war. Nor did nationalization give
rise to great opposition until the latter part of the period. This
was due partly to the "troubled" nature of the firms nationalized, to
the generosity of the payments to the shareholders and, perhaps, too,
15. Llinistry of Labour and National Service, Report for the Years
1939-1945, Cmnd. 7225 (HUSO, 1947), pp. 147, 130.
16. On the development of this consensus see Paul Addison, The Road
to 1945 (London, 1975.
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to the fact that no significant changes were made in management
17
methods: nationalization did not mean workers' control. The main
difficulties in nationalization, and the principal opposition, arose
in connection with those industries road haulage and iron and
steel which were not "troubled" to the same extent. Indeed, in
the case of the latter, sections of the Labour Party leadership itself
18
grew increasingly doubtful of the value of nationalization.
Nor did the Government believe strongly in anything more than
so-called "democratic planning", which amounted to little effective
19
national planning at all. Direct controls were retained after the
war, but they were not considered to be a permanent feature of British
life, leather, they were a means of helping the United Kingdom through
80
the heavy seas of the transition to a peacetime economy. The
conception of democratic planning stressed cooperation rather than
21
control, a point reflected in the very administration of the system
of controls. Especially in the beginning, they were run by representa-
22
tives of the firms they were intended to regulate. Indeed the
17. Compare Halph lliliband, Parliamentary Socialism (London, 1961),
pp. 278-90.
18. Henry Pelling, A Short- History of the Labour Party (London, 1968),
p. 97; Liliband, pp. 500-301.
19. D.N. Chester, "Machinery of Government and Planning", in Worswick
and Ady, pp. 336-64 (especially p. 360). Compare Kiliband,
pp. 290-91.
20. G.D.N. 7/orswick, "Direct Controls", in Worswick and Ady, pp. 278-
312 (p. 282).
21. See A .A. Hogow, The Labour Government and British Industry. 1945-
1951 (Oxford, 1955), p. 44.
22. Hogow, pp. 61-53. Compare Killband, p. 290.
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invoivement of interested groups in the formulation and administration
23
of policies was one of the hallmarks of Labour rule. Direct controls
were, moreover, relaxed, tightened ana dropped in response to changes in
specific aspects of the domestic and international market and of poli¬
tical needs, rather than in accordance with some coherent national
programme. There seems to have been little resistance in principle
24
on the part of the Government to the eventual abolition of the system.
The direction of manpower, so abhorrent to the trade unions, was one
of the first to go, while most of the others followed as soon as
circumstances seemed to permit or demand it. From 1947 on, greater
stress was laid on fiscal policy as a means of guiding the economy.
There was much, too, that was unexceptionable in labour's policy
with regard to the financial sector. The only bank nationalized was the
Bank of England, and, again, the pre-nationalization Governor retained
his office and the Rank itself much of its independence. The cheap
money policy maintained by labour "ensured a big expansion of bank
25
deposits, and thus additional earning assets for the banking system".
Despite some aspects of the policy which the banks disliked, one
analyst could sum up the period in the following terms :
23o See, for example, Samuel H. Beer, fcodern British Politics
(London, 1965), pp. 164-73.
24, Worswiok, "Direct Controls".
25. C.h. Ward-Perkins, "Banking Developments", in Worswick and Ady,
pp. 276-312 (p. 282).
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In retrospect there appears to be 110 very spectacular
development to record either in the field of banking organiza¬
tion or of banking practice that has occurred during the past
sir years. Seldom has the financial machine, and the banking
part of it in particular, operated with so little general
criticism as during Britain's first majority Labour
Government .... (26)
As for the City's international role, Government policy, at the
very 3east, cannot be said to have imposed a serious impediment to it.
Indeed, the discount market, which was "one of the features that (made)
London, despite all the weaknesses of the (preceding) thirty years,
an attractive international banking centre", was officially encouraged
27
and supported. The retention, maintenance and encouragement of
sterling as an international currency, particularly by its institu¬
tionalization in this role during and after the war in the Sterling
Area, also helped conserve the City's international functions,
28
though this may not have been the Government's primary intention.
The export of private capital within the Sterling Area was not greatly
29
hampered either; the petroleum industry and the petroleum-
producing states seem to have been the main beneficiaries of such
transfers, which were at least partly financed by the City.
SO
Investment in other raw materials was apparently less important.
26. Ward-Perkins, p. 208.
27. Ward-Perkins, p. 216.
28. Susan Strange, Sterling, and British Policy (London, 1271), pp.
60-61, 64.
£9. J.R. Sargent, "Britain and the Sterling Area", in Worswick and
Ady, pp. 531-49 (pp. 556-57).
30. See Committee on the Working of the- Monetary System, Linutes
of Evidence (HUSO, I960), Appendix, p. 952.
-47-
Labour's policy, thus, was essentially one of reform and
restoration, a policy which sought to avoid end, indeed, if it
was to succeed, bad to avoid driving any of the main veto groups
in the society into active opposition. The attainment of the produc¬
tion and export goals would have been difficult if not impossible to
31
achieve without- relatively peaceful industrial relations and a
willingness to limit restrictive practices. The operation of the
system of controls probably would not have been so smooth had the
representatives of the trade associations not been willing to help put
them ir.tc effect. Illegal transfers of capital overseas, generally
32
in order to evade taxation, were indeed high, if one accepts the
33
estimates of £200 million for the four years 1946 to 1949, but
they hardly amounted to a full-scale- flight of capital, lioreover,
while domestic industrial investment may well have been inadequate,
the blame could net be laid on the financial institutions, which,
albeit reluctantly at times, were willing to provide the funds for
34
home investment.
Insofar as there was domestic opposition to labour's policies,
it stemmed, on the right, from opposition to specific policies like
road-haulage and iron and steel nationalization, and sometimes, too,
from rather restricted publics, like the B&A'e opposition to the
31. Working days lost through industrial disputes in 1946-1950 were a
mere fraction of those lest in 1919-1925, the corresponding
years following the First World War; Allen Flanders, "Industrial
Relations", in Worswick and Ady, pp. 101-24 (p. 119).
32. Rogow, pp. 120-24,
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National Health Service. Bather more consistent opposition seems
to have come from the left within the Party. From their standpoint,
the generally unexceptionable nature of the Government1s programme was
thoroughly objectionable. On the whole, however, "the Labour Left
between 194b and 1S50 was vociferous, but largely unorganized and un-
35
successful." Nowhere is the Left's weakness more clearly demonstrated
than in the victory of the "consolidationists" in the elaboration
of Labour's new programme for the next election. Socialism and
nationalisation were played down. Instead, the Labour Government would
be pledged to consolidate the gains already made. In terms of
nationalization, this meant making those fims already nationalized
r* n
oo
work well and efficiently rather than extending the system further.
A domestic setting congenial to Government policy was complemented
by an international setting which was, in some respects, also compatible
with the attainment of Britain's limited goals of recovery. Exports
could expand quickly in part because, for much of the period, the "OH
benefitted from a sellers' market. The massive demand for manufactures
33. Thomas Balogh, The Dollar Crisis, cited by Rogow, p. 121.
34. Ward-Perkins, pp. 222-23.
35. David Rubinstein, "Socialism and the Labour Party: The Labour
Left and Domestic Policy, 1945-1950", in Ideology and the labour
Lovement: Essays Presented to John Savllle, edited by David E.
Lartin and David Rubinstein (London, 197S), pp. 226-57 (p. 235).
56. Eatwell, pp. 119-23.
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cf a world attempting economic reconstruction while the productive
capacity of Japan, Germany and much of Europe was out of action made
British sales easier than they had been for a long time. The Sterling
Area too provided the UK with what became more and more a captive
market, or at least one willing to limit its purchases from third
57
countries. Although the members of the Area refused to scale down
58
Britain's debts to them, some of them did limit the "amount and
59
speed of their withdrawals from the sterling balances". In effect,
they limited the speed of their reconstruction and development to the
rate at which Britain could increase its capacity to export production
40
(and capital) to them. To some extent they had no alternative.
When an alternative did present itself, hov/ever, they proved eager to
take it, until it became evident, that its side-effects might be even
worse for them than their original course of action.
The alternative presented itself in relation to the external
aspect of the Government's recovery policy. During the war Whitehall
had realized that some time would necessarily elapse before exports
were high enough to pull the balance of payments on current account
into the black, ldeanwhile, 3ritain would still have to import food
and raw materials. To solve this short-term difficulty, the British
57. Strange, pp. 62-64.
58. Joseph Erankel, 3ritish Foreign Policy, 1945-1975 (london, 1975),
pp. 182-85.
59. Strange, p. 20.
40. Strange, p. 69.
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turned to their wealthy American ally, the country best able to supply
the goods and currency that Britain needed, and asked for a grant of
41
$6000 million. The Truman administration agreed to a loan of $3750
million, and Congress approved it the following summer. Canada added
another #1250 million to the kitty. While less than the British had
in mind, the problem might have ended there but for a few other factors.
One of these was that the US had attached a number of strings to its
loan. Of particular importance was a British promise to make sterling
fully convertible for current transactions during the summer of 1947.
When sterling was accordingly freed, the sterling balance holders fell
over themselves in their rush to exchange their pounds for dollars
which, among other things, would buy the goods they needed for their
42
reconstruction more quickly th an Britain could produce them.
However rapid the growth in British production, it was, in relation to
the country's liabilities and needs, still inadequate. However
successful the country was in attaining the objectives set by Govern¬
ment policy, higher attainments and more far-reaching policies were
required than could be reconciled with the Government's manifest desire
not to alienate any of the major interests in industry, commerce and
finance.
In any event, the fright of the convertibility rush led the UK
and the Sterling Area to coordinate their policies even more closely.
41. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The limits of Power (New York, 2972),
p. 65.
42. Hawtrey, pp. 92-100.
A further closing of the sterling ranks occurred in 1949 when
increasing pressures were exerted, particularly from the USA, for a
45
devaluation of the pound. The result was a temporary strengthening
of Britain's protected market.
Another reason for the speed with which the American loan ran out
was that, by 1947, the terms of trade had begun to turn against the UK.
In the 1930s, when demand was low, the global productive capacity of
44
food and raw materials had declined. The destruction of war, the
dislocations and natural disasters of the immediate postwar years,
together with the upsurge in demand frora all countries and inflation in
45
the United States, drove prices for Britain's imports steadily higher.
To some extent, the UK had to increase the volume of exports simply in
order to buy the same volume of imports.
International political difficulties tended on the whole to
exacerbate the United Kingdom's economic difficulties. The increasing
tension and antagonism between the Soviet Union and the west was
46
especially harmful. The division of Europe cut Britain off from some
45. Strange, p. 62.
44. T. Balogh, "The International Aspect", in Worswick and Ady,
pp. 476-510 (p. 496).
45. The ratio of export to import prices declined fairly
consistently from 1946 to 1951, and rose again only in 1952;
Feinstein, T64.
46. Paradoxically, it was also the heightened tension that smoothed the
allocation of economic aid by the TJS Administration and Congress
for Britain and Europe; Thomas Balogh, The Dollar Crisis (Oxford,
1949), pp. 19, 72-73; Kolko and Kolko, pp. 65-69; Daniel Yergin,
Shattered Peace (London, 1978), pp. 177-78.
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of its prewar sources of raw materials and markets for its manufactures.
Britain's dependence on the dollar markets was thus intensified, as
47
was that of the other European countries similarly deprived. This
heightened dependence meant in turn heightened vulnerability to the
vagaries of the American economy in its periodic bouts of inflation
and recession, though hardly to the extent feared by observers at the
tine. Increased discrimination by the Sterling Area and western
European states against trade with the dollar countries provided only
partial protection.
Britain emerged from the war victorious, a major partner in the
anti-German alliance, crowned with the prestige of having escaped
occupation and having been the only country continuously at war with
Germany from the invasion of Poland to the capitulation. It was still
a great and imperial power with all the economic, political and
military overseas commitments that entailed. Some commitments, like
those in the colonies, were inherited from before the war; some, in
Greece and the Dutch East Indies for instance, fell to the UK during
48
and immediately after the fighting. Cuts were made, however.
In the spring of 1947, Britain turned over to the United States
the cost of defending and maintaining the right-wing Greek regime
47. J.B. Sargent, "Britain and Europe", in Worswick and Ady, pp. 511-
30 (p. 512); Balogh, The Dollar Crisis, p. 48n; Thomas G.
T&terson, "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and
Congress", Diplomatic History, 3 (1979), 1-18 (pp. 3-4).
48. Balogh, "The International Aspect", p. 479.
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against its leftist opponents and of supporting Turkey against Soviet
pressures. In 1948, after losing £100 million ana the lives of 300
of its citizens since the end of the war and having failed to obtain
American endorsement for the imposition of an anti-zionist solution,
49
the British finally withdrew from Palestine. Further relief to the
Exchequer came when India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon were granted
independence in 1947 and 1948.
There were, however, limits to the retrenchment Britain might
undertake. For while much of the rest of the "world wallovred in uncer-
50
tainty, the British leadership tended, despite (or perhaps because of)
51
the country's economic problems to accept Britain's global role.
Differences seem to have revolved more about the interpretation of the
52
part than its essentially global character.
The Foreign Secretary through most of this period, Ernest Bevin,
was well aware of Britain's postwar weakness but considered it unadvisa-
ble that, in the short run at least, this -weakness be translated into
55
any display of lack of resolve. The obvious question is: Hesolve in
the face of what? The primary threat perceived by the British leaders
49. F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power (London, 1974), p. 121.
50. See Frankel, pp. 258-59; compare Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin,
Port-rait of a Great Englishman (London, 1952), pp. 250-51.
51. Frankel, p. 11; Northedge, Freedom and Necessity...; of course,
there were doubters too: Frankel, pp. 160-62.
52. For example, for some this meant leading a Third Force; Avi Shlaim,
Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries Since
1945 (Newton Abbott, 1977), p. 42.
55. Williams, pp. 248-51.
was that nosed by an expansionist Soviet Union ana communist movement,
54
particularly in western Europe, At the same time there was a strong
and expansionist United States to contend with, especially in western
55
Asia, In Asia, which was of continuing commercial and financial as
56
well as strategic importance to the United Kingdom, there were also
local antagonisms and local nationalist and/or communist movements
challenging British interests.
Bevin may well have been sincere in his attempts to reach an
57
accommodation with the Soviet Union; he did not take any chances,
however. America's demobilization and withdrawal from all but its
occupation functions in central and western Europe meant that a Soviet
military offensive or communist insurgency on the Greek model could not
be fended off. Britain was concerned to keep its first line of defence
as far east as possible, and so, first with France and then with France,
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, it entered into military alli¬
ances. Obviously, even these combined forces were an inadequate defence
against any projected Soviet advance. It is true that two world wars
had shown that sending a British expeditionary force after war had
58
already broken out was no answer to an invasion. However, even given
the damage suffered by the USSR and the Red Aimy, the permanent station-
54. Williams, pp. 252-55; Northedge, Descent..., p. 95; Shlaim et al.,
pp. 39-41.
55. Kolko and Kolko, pp. 59-60.
56. See Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, Appendix,
p. 952; "Who Holds the Sterling Balances?", The Banker. 94 (195C),
93-97 (pp. 95-96).
57. Williams, p. 265; Frankel, p. 197.
58. Frankel, p. 294.
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ing of British troops was not an answer either, unless the UK was
willing to CQniw.it the bulk of its armed forces to European defence.
Among a number of other factors, Britain's main objective when
it set about organizing its continental neighbours in political and
military alliances was to draw the Americans into assuming an active
role in western European defence, as far as possible on Britain's terms.
The reasoning of the British policy-makers seems to have followed the
lines indicated below, though it was doubtless less calculating than
this summary would lead one to think.
On one level the intended audience for Bevin's ploys was not so
59
much Truman and his Administration as the US Congress. One of the
arguments used by American representatives when dealing with foreign
suppliants was that, whatever the Administration's own views on the
subject, "public opinion" or "congressional opposition" made it hard
for the United States to accede to their requests. Sometimes it was
added that a change in certain policies or the adoption of certain
courses of action by the suitor might make it easier to get public and
congressional approval. This was one of the arguments used in 1947, for
example, in the "attempt to persuade the British to join a European
60
economic plan".
59. Thus, according to one account., the Administration had expressed
its willingness to assume at least some of the burden of support¬
ing the regime in Athens as early as the summer of 1945; Kolko
and Kolko, pp. 222-23.
60. Peterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy p. 10.
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There was a tendency to stress that the American public and its
representatives in Congress would be most likely to help those who
helped themselves« In the case of Europe, political and economic
unification was considered one of the best indicators of self-help.
The United Kingdom, though opposed to unification, was willing to accept
cooperation and organization. The themes of organization for the
fulfilment of common aims and of self-help recurred frequently on the
61
American side. In London the self-help theme tended to receive
greater emphasis. In his speech at Harvard in June 1947, Secretary of
State Marshall had said: "The initiative must come from Europe....
When European countries have agreed on their requirements and on the
part they themselves will play, then and only then can the United States
62
take supporting action." In response, Ernest Bevin set about
organizing the western Europeans for the distribution of American aid.
65
In this case there were clear benefits to be reaped, and the actual
extent of collaboration could be kept to a minimum. In other case3 the
British commitment had to assume a much more concrete form and the costs
were rather more obvious„
61. See, for example, the Vandenberg Resolution passed by the US Senate
in June 1948; in US Senate, A Decade of American Foreign Policy :
Basic Documents. 1941-1949 (Washington, 1950), p. 197. See too
the statement by Dean Acheson of 8 April 1949, Keesing's Contem¬
porary Archives. 7 (21-28 May 1949), 10009.
62. Quoted by Williams, p. 264.
63. See Pierre Leon, "La mutation de 1'Europe", in Histoire economique
et sociale du monde, Tome VI, Le second XXe siecle: 1947 a nos
jours, edited by Pierre Leon (Paris, 1977), pp. 246-75 (p. £45).
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In the spring of 1348 Britain signed the Brussels Treaty for
joint defence with France and the Benelux countries, Bevin is reported
to have called the alliance a "sprat to catch a mackerel", namely an
American commitment. In his attempts to "arouse congressional sympathy",
64
moreover, he stressed "the 'self-help' element" in the Western Union.
The mackerel was hooked in April 1349 when the United States joined the
Brussels Pact states and six other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Europeans then forwarded to Washington a formal request for aid.
As Prime Minister Attlee put it, they "have had under consideration
their cammon defence programme, and have drawn up a request to the U.S.
65
Government for assistance in carrying out this programme". Towards
the end of the year, Congress passed the Mutual Defence Act, authorizing
the provision of military aid to the European allies in the form of
66
equipment, money and advisors.
The theme of self-help might have remained mere lip-service had
its functions been only to help US policy-makers justify themselves to
each other and to the electorate. A number of factors, however, com¬
bined to give substance to the self-help policy in the field of defence.
One was the heightening of international tension. In the autumn of 1S48,
64. Shlaim et_ al., p. 48. Compare Geoffrey Gooavjin, "British Foreign
Policy since 1945: The Long Odyssey to Europe", in Constraints
and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy, edited by Michael
Liefer (London, 1972), pp. 35-52.(p. 38).
65. Prime Minister's written reply, House of Commons Debates, volume
463. column 213, 8 April 1949.
66. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 7 (7-14 April 1950), 10446-49.
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in the midst of the Berlin crisis, for example, the Government intro-
67
ducel a number of measures to strengthen the armed forces.
Moreover, -while the Americans might grudgingly accept a charade in
relation to economic union, they were far less tolerant in matters of
defence. So, during the Korean War, the US exerted direct pressure on
68
the UK to expand its rearmament programme.
A third factor was the Government's concern that Washington take
British ideas and interests into consideration and not take London's
support for granted. In the autumn of 1945 Bevin had complained to his
Cabinet colleagues that neither the Americans nor the Soviets were pay¬
ing due regard to Britain's views and needs during the Council of
69
Foreign Ministers negotiations then in progress. The following
70
summer he described the Americans as "bomb-minded". In general, the
British were suspicious of American enthusiasms, instability and
inexperience and feared the consequences to themselves if American
71
policy were not channelled and guided in the right direction. There
were, furthermore, various British economic interests to be protected
from the United States' agressive capitalists. Finally, Britain's
67. That, at least, was how the Government justified the measures.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 7 (£5 September- 2 October 1948),
9527-9528.
68. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Atlantic Alliance: NATO's
Role in the Free World (London, 1952), p. 7; Michael R. Gordon,
Conflict and Consensus in labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965
(Stanford, 1969), p. 227.
69. Yergin, p. 131.
70. Yergin, p. 231.
71. Shlaim et al., p. 46.
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traditional global role and status had to be recognized.
Although Britain's military and defence programmes were based
on a number of complex and shifting factors, certain common elements
run through them. The course of British policy showed that the UK was
not merely one of several European countries worthy of US assistance but
the first among the worthies and, therefore, an object of special
consideration. Government policy also aimed to show the UK capable of,
or determined to be capable of, independent action. From this stand¬
point it was important that London be seen to be the organizer of the
neighbouring European states for the distribution of Marshall Aid and
for defence; that the scale of its self-help defence programme mark
it off from the others and leave no doubt as to the importance of its
72
contribution to the common effort; that it further demonstrate its
capacity for taking independent action by protecting its own interests
and advancing its own policies, even though they might conflict with
73
America's outside Europe. Britain was to be recognized as a special
European power and an especially useful one; it was also a world
power and one which even its principal ally and protector could not take
completely for granted. Their relationship, too, would have to be
special.
Similar considerations apparently were operative in the secret
72. For the relative defence contributions of the UK, the US and France
see Frankel, pp. 82-35.
73. See below, pp. 62-64.
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decision of January 1947 by a small group of Cabinet ministers that
Britain build its own atomic- bomb. To some extent, this decision was
merely a confirmation of the assumption held by almost everyone
involved in the atomic programme even before war's end that the United
74
Kingdom would have a bomb of its own. This does not mean that the
75
policy was not carefully considered and deliberate.
The current level of international tension was not an important
factor in the decision; no potential enemy was expected to have the
bomb before five years were out, when the UK's own bomb would be ready.
The decision derived from some of the same factors which determined
Britain's general foreign and defence policy, but with some differences.
Glowing notes that it was in many ways due to "fundamentalist and almost
instinctive" factors:
a feeling that Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in
order to deter an atomically armed enemy, a feeling that Britain
as a great power must acquire all major new weapons, a feeling
that atomic weapons were a rsnifestation of the scientific and
technological superiority on which Britain's strength, so
deficient if measured in terms of sheer numbers of men, must
depend.....
The decision was also a symbol of independence ....
American (hostility to an independent British programme)
hardened Britain's resolution not to be bullied out of business
and not to acquiesce in an American monopoly; it encouraged her
to be a nuclear power for the sake of the influence this was
expected to give her in Washington. (76)
The commitments entailed in sustaining Britain's desired inter¬
national role, however, were costly and required continual outlays of
74. Gowing, pp. 16G-79.
75. Gowing, p. 179.
76. Gowing, p. 183.
cash and wore. National Service legislation was passed in 1347,
and in 1948 the rundown of manpower in the armed forces was slowed down.
A general rearmament programme was introduced in the same year.
National Service and the stationing of troops in Europe had costs not
only in terms of sterling and foreign currency reserves but in the
diversion of skilled manpower from industry. In 1948 the "steel
requirements of the (atomic) programme were involving heavy diversion
77
from other vital and more immediate uses". The rearmament programme
assumed massive proportions after war broke out in Korea in the summer
of 1950 and called for vast expenditures £4,700 million for 1951-
1954. Rearmament increased the demand for raw materials, which were also
being sought by other countries, particularly the United States, for
stockpiling and for current arms production. Raw material prices
skyrocketed.
Rearmament also diverted production from the export markets;
the metal-working industries, which accounted for about 40 per cent of
the country's exports, were also those that had to contribute most to
the defence programme. Home industrial development, which earlier had
to take second place to exports, now had to take its place behind
rearmament as well. There was a reordering of priorities in state
spending, leading to cuts in the social services and particularly to the
78
imposition of prescription charges in the National Health Service.
77. (kwing, p. 224.
78. Northedge, Descent ..., pp. 278-79.
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The balance of payments, which had so painstakingly been brought into
79
surplus, plunged into deficit. American aid under the Mutual
80
Defence Act and later through "counterpart funds" was a help but not
a solution. Moreover, from January 1951, despite fears about the impact
of the war that had broken out the previous summer, the British Govern-
81
ment took no more Marshall Aid.
Britain's imperial and political commitments outside the North
Atlantic area imposed further strains on its economy. Independence had
been granted India for a number of reasons: one was the awesome cost
of any attempt to hold on to the area in the face of growing local
opposition. Another was the Labour leadership's belief in the justice
of the nationalist cause and labour's long association with the Indian
82
national movement. Furthermore, there was a belief that Britain's
interests in the region could be protected and advanced by building a
relationship on a new basis, without having to resort to military
83
occupation.
This belief in the possibility of recasting relations in a new non-
military mould did not extend, however, to Britain's relations with the
liliddle East or with East and Southeast Asia, even though the defence of
these areas from an external threat depended largely on a British
84
presence in India and on the Indian Army. The U1I continued to
73. See Feinstein, T82-85.
80. Northedge, Descent.... pp. 278-79.
81. Labour Party, Report of the 50th Annual Conference, 1951, pp. 62-63.
82. Georges Fischer, Le parti travailliste et la decolonisation de
l'Inde (Paris, 1966).
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maintain troops at both ends of Asia, and indeed reinforcements were
sent to Malaya to suppress the insurgency and to Hong Kong in response
85
to the "unsettled political conditions there". There were, in
addition, subsidies and military largesse for friendly princelings in
85
west Asia.
The reasons for these costly policies were manifold, and it is
difficult to know what weight to attach to each of them. The UK had
numerous economic and strategic interests in the Middle East and
east Asia. Both areas were sources of raw materials vital to British
industry and lay astride the routes to other such areas. They were also
the objects of continuing British investment, and countries there held
87
growing sterling balances.
The threats to British interests were generally the same as those
summarized above. The British leadership feared direct Soviet interven¬
tion (as in Iran in 1945-1946); communist and/or nationalist subversion
and insurgency (as in Malaya and Egypt); intervention by third region¬
al powers (like Saudi Arabia) hostile to Britain and its proteges (like
the Hashimite monarchies in Amman and Baghdad); ana from the United
States itself as it tried to expand its petroleum and other economic
£53. Shlaim et al., p. 57.
84. Shlaim et al., pp. 57-58; Iiorthedge, Descent ..., p. 277; Frankel,
pp. 301-02.
85. Northedge, Descent pp. 278-79.
85. Erankel, p. 128.
87. See above pp. 46-47, and material cited in footnotes 29 and 30;
"7Jho Holds the Sterling Balances?", The Banker. 94 (May 1950),
93-97 (pp. 95-96)
interests. Nor had all Britain's ostensible allies in the kiddle East
distinguished themselves by unequivocal loyalty to the Allied cause
during the recent war; their current and future loyalty could not be
guaranteed either0
The costs of withdrawal were, consequently, high, perhaps too high,
and could well have hampered Britain's economic development as this
88
was understood by the national elite. Britain would have liked the
US to assume more of the burden of defending the kiddle East, so long
as the US accepted the priority of British interests there. Not sur-
89
prisingly, Washington refused. Within the parameters of a foreign
policy concerned with the protection of traditional British interests,
there can have been little alternative to a continued and costly
presence in the region. British policies in east ana west Asia were
traditional in another sense too; they seem to have stemmed, at least
in cart, from an inability to conceive of these regions without a British
90
presence.
Given the importance the labour Government attached to the American
link and to its other overseas interests and concerns, the low priority
given direct ties with Europe comes as no surprise. Often, links with
the Continent seem to have been conceived not as useful in themselves
but as means to the end of greater American involvement and support for
88. Frankel, pp. 258-59.
89. Frankel, p. £17.
90. Frankel, pp. 298-99.
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91
Europe and Britain's reconstruction, recovery and defence. In part
this attitude stemmed from devastated Europe's obvious inadequacy as a
basis for achieving these aims. Western Europe simply had too little
to offer. The American, Commonwealth, Imperial and Sterling Area
contributions were, as we have seen, real enough,and perceived as far
more important. European integration, unless carefully limited and
controlled, might clash with and damage these interests should the UK
decide to take part in it. The Atlantic Alliance might be destroyed
92
and America might, have an excuse for reverting to isolationism.
Hostility to European integration was not based on these contin¬
gencies alone, however. There were some very fundamental attitudes at
work too. For example, there seems to have been little understanding
of the centrifugal forces at work in the Commonwealth. 'The meaning of
decolonization in south Asia and the growing military and economic
importance of the United States for the countries of the Old Commonwealth
95
was not, apparently, fully grasped. The Commonwealth continued to be
seen as a basis for British power and influence which it would be fool-
94
ish to risk for Europe.
91. See above, pp. 55-57.
92. Shlaim et al., p. 51.
93. Compare Hugh Seton-Watson, "Commonwealth, Common Market, Common
Sense", in Suicide of a Nation?, edited by Arthur Koestler (New
York, 1964), pp. 131-46 (p. 154), and above p. 62. See also
Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States
(London, 1969).
94. Seton-Watson, p. 139; Shlaim et_ al., p. 51. See too Peter Nettl
and David Shapiro, "Institutions versus Realities a British
Approach", Journal of Common harket Studies, 2 (1963), 24-36
(pp. 26-27).
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British attitudes were also affected by the "traditional insularity
95
and mistrust of foreigners and their unstable political systems".
The Government was particularly hostile to suggestions involving the
relinquishing of sovereignty. The British state, after all, had not
been put in question in the same way as had the states which had suffered
96
defeat and occupation during the war. Why, moreover, should Britain,
whose Labour Government was extending its control over the economy, yield
that control to a grouping of nations which had swung sharpljr to the
97
right ?
Cooperation with Eurojje thus was acceptable when it had obvious
benefits for Britain's recovery and defence, whether directly, as in
the case of the European Payments Union, or indirectly, as in the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Brussels
Traety. Support for intergovernmental cooperation, however, was not to
be confused with support for supranational schemes; these were opposed
and resisted. The Council of Europe thus was successfully emasculated
while yet in embryo. Schuman's Coal and Steel Community, which would
have affected the newly-nationalized industries, and Pleven's
European Defence Community also met British resistance. "While the
latter was eventually scuttled, the former was established without UK
participation.
The Attlee Government's foreign policy was in many ways the ccunter-
95. Shlaim et al., p. 51.
96. U.'Y. Kitzinger, The Challenge of the Common Larket, fourth edition
(Oxford, 1962), p. 5.
97. Fitzsimons, p. 127.
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part of its policies of reform and reconstruction at home and, like
these domestic policies, was consistent with the national elite consen¬
sus. It certainly continued the foreign policies of earlier governments.
Conflict about it was more or less constant but was restricted mainly
to the labour Movement itself.
In opposition the Labour Party had propounded a "socialist" ap¬
proach to foreign affairs based on the principles of internationalism,
international working class solidarity, anti-capitalism and opposition
98 99
to militarism and power politics. Whether or not they needed it,
the Party's leaders were subjected to a re-education in foreign affairs
during their years in the wartime coalition Government, a re-education
100
that was not extended to all corners of the Party.
Sniping at and attacks on Government foreign policy in Greece,
Marshall Aid, the American Alliance and rearmament rose and fell in
intensity throughout this period. The source of this criticism was
groups whose opposition to the leadership sometimes converged but often
aid not. There were those who attacked British policy because they
supported, the Soviet Union. There were those who wanted to develop a
socialist foreign policy based on the concept of a Third Force of
98. Gordon, pp. 15-14,
99. On Bevin's attitudes, for example, see Williams, pp. 262-65; and
'Idle Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1945-1946, edited by
Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring (New York, 1975),
pp. 417-18.
100. Gordon, pp. 95-101. For an analysis of the -wartime shift, in the
leaders' foreign policy attitudes see T. D. Burridge, British
labour and Hitler's "War (London, 1976).
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European and/or socialist and/or Commonwealth countries, independent of
the two superpowers. There were those who distrusted "power politics",
101
and there were the pacifists. What is most striking about this
opposition is that "attitudes towards foreign policy divided the parlia-
102
mentary party far more sharply than domestic politics". This does
not mean that the internal opposition was any more successful on this
103
issue than on domestic ones.
It was only in the wake of the Korean War, with its massive
rearmament programme and the impact it had on the progress of economic
reconstruction and the social services, that most of these groups could
1C4
come together in opposition to the leadership. Still, although three
ministers resigned in April 1351 as a sign of their opposition, they
did not go on at this time to lead a challenge to the Party leadership.
105
The Government *s position was far too tenuous for that. It should
be borne in mind, too, that whatever the motives of Sevan's supporters,
his own did not apparently stem from a concern for a socialist foreign
policy. Indeed, earlier in the year he had defended the expanded defence
programme "and barely qualified his defence with ambiguous warnings of
106
the dangers of too rapid a rate of rearmament".
101. See David Howell, British Social Democracy: A Study in Development
and Decay (London, 1976), pp. 146-48. Compare Hugh Berrington,
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1945-1955 (Oxford,
1973), pp. 47-82; Felling, p. 99.
102. Rubinstein, p. 236. Compare Felling, p. 99; kiliband, p. 295.
1C3. kiliband, p. 297.
104. Berrington, p. 122.
105. Iviiliband, p. 314.
106. Kiliband, p. 315.
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In general, Bevan and his colleagues did not argue that rearmament
was wrong but that the "scale of rearmament" decided by the Government
was too high. The position they argued from was one of "economic
realism", although they "contrived, consciously or unconsciously, to put-
it into a socialist context". Fundamentally their point was that
Britain could have attained its goals (with which they agreed) with less
effort and disruption.
(They) insisted that the labour Government had underestimated
Britain's bargaining power with the United States; they discounted
the Government's fears that failure to respond to the American
initiative would encourage a reversion to isolationism, and believed
that both the British and American Administrations overrated the
Soviet military threat. (107)
This conflict in the Party's ranks broke out during the second
Labour Government elected in 1S50 with a very slim majority. Indeed,
it was the slimness of the majority which limited the extension of the
conflict to other issues besides rearmament and its impact on the
economy and the social services. In November 1951, another election xvas
held and the Conservatives were returned to power; many of the inhibi¬
tions on the extension of the conflict within the Party thus disappeared.
This chapter has examined the extraorganizational setting of lead-
er-to-rank-and-file trade union communication in the period 1945 to 1951.
The bases of Government policy in home and external affairs have been
107. Berrington, pp. 121-22.
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explored. In the chapters that follow we shall see how the Amalgamated
Engineering Union developed and how it coped with and operated in this
political and economic setting, We shall study too how the Union's
leaders interpreted this setting, and what factors lea them to express
agreement or disagreement with the labour Government's policies, parti¬
cularly in the field of foreign affairs.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING OF CCMDNICATION: THE PERIOD BEFORE 1945
In Chapter I it was argued that communication about internation¬
al affairs in an organization should be understood as a function of
that organizational setting; that is, of its goals, operations,
division of labour and distribution of power. In this chapter and the
next one we shall examine this setting and the role and pattern of
communication through two leader-to-ranlc-and-file channels in it.
I shall not neglect the formal "rule-book" aspects of the
Union's structure, for formal rules, even when robbed of all substance,
may well continue to dictate forms of organizational behaviour,
including communication. The emphasis here, however, will be on
actual patterns of behaviour and relationships and on their historical
development through custom and tradition. Thus, whatever the rule
book may say about the objectives of the AEU, for example, its goals
1
are here understood "as summaries of previous actions".
There are, of course, numerous books about the functions and
2
structure of British trade unions in general. Although these studies
are useful, one obviously cannot assume that such generalizations or
sub-generalizations as they supply actually apply to any given union
at a given point in its history.
1. Weick, p. 37.
2. See Bibliography below.
-72-
There are also works dealing specifically with the ALU, but they
are generally inadequate in terms of the requirements of this thesis.
The history by Jefferys, for example, contains a wealth of information
3
but does not draw conclusions of the type of concern to us here.
Richter, on the other hand, in the historical section of his study,
draws what seem often to be correct conclusions with respect to some
of the problems of concern to us here. In certain areas, because he
does not go into the historical background deeply enough, his conclu-
4
sions seem to be misleading.
This chapter and the next one seek to answer these basic
questions: What specific forms did the leaders' concerns about
l) organizational goal attainment, 2) organizational maintenance and
growth, and 3) power and task distribution take? What did they do to
further these concerns? What part did communication with the rank and
file play in furthering these concerns? It is my intention not to
write a history of the AHJ but simply to establish what patterns pre¬
vailed with regard to these aspects of the organization.
This aim determined the structure of Chapters III and IV.
Chapter III deals with the period before 1S45 and provides the back¬
ground necessary to an understanding of the later period which is
examined in Chapter IV. In each chapter we shall look at the develop-
3. James B. Jefferys, The Story of the Engineers (London, (1945?)).
4. Irving Richter, Political Purpose in Trade Unions (London, 1973),
pp. 29-48. See too belov; pp. 167-68.
raent of the Union's goals, nodes of operation, division of labour and
distribution of power and at the leaders' use of the communication
system.
A. Organizational Goals, Modes of Operation ana Maintenance in Pule
and Practice
The Amalgamated Engineering Union was founded in 1920 through the
amalgamation of ten unions of craftsmen in the engineering industry.
The largest of these was the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE),
established in 1851, which was the dominant force in the new union.
The formal statement of the Union's objectives and of the methods
for achieving them is contained in a rather short and not very coherent
series of paragraphs in the second clause of the first rule in the AEU
5
constitution. This list reflects a concern not only with what might
more commonly be called the attainment of organizational goals but
also with the maintenance and growth of the organization. It thus
6
involves two of the areas of leadership concern noted earlier.
Four main types of organizational goals are listed, regarding
1) conditions of employment, 2) welfare and benefits, 3) social
transformation and 4) partisan and parliamentary activity.
5. The discussion of the rules is based on the 1940 edition of the
Pule Book. Changes in force in 1945-1951 are noted. The dis¬
cussion of objects and methods and all quotations in this regard
are based on Pule 1:2 unless otherwise specified.
6. See above, pp. 16-17.
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1. Conditions of Employment
Of these goals, the ones upon which the ALU's leaders focused
most of their attention were the "obtaining and maintaining of just
and proper hours of work, rates of pay and conditions of labour" and
"the negotiation and settlement of disputes between the members of the
Union and the employers". This is evident from the leadership's
reports of its own activities through the years.
TABLE 1: ITEMS DFALT WITH BY THE AEU EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, 1921-1951
NUMBER NUMBER OF TT&iS INVOLVING:
OF CONDITIONS WELFARE ORGANIZE- PARTY
irais OF AND TIONAL aND
DEALT HiPLOY- BENE- GROWTH/ PARLIA-
YEAR WITH LIENT FITS MAINTENANCE MENT OTHER
NO. ■3 NO. P NO. /° NO. c/0 NO. atP NO. >
1921 203 100 155 76 16 8 23 11 5 2 5 2
1931 69 100 52 75 3 4 11 16 2 5 2 3
1941 205 100 177 86 5 2 20 10 2 1 11 5
1945 335 100 313 93 2 1 19 5 4 1 15 4
1951 450 100 573 83 10 2 48 11 14 3 35 8
Source: The AEU Journal, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1945, 1951.
The sums of the rows will not equal the numbers in the first column
because a single item may involve a number of problems. The rounding
of the percentage figures to the nearest whole number results in
further inconsistencies in their sums.
Table 1 summarizes the problems and issues that the Executive
Council was reported to have dealt with during the years 1921, 1931,
1941, 1945 and 1951. In each of these years, most of the matters
involved conditions of employment questions, that is, wages, hours,
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health and safety at work and the like. Organizational growth and
maintenance came a distant second, followed, during this pre-1945
period, by welfare and benefits issues. Partisan and parliamentary
activity received minimal attention.
VJhen we turn to the manner in which these issues were handled,
it is clear that collective bargaining with the employers was the
method most commonly used.
TnBLE 2: ACTION TaKEN BY THE EXECUTIVE IN RESPECT OE ITEMS RAISED,
1921-1951
NUMBER ITEMS D-qiALT RHE BY *




















NO. rffT NO. 1° NO . NO. % NO. % HO. Hi7°
1921 203 100 156 77 4 2 8 4 13 6 32 16
1951 69 100 46 67 2 3 4 6 9 15 14 pot-j v_-
1941 206 100 166 81 1 if 22 11 11 5 15 6
1S45 335 100 26S 80 1 it 22 7 67 20 13 4
1951 450 100 311 59 r: 1 49 11 267 59 18 4
Source : The AEU Journal, 1921, 1951, 1941 , 1945, 1951.
The sums of the rows vjill not equal the first column figures because
a single issue may be handled in a number of ways. The rounding of the
percentage figures to the nearest whole number results in further
inconsistencies in their sums.
# Less than 0»5c/o
It should be noted that Tables 1 and 2 are in some ways mislead¬
ing guides to the activities of the Union's leaders. Firstly, the
tables depend on the Executive's own monthly reports of its affairs;
matters may well have been dealt with which were not publicized.
Secondly, the tables do not take into account continuing and routine
activities which did not require new decisions, departures and
negotiations. This includes much of the Union's welfare and benefit
work, seme of its political and pressure group activities and some
aspects of inter-union relations. Thus the AEU conscientiously carried
out its duty to provide material benefits to members in "distressed
circumstances", in case of unemployment, sickness, disablement, death
7
and so on. It tried, not always successfully, to execute this func¬
tion even in times, like the 1920s, when, because so high a proportion
of the membership was unemployed, doing so imposed great hardship on
8
the organization and the members in work.
In its dealings with the employers in pursuit of the maintenance
and improvement of the members' conditions of employment, the A33J,
during the period under review, never resorted to a national strike.
Officially sanctioned and unofficial local strikes were not infrequent,
as the Union's reports reveal, but the closest the AEU came to a
national strike was in the 1926 General Strike. It was a rather
confused experience, and only some of the members laid down their tools.
While the Union's official leadership afterwards expressed its
opposition to the concept of the general strike, the leftist opposition
7. Rule 1:2.
8. This sad record is revealed in the "General Office Report"
published in each issue of the Journal during the 1920s and
early 1950s.
ir, the Union attacked the TUG General Council's weak handling of the
9
affair.
VJhile the leadership rejected radical mass confrontation with
the employers, they did not swing to the other extreme and accept
collaboration. This latter trend gained currency and publicity afuer
the 1.1ond-Turner talks of 1927 in which General Council and employer
representatives elaborated the "industrial peace" line. This line
entailed the acknowledgement that the good of the workers depended on
the prosperity of the employing firms, and, therefore, that the two
sides must collaborate to ensure their common welfare,, Britain's
economy was deemed to be in so precarious a state that care had to be
taken to avoid its total collapse and the consequent loss of jobs and
10
decline in the standard of living of the workers. From this stand¬
point, the good of the workers and of the national economy was identi¬
fied with the good of privately owned industry.
The A3J publicy rejected this line. The mere holding of the
11
L-iond-Turner talks was a gross infringement of the Union's autonomy.
Pressure from the militant opposition in the Union was one factor
militating against collaboration. The most important factor, however,
9. Jefferys, pp. 232-34.
10. See Noreen Bramson ana Liargot Keinemann, Britain in the Nineteen
Thirties (London, 1971), pp. 86-88; GJ).H. Cole, "The labour
Party and the Trade Unions", Political Quarterly, 25 (1953),
18-27 (pp. 21-22).
11. Jefferys, p. 238; see also Journal. October 1930, pp. 36-37;
November 1930, pp. 37-38; October 1931, p. 36; February 1S32,
pp. 31-32; Pay 1932, pp. 29-50; June 1934, pp. 5-6; October
1936, pp. 8-9.
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was simply that the AECJ had little to gain frccn the exercise. The AEU
was a shrinking union with a high proportion of skilled men among its
members. It was operating in an economy in which the demand for many
manufactures, and hence for many skilled workers, was relatively low.
"Industrial peace" meant peaceful acquiescence and cooperation in
12
policies of rationalization and mechanisation, which would further
have decreased the demand for skilled workers, particularly as long as
demand continued to be low. .Rejection of the line of industrial peace
was thus a logical policy and clearly in the short-term interest of the
AEU's members and of the union which defended their jobs.
During the Second World War, however, the Union and its leaders
willingly embraced the line they had refused earlier, partly out of
patriotism and "the general sense of involvement in defence against
13
the threat of invasion". Moreover, after the German invasion of the
USSR in June 1941, the strong communist element in the internal oppo¬
sition became the most ardent apostles of collaboration with the
Government and the employers against the Ihscists. This reversal made
14 *
collaboration easier. Another important factor in the change,
however, was probably the fact that collaboration now paid, for the
industrial and economic environment was not only less menacing than it
12. Branson and Heinemann, pp. 85-86.
13. Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, third edition
(Harmonsworth, Middlesex, 1S76), p. 214. The practical aspects
of this collaboration are discussed as they become relevant in
the sections that follw.
14. See below pp. 114-17.
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had been before the war; it was positively encouraging.
The war industries meant hundreds of thousands of jobs in
engineering and hundreds of thousands of new ASD members, many if net
most, of them semi-skilled, unskilled and, from 1943, even women. Given
the growing demand for labour, given, too, that the Union catered to
the workers whose labour was in demand, collaboration no longer posed
a threat to the members' jobs and the Union's membership and strength.
It was thus possible and acceptable to adopt a "national" line, that
is, policies based on the assumption of an identity between the good
of the nation, the national economy and the prosperity of the
private employers in it. As long as private industry functioned
smoothly in the war, the workers had little to fear.
T'he very expansion of the engineering industry, of the work
force in it and of the membership of the A3U created an interest in
maintaining this employment end membership. If events were to follow
the course they had taken after the 1914-1918 war, the Union would see
demand contract., unemployment rise, the Union's bargaining power weak¬
ened and its membership plummet. The Union's problem became hovf to
ensure the continuation of the beneficent industrial conditions after
the war. Revolutionary change, as we shall see below, was not an
option# The fundamental requirement for the postwar period was not to
change the economic system in order to ensure jobs but to ensure jobs
within the existing economic system. Radical policies might be more
disruptive than curative. As long as the demand for labour was high,
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the Union would be in a better position to bargain with the employers
for improved eonditiojis of employment and the Union itself could be
assured of a continued large membership.
The leadership did not expect that unemployment would be a prob¬
lem in the immediate postwar period. Demand for engineering goods, it
was thought, would remain high and so would demand for engineering
workers. This period of high demand could be used to restructure
industry, to rationalize and mechanize it, to enable it to supply goods
15
of a quality and at a price that would keep demand high. It was as
one of the instruments which would help carry out such a policy to en¬
sure full employment in the medium and long term that the AEU leaders
16
paid increasing attention to the Labour Tarty. As long as full
employment was maintained there would be no incentive for the AEU
Executive to turn from its "national" line of cooperation with the
Government and employers. In those circumstances the good of the
"nation", of the engineering workers (whose good was defined in terms
of their conditions of employment) and of the AEU as an organization
were in fact synonymous.
During the war collaboration entailed the Union's participation
in various tripartite advisory and administrative bodies and the
maintenance of union discipline to prevent the disruption of production.
15. Journal, August 1945, pp. 225-26.
16. See below Chapter II]-A-5.
17. See below pp. S9-90.
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After the war it involved the pursuit of policies which will be
examined in the next section of this chapter.
2. Social Transformation
The rule book lists among the primary purposes of the organiza¬
tion the "control of industry in the interests of the community" and
the "extension of cooperative production to assist in altering the
18
competitive system of society for a co-operative system". This for¬
mal concern with bringing about a change in the control of the means
of production received little attention in practice. Thus the Union's
official history records no involvement by the old Amalgamated Society
19
of Engineers in cooperative engineering shops after 1875. In the
early 1920s Engineering Guilds were set up in Coventry, Birmingham
and London, but they soon went out of business. It seems, in any case,
that the intention behind these was not to promote revolutionary change
but simply to provide a form of "insurance" at a time of high unemploy-
20
ment.
During the Second World 7/ar certain moves by the Union indicated
a greater concern with and commitment to social change. On the ini¬
tiative of the A3J and with the support of the Government, Joint
Production Committees (JPCs), comprising representatives of workers and
18. Rule 1:2.
19. Jefferys, pp. 35-34, 42-44, 86.
20. Anthony Carew, "Rank and File Movements and Workers' Control in
the Engineering Industry" (unpublished M. Phil, thesis, University
of Sussex, 1971), p. 114.
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management, were set up as a foruin for consultation in order to increase
war production by increasing industrial efficiency. Despite this
clearly collaborationist purpose, the Union's president spoke of the
JPCs as a means of ensuring that "the greed and self-interest of the
powerful few at the top are progressively curbed by the combined action
21
and pressure of the workers", and as "the first step towards the
22
real control of industry".
The portrayal of the JPCs in this manner reflected a general
tendency on the part of the Union leadership to discuss postwar
economic and social policy and to emphasize the construction of a new
23
type of society in Britain. In order to help bring about this new
society, the Ifetional Engineering Joint Trades Movement (KEJTL), a
coalition of the unions in the engineering industry in which the hEU
vrns the dominant force, established its own Reconstruction Sub-commit-
24
tee to plan the future. Researchers at the AEU General Office
produced a much-heralded programme for popular control of the
engineering industry. In substance, however, the plan was hardly
radical and called merely for state regulation and joint consultation
in industry, in effect a continuation of the system established during
25
the war.
21. Report of Proceedings of the Rational Committee (hereafter RH3C)
1944, p. 255.
22. RBNC, 1945. pp. 214-15.
£5. See, for example, HPNC, 1944, pp. 254-56.
24. RPNC, 1944, p*. 254.
25. Richter, pp. 45-46.
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3. Partisan and Parliamentary Activity
The rules set the AEU "political objects" not explicitly related
to the social transformation goals listed. As Rules 4-5 ana 46 make
clear, these objects include the election of Union members to Parliament
on behalf of the labour Party and raising money for a political fund to
be spent for election campaigns and propaganda. These roles lay down
the mechanics by which these goals may be achieved. In general, parti¬
san and parliamentary activity was not pursued as an end in itself, nor
as a means of bringing about basic social change. It was used, inter¬
mittently, to protect and enhance the organization and the members'
conditions of employment.
After the 1901 Taff Vale decision, which undermined the legal
protection of union funds and officials, the interest of the AS'E
(and of other unions) in the election of Labour members to Parliament
rose sharply,- only to subside again after the 1906 Trade Disputes Act
26
rectified the situation. The A3E leadership's continued verbal
attachment to the Party and Parliament was, in part at least, "a bureau¬
cratic diversion: to obscure the failure of the national organization
tc cope effectively with the 18S8 Terms of Settlement" with the employers
27
after the Union's defeat in the 1897 lockout. Since Labour representa¬
tion in Parliament did not prevent Government intervention in industrial
disputes on the side of the employers, the reversion to reliance on the
26. Richter, pp. 36-37.




Union and its bargaining power gained even greater impetus.
The employers' attack on the Union in the 1922 lockout led to a
resurgence of official interest in parliamentary action. In October
1922 the Executive Council circulated a letter to the branches calling.
on the members to support. labour in the forthcoming elections. "The
defeat in the lock-out. was due, the letter stated, to 'superior power
of the employers, the hostility of the coalition-ridden House of
Commons and was in part due also to the numbers of the Labour Party
29
in Parliament'".
On the whole, however, the interwar period was one "of generally
30
diminished union interest in politics". The official history draws a
picture of growing political concern as the economy, the Union and the
33.
workers' conditions began to recover in the mid-1950s, but this
interest seems not. to have led to much political action on behalf of
the labour Party or with regard to Parliament. Thus, despite the rise
in the AEU's membership after 1933, little seems to have been done to
increase the number of members paying the political levy. Only in
1943 did the National Committee (the Union's supreme policy-making
body), with the strong and active encouragement of the Executive, call
32
for a campaign to mobilize the members in support of the Party.
28. Carew, pp. 43-44.
29. Jefferys, pp. 229-50.
30. Hicht er, p. 41.
31. Jefferys, pp. 247-48.
32. Jefferys, p. 251,
Since the absolute number of contributors was more or less stable, the
proportion of the membership paying the levy had declined, steadily as
the total membership rose. In 1943 "scarcely 10 per cent, of the
33
membership (were) paying the political levy". The campaign soon
o4
bore fruit, and in 1945 the figure was 24.65 per cent.
The Union's increased commitment and the leadership's desire for
it seem to have stemmed from e number of factors. The AEU's promotion~
al material for the political levy campaign stressed the element of
prestige strongly. It said, in effect, how can a union so strong
35
industrially be so weak politically? The leadership also may have
been trying to compensate for the decline in its power within the Union
by providing itself with new functions and roles in the political
36
sphere. It seems likely, too, that the Executive was interested in
strengthening the Party financially so that labour might be in a posi¬
tion, once the war ended, tc win an election. A labour Government was
an important factor in the full-cmpicyment programme which was the
basis cf the ASU's "national" line. The strengthening of the labour
Farty, the President told the members at the 1943 Ifetional Committee,
is one of the elements that "will become increasingly important when the
Questions affecting the change-over from war to peace and of reconstruc-
37
ticn policies come to the fore".
35. See ABU Financial Report.. 1920/21-1945; HPNC. 1945. p. 222.
34. Richter, p. 246.
35. See Journal. 1944-1945.
36. Compare Richter, pp. 99-100.
37. HPUC. 1945. P. 22.
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4, Organizational Growth ana Maintenance
In terms of the maintenance and growth of the organization the
rules postulated nothing less than:
The organization of all workers qualified for membership, the
development of the most cordial relations with other unions in
the industry with a view to the bringing into existence of one
union for the foundry, engineering, shipbuilding and kindred
trades. (38)
The AEO was imperfect by definition .as long as this objective was not
achieved. Organizational growth and maintenance, thus, was explicitly
accepted as a continuous and basic task of the Union, The importance
attached to this task is confirmed by a glance at Table 1, In the
prewar period it was the second most frequently cited issue dealt with
by the Executive.
Pursuit of this goal, however, was hampered both before and after
the 1920 amalgamation by a strong conservative streak among large sec¬
tions of the membership. It had not been easy for the Engineers to
accept that their organization would have to change to cope with the
changing industrial and economic setting. They had regarded their
39
original union, the ASE, with a pride verging on smugness.
The engineers' own high status and good conditions were basod on
their monopoly of certain skills and their ability to limit the supply
38; Pile 1:2.
39. See, for example, Jefferys, p. 89, for an especially illuminating
illustration of this attitude.
-87-
of skilled labour through their control of apprenticeships. Technolo¬
gical innovation, however, progressively eroded the differences between
skills and opened many parts of the manufacturing process to unappren-
ticei workers. The Engineers first tried to extend their monopoly
40
to the new types of work, but they failed in the attempt„ The aSE's
defeat at the hands of the employers in the 1897 lockout showed that it
could no longer adequately defend its members' jobs, wages and condi-
41
tions. To regain its leverage with the employers the Society had to
extend its control over the actual and potential rivals for the skilled
engineers' jo"d3. This meant, on the one hand, amalgamation with other
craft unions in order to remove the basis for intercraft demarcation
disputes and, on the other, admission of noncraftsmen to the Society in
order to control the conditions under which they were employed in the
42
shops, *
Amalgamation was pursued fairly consistently throughout the
first two decades of this century, and in 1920 the Amalgamated Engineer¬
ing Union was formed. Efforts to extend the amalgamation continued
through the years that followed but with little successs
The admission of semi-skilled and unskilled workers evoked a
great deal of hostility among the rank and file. In 1925, for example,
40. Richter, pp. 31-32.
41. Jefferys, pp. 150-51.
42. It must not be forgotten that for many union activists industrial
unionism had an important social and political dimension as -well
as, or even instead of, that of protecting skilled men's jobs.
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the Union established new sections to cater for noncraftsmen, but many
43
branches refused to admit them as members. nevertheless, once the
AEU's membership began to grow in the mid-1950s, it was in these new
44
sections that growth was most rapid. The last formal bar against
any kind of engineering -worker fell in 1943 when, after a ballot of
the membership, women were admitted to the Union. 3y the time the war
ended, the vision of a single union for all workers in the engineering
industry apparently had been accepted by the ASU rank and file, almost
fifty years after the idea had first been enunciated.
Pursuit of the goals of organizational growth and maintenance
also took less explicit forms than those we have been discussing up to
now. Thus the policy of full employment adopted during the Second
?/orld War was also a policy for organizational protection and enhance¬
ment . If the members could be assured of jobs, the A3J could be assured
of members, while a great demand for labour put the Union in a better
45
bargaining position vis-a-vis the employers. The Union's political
activity and much of its pressure group activity were directly
46
concerned with protecting the organization. Indeed, whatever other
purpose they served, many Union activities, by helping the members,
enhanced their commitment to the Union and so contributed to the
maintenance of the AEU.
43. Jefferys, p. 235; compare p. 165.
44. Jefferys, pp. 208, 241-42.*
45. See above pp. 78-79.
46. See above pp. 83-34 and below pp. 90-91,
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5. Other Types of Activity
Another sort of activity that the AEU engaged in was "pressure
group" activity, the representation of the interests of the organiza¬
tion and its members to state authorities. Although the rules did not
explicitly provide for this type of action, it was, nonetheless, a
constant, if often unpubiicized, feature of Union affairs. Engineers
had long experience of lobbying the Government and state agencies, of
acting as an agent of the state and of participating in formal
policy-making and advisory bodies. This activity revolved around
questions of organizational growth and maintenance, social welfare
benefits and conditions of employment. Often it stemmed not from any
initiative of the Union but from the extension of state power and inter¬
vention in social and economic affairs and from conflicts between the
Union and the Government, the courts or the employers.
Thus, although partisan political activity was prohibited in the
early days of the ASE, "when the issue was obviously concerned with the
status of trade unions as such no objections were raised to (General
Secretary William) Allen's methods of putting pressure on the Liberals
47
and of constant lobbying and Parliamentary agitation".
The Society became a formal agent of the state after the passage
of the ^National Insurance Act of 1911 which covered health and unem¬
ployment- insurance. Under the terms of the Act the ASE "became an
47. Jefferys, p. 81.
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'Approved Society' through which benefits could be paid to the members".
Thus, in 1926, of £1,087,439 distributed by the AEU in unemployment
49
benefit, £891,184 came from the "State Unemployment .Refund".
During the First World War and even more during the Second, the
ASF's lobbying role was institutionalized through its participation, at,
the Government's invitation, in various advisory bodies, while its
administrative role was extended from the distribution of National
Insurance benefits to include the overseeing of Union-employer-govern-
ment agreements to boost munitions production and keep industrial
50
disputes to a minimum. In the Second World War this participation
was a concomitant of the "national" line which legitimized it.
The Engineers did not conduct all their pressure group activity
directly or by themselves. The Trades Union Congress was a very impor¬
tant channel for such action. Indeed, the ASE joined the TUC specifi¬
cally in order to use it as a vehicle for lobbying Parliament, to pro¬
test the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871 which "declared picketing
51
and all allied activity to be illegal". The TUC was also used in
order to resolve disputes between unions and to arrange and change
relationships among them. Thus the Engineers used the good offices of
52
the TUC in their continuing amalgamation efforts.
48. Jefferys, p. 81.
49. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, 1928.
50. Jefferys, pp. 174-37, 259.
51. Pauline Gregg, A Social and Economic History of Britain, 1760-1972,
seventh edition (London, 1973), p. 346; Jefferys, pp. 82-83.
52. Jefferys, pp. 162-63, 228-29, 232-54.
The AEC constitution even allowed the iUC General Council a
modicum of control over its use of the General Strike weapon, but the
union refused to delegate any part of its collective bargaining role
to the TUC. It thus firmly rejected the 1927 liond-Turner talks on
53
industrial relations. In 1941 the General Secretary wrote that the
AEU rejected "directives from the T.U.C. General Council, ... from the
Congress, ... from even a special conference of Trade Union Executives
54
if one should be called" with regard to wage policy.
On the other hand, the AEO did prove increasingly willing to pre¬
sent a common front with other unions when entering negotiations with
the employers. Although it preferred to stay out of formal and more
binding groupings like the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineer¬
ing Unions (CSEtJ), it joined with it and other unions and groups of
unions in presenting claims. In 1942 it joined with the Foundry Workers
and the CSSU in the National Engineering Joint Trades Eoveruent. One
important difference between such groupings and the TUC, it should be
noted, was that the former were often regarded as a preliminary to
55
further amalgamation.
To sum up, the main purpose of the AHJ throughout the period
before 1945 was the improvement of its members' conditions of employ¬
ment; its main method of achieving this was through direct collective
bargaining with the employers. Exceptions to this direct negotiation^
53. Jefferys, p. 2.38; see above pp. 77-78.
54. Journal, August 1941, p. 201,
55. See Table 2 above and Jefferys, pp. 163-54, 191, 219, 263.
in the sense of bargaining coalitions with other engineering unions,
were seen as temporary expedients pending further amalgamation0 With
the War and the adoption of the "national" line, inany problems pertain¬
ing to conditions of employment were thrashed out in tripartite
advisory and control bodies and in JPCs. But these types of action
did not involve matters normally dealt with in Union-employer negotia-
56
tions „
The IPCs, the increased interest in the labour Tarty, the
increased talk of postwar social change indicate no change in direction
no sudden increase in concern for social transformation. On the con¬
trary they were concomitants of the "national" line and signals of the
intention of the leadership to pursue this policy in the postwar period
On one level the "national" line meant collaboration. It also meant
creating the most favourable conditions that is full employment
for maintaining membership and giving the Union a strong hand in its
dealings with the employers. It was, too, a means of strengthening
the collective bargaining system through which the Union carried out
its function of improving its members' wages and the conditions under
which they worked.
56. Carew notes exceptions to this (pp. 158-59) but the IPCs' role was
never binding, only advisory, as he points out.
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E. Tie Division of Labour and Distribution of Power in Rule and
Practice
The drafters of the AEU constitution were concerned to limit the
extent to which the leaders of the Union would be able to revise the
division of labour and distribution of power in their own favour.
They sought "to put the maximum control of policy in the hands of the
members and to prevent the undue influence of" and, one might add,
57
abuses of power by —'"paid officials". The main constitutional
mechanisms for achieving this were: 1) direct triennial election
of all full-time officers; 2) disciplinary procedures; 3) separation
of powers among the Union's national organs; and 4) distribution of
power and tasks between the centre and the regions.
1o Re-election
All full-time officials of the AEU from the President and the
General Secretary to the District Secretary were directly elected for
three year terms by the rank-and-file members of the relevant terri¬
torially-based constituency; the members had to attend one of the
fortnightly meetings of their branch during the election period in
order to cast their ballot. At the end of his term of office an
incumbent could stand for re-election and could continue to do so
until he retired at the age of sixty-five.
57. Harrison, p. 142.
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The premise upon which the election rule is based is clear: the
members will re-elect officials who do their duty and carry out
policies approved by the rank and file and will reject the officers
who do not. The sensible official will, therefore, carry out his
constitutional duties faithfully and will not seek to apply policies
contrary to those desired by his constituents. It seems an ideal
means of ensuring popular control and preventing official abuses. The
Union's history provides no basis either for confirming or for rejec¬
ting the validity of the premise, however.
According to one prominent member of the ASE/AEU the continual
elections which characterized the Union were "a weariness of ths flesh
to members" and did nothing to add "dignity and responsibility to those
58
elected". Moreover, it has been suggested that direct election, by
providing each official with his own constituency to which he could
claim ultimate responsibility, could in fact disrupt constitutional
59
authority relationships within a union.
The evidence of the deterrent effect, of periodic elections is
mimed. On the one hand, since 1920 no incumbent of either of the top
two posts in the ALU has been defeated in a bid for re-election,
60
although the sitting General Secretary of the ASE was defeated in 1913.
58. Robert Young, quoted by V'. McLaine, "Shall tfe Learn a Lesson
from Russia?", Journal. October 1S36, p. 22.
59. V. L. Allen, Power in Trade Unions (London, 1954), p. 181.
60. J. David Edelstein and Malcolm Warner, Comparative Union
Democracy (London, 1975), pp. 172-74; see H. A. Clegg, The
System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain, second edition
(Oxford, 1972), p. 91.
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Th is tendency to re-elect the incunbent may not be solely (or even) a
result of rank-and-file satisfaction with the incumbent and his poli¬
cies, Clegg points out that "to defeat the incumbent would be to
sack him from his job, perhaps to rob him of his pension", This is
not something a working man and a trade unionist would do willingly.
On the other hand, Clegg notes, many managers maintain "that the
conduct of many full-time officers of the Engineers is noticeably
61
influenced by the approach of election day".
2. Disciplinary Procedures
The AEU constitution outlined a number of methods end measures
for disciplining members, whether paid officials, lay officers or
ordinary rank-and-file members, for neglecting their duties, refusing
to obey instructions, embezzling Union funds and so on. Provision
was made for members to oversee and observe the activities and
behaviour of their superiors, peers and subordinates in the Union
hierarchy, to report lapses and impose sanctions ranging from
fines to expulsion.
The Engineers' top leadership was not immune from, this system.
In 1896 the Executive Council dismissed the ASE's General Secretary,
62
John Anderson, for "willful neglect of duty". In 1932 the President,
W. H. Hutchinson, was dismissed after a rather bizarre case. He had
been invited to address a Peterborough District Committee celebration
61, CIegg, p. 82.
62. Jefferys, p. 141.
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but embarrassed bis hosts and their guests (who included some of the
town's notables) by being so drunk when he arrived that he could not
even speak coherently. The District Committee and the Peterborough
1 Branch complained; the former demanded his expulsion from the
Union, the latter merely his removal from office, Their grounds were
that he "had brought the union into discredit" and "that he was not a
fit and proper person to hold that office". Ultiraately, the Final
Appeal Court, the Union's highest judicial organ, decided in favour of
63
the Branch and Hutchinson was dismissed.
In general, however, there seems to have been an unwillingness
to resort to disciplinary measures in dealing with abuses by top
officials, even in later years when such abuses were particularly
64
blatant. It seems unlikely that fear of punishment was ever much of
a deterrent.
3, Separation of Powers
The third way in which the drafters of the AEtJ's rules sought to
ensure rank-and-file control of policy and to prevent abuses by
officials was through the separation of powers at the centre, at the
national level of the Union's structure. The organization was endowed
with what might be called without too much exaggeration separate
65
legislative, executive and judicial branches. Both in rule and in
63. Journal. September 1932, pp. 10-12.
64. Edelstein and Warner, pp. 289-91.
65. Edelstein and Warner, pp. 286-89.
practice, however, the distinctions between the structures were some¬
what blurred. Therefore, the effectiveness of the scheme in preventing
abuses is debatable; as a system of ensuring rank-and-file control of
policy, however, it could not succeed. The formal separation of powers
is summarized in Figure 1
The AEEJ's supreme policy-making body was the Rational Committee
66
(NC), a rank-and-file body which was not elected, as were the full-
time officials, by the members voting at their branches, but by a com-
67
pier system of indirect elections. Strictly speaking, the National
Committee was not representative of the mass membership but of the
regional lay officers of the Union. Thus any control the NC might
have exerted over policy would more correctly have been called lay-
officer than rank-and-file control.
In the event, its control of policy was limited, despite the
breadth of its powers under the rules. It could review and pass
judgement on the performance of the Executive which was obliged to
carry out its decisions. It had the power to "initiate any policy
which (it thought) beneficial to the Union", and, every five years, it
sat as the Rales Revision Meeting to consider constitutional amendments.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that it was a part-time rank-end-file
body militated against its ability to use its powers fully. Every year
the NC met for ten days to consider the Executive^ report on the pre-
66. References to rules regarding the NC are drawn from Rule 14
throughout the following discussion unless otherwise specified.
67. Riles 14:1, 15:1-3, 6.
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FIGURE 1: AjgXJ STRUCTURE A!© INTERNAL DIVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
POWERS
The overlapping of broken lines Beans that functions of both types are
performed, The EC carries out tasks of all three types, for example.
Solid lines with arrows indicate the electoral base of a body or
officer. Thus, the Divisional Committees elect the National Committee,
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vlous year and to approve or reject resolutions suggested by branches
and District and Divisional Committees. Given the distance between the
original proposers of resolutions (in the branches, districts and
divisions, not in the NC) and the day-to-day operation of national
Union affairs and given, furthermore, the lapee of time between the
first discussion of the resolutions in the regions and their ultimate
consideration by the NC, the policy proposals could well prove unwork¬
able or irrelevant in the end. In terms of collective bargaining, the
increasing tendency to resort to inter-union cooperation made control
of conditions of employment policy by the Committee even more difficult;
the unions had to bargain amongst themselves before they even approached
68
the employers. The NC could be (and often was) recalled to hear
reports on negotiations and to issue fresh instructions, but it could
not conduct negotiations itself.
The fact that the Committee sat for only ten days a year meant
that someone had to be available to take decisions on the myriad mat¬
ters that might arise during the rest of the year. Therefore, the
69
Executive Council (EC), a body that sat throughout the year, also
had policy-making functions. The Council was made up of eight directly
elected full-time officers. Seven were elected from regional constitu¬
encies into which the country was divided. The eighth, the Chairman of
68. Richter, pp. 99-100.
69. References to the EC are drawn from Rule 15 throughout the follow¬
ing discussion unless otherwise specified.
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the EC and President of the AEU, was elected from a constituency of all
the members of the Union.
The EC was charged with the "general executive government of the
Union" and was obliged to carry out the decisions of the National
Committee. Its duties involved organizational maintenance, negotiating
the conditions of employment of the members, the administration of the
benefits system and political and partisan activities. It could
suggest policies to those formally responsible for making them and
could participate in those bodies' discussions. It could also make
policy in its own right: "where the rules do not provide to the
contrary (the Council may) do such things as are in (its) opinion
necessary or expedient for the welfare or good government of the Union".
Moreover, in case of a problem arising on which "the rules are silent",
the EC had "the original jurisdiction to give a decision on the matter".
The Council was given an explicit judicial function, too, as the court
70
of second appeal from branch decisions.
In practice the EC's tasks could not but be broader than those
laid down in the rules. When it was engaged in collective bargaining,
despite any instructions it might receive from the National Committee,
the Council made policy as it went along in the light of its assessments




The President of the Union was Chairman of the Council and had
71
an important role in his own right. He could influence the decisions
of policy-makers on the basis of two closely related resources:
information and access. He attended and/or presided at meetings of the
72
whole range of policy-making and representative bodies in the Union.
These meetings provided him with the opportunity to glean information
about developments and opinion among the rank-and-file activists and to
use the information in interventions in the discussions of these bodies
73
and behind the scenes in order to influence their decisions. He also
gained information from his access to all of the Executive Council's
correspondence and from his role as the Union's chief negotiator with
the employers.
Perhaps more important than this potential influence was the
direct impact he could have on policy. For example, in the case of a
tied vote on the EC, it was the President who made the final decision.
In industrial relations matters his constitutional role as chief
negotiator could be decisive. While the NC might set the objectives,
strategy and tactics were his province. With the extension of the
Union's pressure group role, moreover, the task of representing the
Union fell in large measure, but not exclusively, to the President.
The President's influence over the outcome of policy, therefore, was
crucial and growing.
71. References to the role of President are drawn from Rule 15:2
unless otherwise specified.
72. Rules 14:6, 43:1.
73. See Allen, Power in Trade Unions, pp. 112-13.
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Uhe rules did not give the General Secretary the same opportunity
for independent action as they did the President, but they did give him
both the means and the opportunity to exert great influence on those
formally responsible for establishing and executing policy. In a for¬
mal sense he was the Union's chief clerk. This meant that he was the
centre of the Union communications system, its chief intelligence
74
officer and chief propagandist.
No other members of the Union had access to as much information
about all aspects of the Union's activities. As Union secretary he
could learn about many of the AEU's national and regional concerns
through his attendance at meetings of policy-making and -executing
bodies from the Executive Council to the TUC delegation. As chief
clerk he was in charge of all correspondence to and from the national
headquarters. He could learn much of the concerns of members of the
Executive both from his attendance at their meetings and from his daily
aocess t6 them in the corridors of the General Office. Furthermore, he
had access to fuller and better information on conditions and develop¬
ments in the regions than any other officer. As chief administrative
officer, bookkeeper and electoral officer he received information on
all aspects of the AEU's activities in the regions and among the rank
and file. Much of the information was standardized in form; much was
not. Much of the information he received was published for general
74. References to the role of General Secretary are based on Rule 16
unless otherwise specified.
circulation among officials or the general membership; much was not.
In short, for his intelligence-gathering value alone the General
Secretary could be a very useful ally to any officer.
His value as an ally and, consequently, his influence were
enhanced by the fact that he was the Union's chief publicist, the
editor of its monthly publication, the Journal0 He could select and
reject material for publication and deny the use of the Journal to the
proponents of dissident ideas. The General Secretary, therefore, had
at his command the means of influencing the Union's decision makers
and its attentive public, its electors and activists.
Clearly the members of the executive branch had a great deal of
room for manoeuvre in their activities, but they did not always exploit
it. They seem to have accepted their subordination to the National
Committee or, at least, not to have openly flouted its authority.
There is no evidence of systematic Executive disobedience to rank-and-
file decisions, and generally the leaders seem to have made an honest
effort to execute their orders. It has thus been said, for example,
that "more often than most leaders, the AEU's President has (had) to go
to the rostrum (at the TUC and the labour Party Conference) to support
75
policies of which he disapproves".
There are a number of apparent reasons for the Executive's
75. Harrison, p. 146.
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"restrairrt". One, which should not be underestimated, is the leader¬
ship's commitment to the democratic ideals of the movement • Until the
economic recovery of the mid-1950s the AEU was still essentially a craft
union, and afterwards, even as more and more unskilled and semi-skilled
workers Joined, the skilled men continued to furnish the Union with its
officers and activists. To use Turner's terms, the Union changed from
em "exclusive democracy" to an "aristocracy". In both cases the rela¬
tionship of the craftsman lay member to the craftsman paid officer has
certain special characteristics. There is little distinction of status
between the members" and "from the members' viewpoint, the official
is very much one of themselves: his specialist qualities are largely an
extension of the intimate knowledge of their occupation's conditions and
practioes which all its members possess in large measure." The full-
time officer "seesa3 more definitely to be regarded as a paid, if respeo-
76
ted, servant of the union". The pre- and post-1945 leaders of the
ABO were socialized into this conception of their role and behaved
accordingly when they assumed office.
Soles, however, are determined not only by traditions but by con¬
tinuing relationships. How the incumbents of other offices treated the
Executive and how the members of the Executive acted towards each other
was crucial. The National Ccesmittee, though often willing to be
76. H, A. Turner, Trade Union Growth. Structure and Policy (London,
1962), pp. 287-90, The "aristocracy" differs from the "exclusive
democracy" in that it includes members who are not craftsmen, who
tend to play a less active role in union affairs and who do not
share in the special relationship with the leaders.
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persuaded by the Executive, was not averse to rejecting the President's
advice, criticizing the national officers and, at times, rejecting the
77
collective agreements they had negotiated.
When the Executive was engaged in negotiations with the employers
or representations to the Government, it rarely, if ever, was represen¬
ted by only one member. Almost without exception, there were a number
of EC members involved or one of them would attend along with the
General Secretary or divisional and district officials and representa-
78
tives. With surprising frequency, they attended en masse. Their
behaviour, thus, was generally overseen and observed. As we shall see
when we turn to the post-1945 period, little could be done to stop the
Executive, if its members could agree on a course of action. Without
such unity, however, independent action or secret negotiations outside
the formal bargaining framework would have been of little avail and,
79
indeed, risky for anyone who participated in them. For the collective
leadership of the AECJ comprised ambitious men who were quite willing
to make political gains at the expense of their fellows and always
80
contained a minority representing the communist and leftist opposition.
There are, no doubt, other reasons for the Executive's apparent
77, Richter, p, 100,
78, See the "Abstract Report of Council's Proceedings" in each issue of
the 1921, 1931 and 1941 Journal.
79, On this type of action see Tony lane, The Union Makes Us Strong
(London, 1974), pp. 243-44,
80, See material cited in Chapter IV, footnotes 2 and 88, for discus¬
sions of same of the members of the Executive active before and
after the Second World War.
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docility, for example, a concern for re-election and perhaps even a
fear of disciplinary action. Moreover, however little control the NO
may have had in practice, its decisions had the cachet of legitimacy.
On important and controversial matters the NC's approval would be use¬
ful in obtaining the acquiescence of recalcitrant members of the rank
and file. It would have been impolitic, therefore, to flout the
authority of the NC when the leaders themselves might someday have to
use this authority for their own ends. On relatively unimportant mat¬
ters docility was, consequently, the rule. On important issues, as we
shall see more clearly in Chapter IV, there were ways of avoiding
executing a decision while yet seeming to obey, Furthermore, if the EC
did not obey, it could see its decisions and agreements rejected by the
NC or overruled by the independent, directly-elected rank-and-file
judiciary, the Final Appeal Court, The Executive^ actions in matters
about which it had not received instructions were subject to similar
81
controls.
While there were thus restraints on their behaviour, the leaders
of the AW were not weak men, mere tools of the rank and file. For the
NC could not control policy. Through most of the year and on most
matters the Executive could conduct its business generally free of out¬
side interference. National Committee and Appeal Court rejection of
Executive action was the exception, not the rule. The Executive had a
broad compass in which it could and did use its initiative,
81, Boles 19-20,
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Nor was it without influence on rank-and-file policy-makers. On
the contrary, these men could hardly have reached the positions they
held had they not earned some respect from their fellow members or had
they not known how to arrange transactions and deals in order to attain
their ends. Their consequent influence was reflected in NO decisions.
Two dramatic instances of the Executive's persuasive powers occurred at
the peak of rank-and-file opposition strength in the Union: the 1928
82
NC resolution attacking the Minority Movement and the 1947 resolu-
83
tions in support of Ernest Bevin's foreign policy.
To stem up, then, it can be said that the division of labour and
distribution of power at the centre of the AEU did not put effective
control of policy in the hands of the rank and file. If members of the
Executive did abuse their power, they were very careful to cover their
tracks and to abide by the fonnal, constitutional requirements. On the
whole, however, there seems to have been very little reason for such
abuses. Their power and influence, though not unquestioned, were
sufficiently extensive,
4. Regional Distribution of Power
The distribution of tasks and power between the national centre
and the organization's regional organs was the fourth way the drafters
of the rules sought to ensure rank-and-file control of policy and to
prevent official abuses. The regional structure of the Union is illus-
82. Journal. June 1928, pp. 9-10.
83, Harrison, pp. 144-45.
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trated in Figure 1 above. Outside the national centre there were full-
time officers, Divisional Organizers (or "Organizing District Delegates",
as they were known for most of the prewar period), responsible for the
84
organization within a given territory. Directly elected by the mem¬
bers in the division, their main duty was to negotiate on behalf of the
regional rank-and-file bodies, the District Committees (DC), in their
division. District Secretaries, too, that is, the secretaries of DCs,
85
might be full-time officials. Under the rules these officers were
responsible to the Executive. However, they also had an independent
electoral base and were dependendent on the cooperation of the DCs in
order to operate effectively. For example, they could not intervene in
86
a district matter unless invited by the DC. Some conflict with their
constitutional responsibility and consequently some degree of autonomy
8?
could easily arise.
Under the rules the DC's powers constituted an important check
on the power of the Executive and an important source of independent
88
action. The DC was composed of representatives of the branches and
shop stewards in the district. It could negotiate with employers about
all conditions-of-employment questions arising in the district. Its
authorization was necessary for the appointment and terms of reference




87. Compare Allen, Power in Trade Unions, p. 181.
88. References to the role of the District Committee are to ftile 13
unless otherwise specified.
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of shop stewards, for resort to strike action and for the intervention
of the EC and Divisional Organizers in district affairs.
On the other hand, the Divisional Organizer had to be included
in DC deputations to the employers "wherever possible", and most DC
decisions required Executive approval if they were to be enforceable on
the membership "by fine suspension from benefits, or expulsion".
In general, as long as the DC acted constitutionally and in
accordance with national agreements, there was little the Executive
could do to intervene. Even officially requested intervention or the
suppression of unconstitutional DC action could not be undertaken light¬
ly, however. Thus in 1934 the EC was asked to help settle a dispute in
Southampton, The militant strike committee, which opposed the interven¬
tion, spread rumours that the DC had never extended the necessary
invitation. Telegrams to the EC and the employers, denouncing and
repudiating the Executive and any agreement they might reach, followed
89
and did little to bolster the centre*s credibility in the negotiations.
In 1936-37 the EC avoided for several months suspending the
Barrow District Committee, which was contravening a national agreement,
90
while the leadership advised, argued, wheedled and ordered. Bad the
Executive intervened prematurely, it might have alienated the rank and
file and the dispute might not have ended. It might also have drawn the
ire of the NC which represented the AECJ's lay officialdom and which
89, Journal. July 1934, pp. 50-53,
90, Journal. February 1937, pp. 51-55; The Times, U January 1937,
p. 16,
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could have overturned the £0*8 decision. The NC*s role as defender of
the activists in the districts and the shops had been established very
early in its history. In 1922 it had requested that the EC reconsider
its suspension of the Sheffield DC, It did not have to repeat the
91
request; the EC soon reversed its earlier decision. Other factors
which may have inhibited gross interference by the Executive in the
districts were mentioned earlier in relation to the National Committee:
the collective nature of the leadership and the fact that the DC*s
willing support would be helpful in other circumstances and should not
be risked lightly.
Although there were thus objective and subjective barriers to
EC interference, the districts* positive policy-making and -executing
role had long been undermined. In the ASE negotiations about conditions
of employment had been the province of the DCs. Towards the end of the
nineteenth oentury, however, the centre of negotiating activity began to
shift to the Society*s national officers. More and more district mat¬
ters were referred to the national centre for resolution in negotiations
with the employers' representatives. In part, this was because the
employers* representatives wanted it this way. In part, too, the
national officers considered that the centralization of bargaining was
the correct response to the development of a better organized and more
sophisticated apparatus by the employers, an apparatus which the
districts could never match. It soon became evident that the centrali-
91. Journal, December 1922, p. 3.
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zation of function necessitated a centralization of power, for the
districts did not yield their prerogatives easily; during the first
decade of this century, a wave of three-sided conflicts, pitting the
local union organizations against the employers and the national
officers, culminated, in 1908, in the resignation of the General
92
Secretary out of exasperation with the unruliness of the Society.,
To maintain the bargaining role that it considered vital to the
interests of the members and the organization, the centre had to be
sure of the members* discipline, but the very removal of the bargaining
system from the regions to the national level created and abetted
indiscipline. On the one hand, it lengthened the time lag between the
eruption of a dispute and its ultimate resolution. On the other, even
when a settlement was reached, it lacked legitimacy and authority. The
District Committees, which were elected annually and reported regularly
and personally to the branches, appeared to be subject to the members*
control and so had a claim on the loyalty of the rank and file. The
national officers, however, seemed remote from any popular control and
consequently could not call on the same store of loyalty.
One of the responses to this problem was the movement to reform
93
the Society by creating a lay policy-making body. It would serve to
control the actions of the officials and to invest their decisions with
the authority necessary to evoke discipline and ensure the officers* own
92, Jefferys, pp, 167-68,
93, Jefferys, pp, 167-69,
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standing as interlocuteurs valables. This body was established at
amalgamation in 1920 as the National Committee.
A concurrent trend was a centrifugal one of attempting to
exercise rank-and-file control over policy by determining it in the
workshop through the institution of the shop steward. Shop stewards
had became increasingly common since the end of the nineteenth century
94
and, in 1896, were incorporated into the ASE's apparatus. The AEU's
rules show clearly how the stewards were intended to represent the
95
Union to the men as well as to the management. A steward's appoint¬
ment had to be approved by the DC and he was responsible to it. Apart
from any tasks the Committee might assign him, the rules called on the
steward to keep the DC informed of conditions and events in the shop
and to enforce Union discipline, membership and agreements there. He
could negotiate with management "on any question arising in the shop
... provided that no question involving a principle , change of practice
or stoppage of work shall be determined in any shop until it has been
reported to and ratified by the District Committee". He was required
to act in accordance with "the rules and principles" determined by the
Executive Council and the DC.
During the First World War the relationship established between
the national Executive and the employers and the Government marked the
triumph of "a national policy and approach to all problems ... over the
94l Jefferys, pp. 165-66.
95. Beferences to the constitutional role of the shop stewards are
drawn from Bule 13:17 unless otherwise specified.
-113-
local and parochial outlook". At the same time, however, "new ideas
were developed, chiefly by shop stewards, as to the role and functions
96
of the Society". They were a focus of resistance to the institutional
power of the centre and to the reformist and "collaborationist"
policies of the national leadership. The shop stewards provided the
cadres for the Syndicalist movements in Britain (and to some extent the
reverse was true). Prom now on, far more clearly than before, the
institutional struggle for rank-and-file control over policy would be
inextricably linked (but not identical) with the struggle over the
substance of Union policy.
In the event, the first shop stewards* movement faded soon after
the First World War, and the institution of the steward, too, became
9?
less coinaon. In the years that followed, collective agreements "on
the main issues of wages, working conditions and the rights of trade
98
unions were national in character". The settlement imposed by the
employers after the 1922 lockout provided for a highly centralized dis¬
putes procedure which sanctified the national Executive's bargaining
role.
Regional resistance to the overriding authority of the Executive,
as at Bristol in 1924 and Barrow in 1936-37, oould be and was success-
96. Jefferys, pp. 165-66,
97. Branko Pribicevic, The Shop Stewards* Movement and Workers' Control.
1910-1922 (Oxford," 1959); James Hinton. Ihe First Shop Stewards*
Movement (London, 1973); G. D. H. Cole, British Trade Unionism
To-day; A Survey (London, 1945), pp. 168-71.
98. Jefferys. p. 189.
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fully suppressed, though the EC did not like to make its supremacy too
99
obvious. The Council did try, in negotiations with the employers
throughout the interwar years, to strengthen and develop the position
100
of the shop stewards. There was no necessary contradiction between
this attempt and the EC's policy of centralization, A disciplined shop
steward who carried out his duties according to the rules would be a
definite asset to the organization.
The character of the opposition in the Union underwent a change
in the interwar years. Although the syndicalist streak remained strong
and left-wing socialists of various types were also active, the
communists assumed a larger and, for much of the period, a dominant
101
role in the opposition. The leadership of the Union did its best to
discredit the Metal Workers' Minority Movement, the Members' Rights
Movement and the Aircraft Shop Stewards' National Council, which pro¬
vided the institutional framework for the opposition at various times
over the years. These groups could never be eradicated entirely,
however. The opposition continued to pursue and press for more
102
militant and less compromising policies towards the employers.
99. On the Bristol dispute see the Journal. September 1924, pp. 8-9;
October 1924, pp. 6-7; November 1924, pp. 28-29. On the Barrow
dispute see above pp. 109-110.
100. A, I, Marsh and E. E. Coker, "Shop Steward Organization in the
Engineering Industry", British Journal of Industrial Relations,
1 (1963), 170-90 (pp. 175-76).
101. Roderick Martin, Communism and the British Trade Union Movement,
1924-1955 (Oxford, 1969).
102. Martin; Carew, pp. 96-148; Journal. January 1925, p. 53;
March 1928, p. 78; June 1928, pp. 9-10; April 1929, pp. 8-18;
August 1931, pp. 4-15; May 1932, pp. 6-7; February 1933, p. 10;
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The recovery in certain sectors of the economy, particularly in
certain sectors of the engineering industry, and the Cormunist Party's
shift to a united front policy after 1933 strengthened and spread the
office of shop steward, on the one hand, and the internal opposition
103
which found its base among the stewards, on the other0 The Second
World War, however, provided them with their greatest opportunity: the
stewards could prove themselves invaluable to the overworked officials
and to the members in the shops, the overwhelming majority of whom were
new to the industry and the Union; the political opposition, by
pursuing a collaborationist policy and apparently enforcing it in the
shops with the help of its adherent stewards, demonstrated and increased
its power and influence vis-a-vis the official leadership.
The AEU's leaders cooperated with the Government and the employ¬
ers in seeking to boost war production, but they could not control
unrest and grievances in the many thousands of shops employing the many
tens of thousands of new members. Uncontrolled, such unrest could have
seriously disrupted production. Throughout the war, strikes, though
illegal,continued to occur. In comparison with the situation in the
previous war, however, the overwhelming impression is one of industrial
July 1934, p. 2; August 1935, pp. 7-8; February 1937, p. 67;
June 1937, p. 2250
103. Carew, pp. 96-148.
104. And, under the terms of the Essential Work Order, the stewards
were, like all workers, protected from unjust dismissal; Marsh
and Goker, p. 176.
peace. For this the communists took much of the credit. Although the
statistics for industrial unrest in the metal trades show no relation¬
ship between strike activity and the shifting industrial policy of the
communist shop stewards before and after the German invasion of the
105
USSR, the impression was strong in the AEU that the CP was in fact
in control. Hius an official document of the Union reported: "Through¬
out the ranks, the autumn of 1941 'marked the turning point from a
period of cynical or angry passivity, bred of frustration, to one of
106
action'." VJhatever the political opposition's actual impact, it at
least seemed to be able to deliver the goods.
The opposition's apparent strength was based on the strength of
the shop stewards among whom it was strongly represented. The stewards'
influence grew as they showed how valuable, if not indispensable, they
were to the workers. TShile it would be wrong to ascribe the change
solely to the activities of militant stewards, a larger and larger
part of the workers' pay came to be determined by local, works and
107
shop agreements in the late 1930s and even more during the war itself.
In this way and through their other work, the shop stewards could
reinforce their standing among the members; it is hardly surprising
105. K. G. J. C. Knowles, Strikes (Oxford, 1952), pp. 54-56; J. F. B.
Goodman and T. G. Whittingham, Shop Stewards, revised edition
(London, 1973), p. 41; H. A. Turner, "The Trend of Strikes: An
Inaugural Lecture" (Leeds, 1963), pp. 11-13.
106. Quoted by Jefferys, p. 253.
107. K. G. J. C. Knowles and T. P. Hill, "Ihe Structure of Engineering
Earnings", Oxford University Institute of Statistics Bulletin.
16 (1954), 272-328 (p. 293).
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108
that for many workers the shop steward was the Union.
It was ... on the local scale that the value of trade unionism
to the workers in relation to the (Essential Work) Order was
perhaps most clearly demonstrated. The complicated procedure
of form filling, visits to the labour Exchange and appearances
before the National Service Officer and Appeal Boards, which
had to be embarked upon whenever a worker wished to change his
job, or remain in his old one when his employer wished to dis¬
miss him, called for expert advice which shop stewards and branch
officers, supplemented by district officials, were able to
supply. (109)
The steward proved his worth to the organization as well by
taking some of the administrative load on his own shoulders; "branch
and district officials found themselves unable to handle the growing
membership and they were forced, often reluctantly, to permit stewards
110
to perform traditional branch functions". With more members to deal
with and more work for the officials in dealing with state and employer
representatives in tripartite bodies, some of the burden of collective
bargaining was shifted away from the centre to the factories and dis¬
tricts; "a large increase in the number of Works and Local Conferences
111
took place", with the results for the workers* earnings noted
earlier. Control of policy on conditions of employment was moving
away from the centre and back to the rank and file.
The national Executive did not stand idly by, however, and tried
to ensure some continuing control and supervision. The number of
Divisional Organizers was increased from twenty to twenty-six in 1941,
108. Compare Allan Flanders, "The Importance of Shop Stewards", New
Society. 14 February 1963, pp. 13-14 (p. 13).
109. Jefferys, p. 258.
110. Walter Galenson, Trade Union Democracy in Europe (Westport,
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while in 1943 the new office of Regional Officer was established in
each of the seven Executive divisions. In January 1945 (significantly
as a last resort), the number of full-time District Secretaries was
raised from seven to ten, Furthermore, from 1943 on periodic conferen¬
ces were held of DC representatives and full-time officers so that the
112
former might "hear (the DCs') opinion on vital questions of policy"
and, no doubt, so that the DCs might hear the officers' views.
To sura up, then, the aim of the drafters of the AEU rules was
only partially fulfilled. Abuses of power by the officials were,
apparently, prevented, but their "undue influence" was not, as
collective bargaining and power were increasingly centralized.
Organizational centralization, in part a product of procedural agree¬
ments imposed by the employers, was also the response preferred by the
national leadership in coping with the strong, centralized and
sophisticated employers* organizations. The centralized structure was
also considered the logical response to increasing Government inter¬
vention in industrial relations, especially during the First World War.
The resurgence of the shop stewards as an institution and as an
opposition movement in the late 1930s and during the Second World War
was not necessarily a threat to the centralized system which the
leadership continued to think vital. The convergence of interests
~
Connecticut, 1961), p. 46.
111. Jefferys, p. 259,
112. Jefferys, p. 262.
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between the movement and the official leadership for most of the
later period seemed to ensure the maintenance of what the leaders
wanted, a disciplined body of stewards carrying out national policy in
the shops. However, the conditionally of this convergence was all too
113
clear to the leadership. Therefore, given the leaders1 belief in
the correctness of centralized bargaining and action and given changing
circumstances which would disrupt the convergence of interests between
the political opposition and the leadership, conflict was almost in¬
evitable .
C. Cocuminication as a Tool for Furthering the Executive's Interests
We have seen that in the period before 1945 the leadership of
the AEU dealt mainly with the following matters in terms of their three
main areas of concern. With regard to the attainment of organizational
goals, they were interested principally in maintaining and enhancing
their members' conditions of employment through collective bargaining.
With regard to organizational growth and maintenance, they sought the
expansion of the Union to include workers of all degrees of skill in
the engineering industry. In their pursuit of these two objectives
and in response to changes in the economic and political setting during
the Second World War, they came to pursue a "national" line which
113. The Times. 1 June 1940, p. 3; HEKC. 1942. pp. 287-80.
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entailed a demand for full employment in the postwar period. With
regard to the third set of concerns, the distribution of power and
tasks, the leadership, in response to changes in the environment,
sought the centralization of power and negotiating authority in the
Union,
Now given the dispersal of power and authority in the Union, the
Executive could not simply take a decision and assume that it would be
obeyed, There were, as we have seen, competing centres for the obedi¬
ence of the rank and file, centres which might collaborate with the
national leadership for a time but which did not have to do so. In
order to pursue its goals in the manner it wished, the national leader¬
ship needed the cooperation and acquiescence of the competing power
centres. It needed the legitimacy their blessing would bring and the
persuasive powers they could bring to bear on the general
membership. From this standpoint the most important power centres were
the National-Committee and the shop stewards. Whatever other tools
the Executive may have had to obtain their cooperation, communication
and persuasion, the affecting of the receivers' knowledge, attitudes and
behaviour, were among the most important. To transmit their arguments
the leadership had two channels (among others) which are open to obser¬
vation by the outsider: the direct contact afforded by the annual meet¬
ing of the National Committee and the Union Journal,
As noted earlier, the President, General Secretary and some
members of the EC attended NC meetings and could intervene in the
-121-
proceedings, though they could not vote. Here they could and did try
to influence the policy-makers' decisions directly and explicitly.
The Journal was. under the rules, the exclusive domain of the
General Secretary:
He shall ... issue a (Monthly) "Journal" in which shall be pub¬
lished any original decision given by the Executive Council,
upon which the Rules are silent.
The "Journal" may contain anything of interest to the members of
the Union and ... shall be open to receive suitable contributions
from members or others appertaining to our trade and organiza¬
tion. The General Secretary shall be responsible for the
conduct of the "Journal". (114)
Miohels considered trade union journals instruments for the
leaders' pursuit of personal power and authority, the third type of
concern outlined earlier. He wrote that the "labour press, and this
applies equally to trade-union journals" are used "for the conquest,
the preservation and the consolidation of power on the part of the
leaders" and are, therefore, "full of panegyrics concerning the
115
personalities of the leaders". If Michels was right, the AEU
Journal was a remarkable exception. The absence of any attempt to
create a cult of personality of the leader fits in with our earlier
description of the ABCJ as an "exclusive democracy" turning into an
"aristocracy". The craftsman lay member's sense of equality with, and
aspirations to control of, the craftsman paid officer did not permit the
personalization of the Union that could occur in a "popular bossdcm"
114. Rule 16:5.
115. Robert laichels, Political Parties, translated by Eden and Cedar
Paul (London, 1915), p. 139,
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— as Turner expressed it so aptly -—like the TGTiU. Indeed, even
the most cursory comparison of the AEU Journal and the TGWU Record for
the years 1945 to 1S51 shows how strong was the cult of the leader in
the latter union. References to and articles about the comings, goings,
doings and sayings of the General Secretary, Arthur Deakin, are a con¬
stant feature of the Record. In the AEU Journal the President and the
members of the Executive Council were sure only of figuring in the
"Abstract Report of Council's Proceedings" which was drafted by the
President and in which the participants * names were usually emitted.
The General Secretary, as editor, contributed a monthly column of news
and opinion and selected the other contributions, but he was no more
built up as "leader" than anyone else.
In a sense the mere reporting of the Executive's activities may
be a means of glorification, especially when the reports show the
Council's members hobnobbing with cabinet ministers and other members
of the elite. Very often, however, one gets the impression that the
detailed descriptions of negotiations with the employers, of claims
and counterclaims, arguments and counterarguments, are not an invita¬
tion to admiration but an attempt to deflect rank-and-file ire by
demonstrating how hard the Union's negotiators tried. The detail of
the suHEiaries is particularly great when it is the President himself
who is conducting the negotiations, perhaps because he was the most
116. Turner, pp. 287-90.
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vulnerable to attack and easiest to blame for the all-too-frequent
failures and defeats suffered by the Union.
The Journal played no part in Union elections except as a means
of informing the members that an election was about to take place, of
recording the names of the candidates and reporting the vote. Evidence
was found in later years of the use of the Journal to publicize the
incumbent or his favoured successor or of launching vicious attacks on
117
the opposition in the run-up to an election. One problem with the
first charge is that what the President, for example, does is by
definition more newsworthy than what anyone else does. Furthermore,
as Undy points out, in the specific case cited, the outgoing President
■— who did not need the publicity -— got more "plugs* than the "heir
118
apparent" who did. In any case, there is no evidence of such biased
reporting before 1951, possibly because there were no readily identifi¬
able heirs apparent.
The Journal, of course, was used to attack the internal opposi¬
tion, and in 1928 and again in 1933 such attacks were published about
119
the time of presidential elections. The first of these was a
response to a particularly blatant flouting of the election publicity
117. Ken Coates, "The State of the AEU", in Ihe Crisis of British
Socialism (London, 1971), ppe 167-74 (p. 173); Edelstein and
Warner, pp. 303-05.
118. R. Undy, "The Electoral Influence of the Opposition Party in the
A.U.E.W. Engineering Section 1960-75", British Journal of
Industrial Relations. 17 (1979), 19-33 (p. 33).
119. Journal. March 1928, pp. 7-8; February 1933, p. 10.
rules by the Metal Workers* Minority Movement, so it hardly seems to
have been part of a premeditated campaign by the official leadership
(always assuming, of course, that the accusations were true). The
second attack dealt with the Movement's use of Union channels to distri¬
bute its propaganda, a perennial sore point with the leadership. The
Journal frequently contained attacks on the rank-and-file opposition
during the interwar years, and, given the frequency of elections in the
AEU, it is surprising that such attacks did not coincide more often with
120
important election campaigns. The leadership's concern seems not to
have been only or particularly with elections but with policy as well
and with the opposition's apparent ability to hamper the execution of
policies determined by the centre. Indeed, it seems that the Journal
was even intended by the rule-makers as a propaganda instrument for
nationally determined policies.
According to the Union rule book, one of the reasons for estab¬
lishing the Journal was the need for a vehicle in which to publish
"any original decision given by the (EC) upon which the Riles are
121
silent." The lack of any substantive difference between decisions
of this type and those disseminated throught the Union's other communi¬
cation channels leads one to doubt this reason. Such decisions are
neither more nor less likely to affect the ordinary member than those
relayed to branch secretaries by post. Still, the leadership did use
120, See above, this chapter, footnote 102.
121. Rile 16:5.
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the Journal for ordinary downward communication of this type. The
"original decision", task directives and explanations, as well as pro¬
cedural instructions, appeared, as did articles about the history of
the Union and the British Labour Movement, portraits of trade union and
labour Party leaders, past and present, essays on economics and so on.
These educational articles clearly were intended as a means of deepening
the members * commitment to the organization and its purposes.
The second reason cited in the rules for establishing the Journal
is contained in the statement that "the ♦Journal* may contain anything
of interest to the members of the Union and ... shall be open to receive
suitable contributions from members or others appertaining to our trade
and organization". It was, in short, to be a forum for discussion and
122
debate of Union affairs. The Journal was used in just this way, and
many sides of many questions were published in it. This freedom of
expression was not unrestricted, however, and the General Secretary,
who was "responsible for the conduct of the *Journal'", used his edi¬
torial prerogatives to exclude certain opposition elements from this
platform.
The only explicit instance of such exclusion, in 1925, was
123
reported in the Journal itself. Tom Mann, a former General Secretary
himself and a leader of the Minority Movement, submitted an article
about the MM for publication and was refused. The General Secretary,
122. Journal. January 1976, p. 20.
123. Journal. February 1925, p. 53.
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A. H. Smethurst,
assumed full responsibility in refusing to publish the article as
submitted, by Bro. Mann, believing that the best interests of the
society would be served by the membership talcing their share of
the work under the provisions provided for in our rule book0 To
create a movement outside the union is to disintegrate, and if
ever there was a need for unity in our ranks surely it has been
during the past few years.
The article was rejected, then, because it was antagonistic to the
interests of the organization, its maintenance as a single and united
movement. In calling for the members to carry out the tasks assigned
them by the rules, Smethurst was also underlining his concern for the
maintenance of the power distribution in the Union.
Although such an explicit statement of editorial policy was
never to be repeated, it was implicit in the Executive's warnings
against the use of Union funds and facilities on behalf of "external"
organizations, like the Minority Movement, to which the AEU was not
124
affiliated. One factor behind this opposition to externally
controlled bodies was the Union's traditional independence. An AKJ
controlled by the MM {or the TUC or a permanent coalition of engineering
unions) could not engage freely or directly in its primary function of
collective bargaining about the conditions of employment. Another
factor was that, as a rival for the loyalty of the worker on the shop-
floor and in the districts, the internal opposition could hinder the
peaceful application of settlements reached at the national level.
124. See, for example, Journal. February 1953, p. 10; January 1941,
p. 7.
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Given the Engineers' tendency to re-elect their leaders, it was not the
"mere" holdiDg of office but the ability to use that office, that is,
policy and organizational considerations, which led to the denial of
opposition access to the Journal and to the attacks launched on the
internal opposition in its pages.
This policy of exclusion was not absolute. Shortly after the
Mann episode, two articles by Jack Tanner, another prominent member of
125
the MM, appeared. The subject the opening of the Union to
unskilled workers — and Tanner's stance — he supported it
undoubtedly made his contribution more palatable. One might have
thought that the General Secretary would be wary of allowing a leading
member of the opposition to "plug" himself in this way, and in fact
Tanner's name appears only on the second article. On the other hand,
total exclusion simply would have given the opposition a weapon to use
against the official leadership.
The General Secretary's monthly editorials were one of the
principal vehicles for the expression of Executive opinion in the
Journal. These "Editor's Rotes" were a fine misture of news and
opinion about all kinds of things of concern to the Union. If there
was no official policy on an issue, the Secretary would either wait for
Executive or NC guidance or voice his own views. Once the EC or NC had
decided a policy, he would back their line. Only rarely, as in 1942,
when the Rational Committee demanded the immediate opening of a second
125. Journal. March 1S25, pp. 50-51 and April 1925, pp. 58-60.
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front in Europe did the Secretary dare disagree. The then General
Secretary, Fred Smith, tola the members: 'Slake your further contribu¬
tions towards the strategy of the war by refraining from tendering
advice upon subjects for which you do not possess knowledge or tech-
126
nique."
The AEO's leaders, therefore, used the Journal to influence the
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour of its receivers. Who were its
receivers, however? Certainly not the entire membership. If the
Journal ostensibly was not aimed at specific groups in the Union, the
maimer of its distribution ensured that in practice its readership was
restricted. Copies of the Journal were sent to branches where the mem¬
bers could pick them up (or, before 1927, buy them). Branch attendance
gave rise to complaints and arguments in the AEU almost continuously
127
since the amalgamation. The fewer the members to attend meetings,
the fewer the magazines picked up, the smaller the proportion of the
members reached by the leaders' message (assuming it was read).
In 1925 £1298 14s. 7d. was collected from sales of the Journal
128
at Id. a copy, that is, a total of 311,695 copies sold during the
year, or less than 26,000 a month. In addition, "approximately 4,000
copies (had) to be supplied free of charge to branch and other
123
officials". So 30,000 was the average circulation# Even assuming
126. Journal. September 1942, p. 230.
127. Journal. March 1921, pp. 97-98.
128, Journal. September 1926, p. 45.
129, Journal. July 1926, p, 58,
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that each copy was passed on to at least one other member, it is highly
unlikely that a majority of the AEU's 234,323 members ever saw
the Journal. From 1927 on all members paid Id. a month for the Journal
as part of their subscription and had only to attend their branch meet¬
ings in order to pick it up. Branch attendance thus becomes an
indicator of the potential readership. The estimated attendance for the
years 1920 to 1945 is twenty per cent of the Union membership. Since
this estimate is based on the average poll in Union elections, which
always took place at meetings of the branch, and since important
elections probably drew more voters, this figure is probably an over-
130
estimate. The publication and circulation figures for later years
are even worse, however, and reports of Journals piling up at branches
131
or thrown out are not uncommon.
The mere fact, hovfever, that the Journal readership was restricted
to a small number of branch attenders (and anyone they migdit show their
copy of the Journal) tells us something about the Executive's audience.
It is these branch attenders who constituted the hard core of the Union's
attentive public and of its participating public as well. At branch
meetings they could learn about national union and branch affairs and
about the Union's activities in other shops and at district level,
130. Political and Economic Planning, British Trade Unionism (London,
1948), p. 180.
131. David P. Selvin, "Communications in Trade Unions : A Study of
Union Journals", British Journal of Industrial Relations
1 (1963), 73-93 (pp. 74, 78-79); Journal. December 1975. p. 562.
Consequently, they were more likely to be knowledgeable about AEU
policies and their execution and about the Union's activists, the can¬
didates for lay and full-time office. They were the constituency to
which all elected members were ultimate responsible and upon whom all
ultimately depended for advancement. Given the tendency for shop
stewards to attend far more frequently than other members, according to
132
studies of later periods in the Union's history, a relatively large
proportion would be concerned with the actual application of policy in
the shops. Branch members and stewards, as electors and candidates for
the DCs, were also responsible for policy at district level.
In general, then, the likely readers of the Journal were an im¬
portant target for Executive communications. They were the very members
whose support the leadership needed to carry out its policies and to
resist the encroachment and challenges of the internal opposition. The
Journal, moreover, was the centre's only direct link with most of these
members. Other channels led to branch and district officers and offi¬
cials who might, or might not, pass on the infoxmation as they received
it.
It was particularly important to reach these attentive and active
members since they were also the target of communications from other
sources. An organization is neither closed nor enclosing. Informal
communication systems exist alongside formal ones and the members are
132. Government Social Survoy, Workplace Industrial Relations (HMSO,
1968), p. 25; Clegg, p. 81n,
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also parts of systems completely outside the organization. The inter¬
nal opposition, with its external links, could make use of both types
133
of communication, for example.
To sum up, communication from the national officers to rank-and-
file members, in the form of personal statements by the President at
national Committee meetings and of articles in the Journal — the
focuses of our study here served a number of purposes. These
included the ordinary downward communication aims of issuing and
explaining instructions and procedures and raising the members' commit¬
ment to the organization. They also involved the furnishing of infor¬
mation to policy-makers and attempts to influence their policy decisions.
Finally, these communications also involved attempts to maintain power
relationships in the Union, in both an organizational and a personal
sense, and to preserve the unity of the organization itself. The
Journal, thus, was a tool used by the leaders in their pursuit of their
three principal organizational concern3: goal attainment, organization¬
al maintenance and the distribution of power.
133. In later years it was the leftist opposition that would complain
of intervention by external (that is, the national) media in
Union affairs. See, for example, "Interview with Bob Wright",
Marxism Today (September 1978), 271-78 (p. 273).
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CHAFTER IV
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING OF COMMUNICATION: 1945-1951
A. Leadership and Role Fulfilment
As we have seen, by 1939 certain patterns of behaviour and modes
of thought had become prevalent and habitual among the Union's leaders.
These patterns had proved persistent despite changes in personnel and
opposition from vocal sections of the rank and file and thus formed
part of the role expectations of any individual who entered the Union's
executive branch.
This is not to say that these patterns were immutable. It
should be clear from the preceding chapter that the AEU was nothing if
not an adaptive organization, reacting to changes in the external set¬
ting by changing itself rather than by trying to change that setting in
any fundamental sense. The organization's prevailing patterns of
behaviour had evolved as responses to technological, economic and
political changes in a wider society more than to the leaders'
ambitions and attitudes, When different pressures emerged during the
Second World War, the earlier patterns were disrupted to some extent,
although the leadership tried to minimize certain aspects of the
disturbance.
Under the first postwar Labour Governments, various and some¬
times countervailing pressures undermined some patterns and reinforced
others. Thus the leaders' operative indifference to social transforms-
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tioxi was buttressed by a Government which, as we saw in Chapter II,
while eager for reform and concerned for the welfare of the mass of
the people, showed little interest in forcing fundamental social change.
The leadership's centralizing proclivities were strengthened by their
conception of the necessity of full employment and of the dependence of
full employment on the prosperity of the national economy. At the same
time full employment gave added impetus to centrifugal tendencies in
the Union.
The two main spokesmen for the AEU's national leadership, the
President, Jack Tanner, and the General Secretary, Ben Gardner, were
—- when not required by the NC to support opposing policies faith¬
ful exponents of the attitudes and patterns of behaviour prevailing
among the national officers. It is wrong, given the nature of decision¬
making and of power relationships in the AEU at the time, to ascribe
any major significance to the personal beliefs and attitudes of either
1
of these men, as Richter does in Tanner's case.
Even before his election to the Executive, Tanner had not
consistently championed only those views consonant with the syndicalism
of his young manhood. Hie views he expressed had changed over time, and
they changed further after he became President in the summer of 1939.
While a biography of Tanner is sadly lacking and beyond the scope of
this thesis, it seems fair to say that he usually propounded the views
1. See, for example, Richter, pp. 45, 221.
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of the group or organization to which he devoted most of his time and
2
effort. After 1939 that group was the Executive Council of the AEU.
Once he had championed the workshop organization against the
Union's centralizing national officialdom, called for workers' control
of industry on the basis of strong shop and works organization, attacked
the Union leaders and the labour F&rty and called for the use of the
3
strike weapon to attain political objects. A little later he had
become a leading member of the communist-dominated Minority Movement
which organized the internal opposition to the official leadership and
4
rejected direct workers' control. It was with the help of the
communists and the left that he was elected President, but by the
summer of 1940 he was attacking the communists for their anti-war
5
policy and for trying to mobilize support among the shop stewards.
After retiring from Union office, he became editor of the anti-communist
trade union newspaper, IRIS News.
2. A biography of sorts may be cobbled together from the following
sources, with the emphasis on the earlier part of his career:
Journal. April 1929, p. 17; August 1931, pp. 4-5; April 1954,
p. 106; April 1965, p. 135; The Times, 4 March 1965, p. 14;
Carew, pp. 103-06, 294; James KLugmann, History of the Communist
Party of Great Britain. 2 volumes (London, 1969); Martin, passim.,
especially pp. 5-19, 50-51, 110-13, 133-36; Hinton, pp. 324-26;
L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Ffarty (London, 1966),
pp. 60-61; Hugo Dewar, Communist Politics in Britain (London,
1976); Pribicevic, pp. 107-08.
3. See his editorials in the Shop Stewards' Movement Journal, Solidarity.
1918-1921; for example, June 1918, p. 2; February 1919, p. 1.
4. Martin is the best published source on this period in the development
of the MM.
5. The Times. 22 May 1940, p. 3; 1 June 1940, p. 3.
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Far less has been published about Gardner and he himself pub¬
lished far too little during the earlier part of his career to enable
one to judge -whether he had undergone similar metamorphoses. Hie little
6
that is available indicates that he had not. In any event, after
becoming General Secretary in 1943, he "co-operated loyally with his
7
presidents and kept a sensitive finger on the pulse of the membership".
For both men the only apparent dissonance in the policies they
pursued and propounded with those favoured by the Executive arose from
their obedience to the directives of the NC. Given their potential
influence within the Executive, they may well have agreed generally
with its official policy. In the final analysis, however, whether they
did or not is not of critical importance to what they said in public.
B. Organizational Goals, Operations and Maintenance
1. Conditions of Employment Goals
The leadership of the AECJ emerged from the Second World War with
its order of priorities generally intact. Its main objective was main¬
taining and improving the members* conditions of employment through
collective bargaining. A glance at Tables 1 and 2 above shows that this
6. Journal. May 1956, p. 133; B. C. Roberts, Trade Union Government
and Administration in Great Britain (London, 1956), p. 535;
The Times. 7 April 1956, p. 11.
7, Hie Times. 7 April 1956, p. 11.
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goal and this method continued to occupy most of the Executive's
reported attention, although, increasingly, collective bargaining
8
took place in cooperation and coordination with other trade unions.
During the war, the AEU leaders had shifted from their prewar
policy of limited confrontation and adopted instead the "national"
line of limited collaboration with employers and the Government. The
initial adherence to this line had been made possible, in large measure,
by full employment during the war. The AEU's leaders wished to
maintain full employment after the war as well. The 1945 victory of the
Labour Party constituted a part of the answer to the leadership's wishes
since labour pledged full employment in an economy geared to maintaining
a high level of exports and economic expansion. It also made possible
the continuation of the "national" line. Indeed, this line was a
necessary factor in the Union's full employment policy. If full employ¬
ment is the principal objective and deemed necessary to the Union's
successful pursuit of its other goals, the pmrsuit of short-term
interests must be tempered to accord with the basic aim. If national
economic expansion is deemed to be the instrument for maintaining full
employment, it too must take priority. In these ciecumstances the
national interest is consonant with the interests of the worker-members.
Collaboration with others seeking this interest, be they employers,
bureaucrats or politicians, becomes not only possible but a positive
8. See above, pp. 74-75.
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virtue. Moreover, fundamental changes in the structure of the economy
and anything else that might disrupt expansion are to be avoided.
Tanner made the point clear to the members of the 1949 NC: wOur
members • welfare — like all others* — is ultimately dependent on
national conditions, and any decisions we make, supposedly in the
members' interests that are not also in the national interest must
9
ultimately react to our members* detriment." Maintenance of the
"national" line was made easier by the lack of any significant counter¬
vailing pressure from the internal opposition, which continued its own
policy of collaboration. In the event, the AEU leadership, which had
come to accept the "national" approach rather later than many other
10
unions, expounded upon it with the fervour of the convert.
In the immediate postwar period, the AEU Executive did not per-
• ceive or make explicit any essential short-term contradiction between
the needs of the nation and the material benefit of the worker. Thus
in February and March, 1946, the General Secretary called for higher
priority to be given the production of household goods as an incentive
11
to increased production of all products by the workers. Yet once the
9. KFNC, 1949. p. 242,
10. See, for example, Journal. November 1946, p. 322; March 1947, p. 66;
September 1947, pp. 257-58; November 1947, p. 322; April 1948,
p. 98; July 1948, p. 202; December 1949, pp. 353-54; August
1950, p. 229; September 1950, pp. 261-62; March 1951, pp. 65-
66; July 1951, p. 201; September 1951, pp. 257-58,
11. Journal. February 1946, p. 33; March 1946, p. 66.
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dependence of the workers' condition on the prosperity of the nation
was accepted, it was but a short step to the position that anything
that might harm the nation was not in the workers' interest. This
viewpoint was all the more acceptable as the delicacy of the nation's
position and of the workers' position in it was highlighted by the
fuel crisis of the winter of 1947, the convertibility crisis of the
following summer, the increase in military expenditure and so on.
From 1947 on, the Labour leadership and other sections of British
society came to see a major source of danger to the national economy in
wage rises. Wage restraint or a Government-imposed wages policy was
12
touted as the solution. In the summer of 1947, Tanner attacked the
notion of a Government-imposed policy and was echoed by Gardner who
called Government intervention in collective bargaining "a usurpation
13
of the rights of Trade Unions",, It was not wage restraint as such
that they opposed but its imposition by the Government, The necessity
of restraint is implicit in Tanner's statement that "We are quite
competent and prepared ... to adjust our demands ... in accordance
14
with national needs". The NC did not agree, however, and called for
15
large wage rises.
Consequently, when, after much lobbying by the Government, the
1UC General Council adopted a "voluntary policy" of wage restraint in
12, See above pp. 42-43,
15. Journal, October 1947, p, 290,
14. RPNC. 1947. p. 268,
15, Journal. September 1947, p. 271,
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the winter of 1947-48 and called a meeting of trade union Executives to
16
approve it, the AKJ "voted against the recommendations". Despite the
constraints imposed by the rank-and-file policy-making bodies, the ASJ
leaders continued to preach restraint to the members in the pages of the
17
Journal and at National Committee meetings.
As Britain's economic difficulties mounted, culminating in the
huge devaluation of sterling in the autumn of 1949, the General Council
formulated even stricter wage guidelines. Devaluation and social
service cuts, however, also made it more difficult to "sell" restraint
to the workers. The lack of severe restrictions on profits and dividends
did not help the Government and General Council's case either. The AEU
and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, further¬
more, were committed to a £l-a-week wage claim. In the event, they
found themselves among the majority at the 12 January 1950 meeting of
union Executives who voted against acceptance of the General Council
18
plan.
Even then calls for restraint persisted, but now they were
coupled with demands for the Government to make wage restraint more
acceptable by doing something about prices, profits and dividends. Yet,
while the AEU leaders did not go as far as the leaders of some unions
16. Leo Panitch, Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy (Cambridge,
1976), pp. 20-29; Journal, April 1948, pp. 97-98,
17. See, for example, HPNC, 1948. p. 225; KPNC, 1949. p. 241; Journal.
April 1949, p. 97; July 1949, p. 194.
18. Journal. January 1950, p. 2.
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who spoke explicitly of the importance of high profits to the nation
19
and the national economy, they did demand Government action of a
type based implicitly on such an analysis, which was consonant, of
course, with their "national" approach. Hius, at the meeting of the
1950 National Committee, Tanner spoke of the value of wage restraint
to "the country's economy" and pointed out how much more company profits
were now being paid in taxes than before the war. His short-term
solution to the problem of too-high profits was not their total
expropriation by the state. Instead, he called for price controls to
limit the need and possibility of expanded profits. He also suggested
"a legal limitation of dividends, with the proviso that any surplus
earned by companies over and above the limit should be shared in
agreed proportions between workers and employers"; in short, profit
20 21
sharing. He repeated this suggestion the following year,
Panitch has suggested that the success of the wages policy was
due to the loyalty of the leaders of the trade unions to the labour
22
Party and to the influence of the Phrty hierarchy. This is indeed a
plausible explanation, but it must be remembered that the Executive
shared at least some of the premises, in the form of the "national"
outlook, that made persuasion easier. Wage restraint was a corollary
of the proposition that the condition of the workers depended on the
19, Panitch, p, 30,
20. HFNC. 1950. pp. 237-38.
21. HFNC. 1951. pp. 287-88.
22, Panitch, pp. 30-31.
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condition of the national economy as it was then organized. In a
capitalist economy, insofar as wage rises "unjustified" by greater
labour productivity are inflationary, they are harmful to the nation
23
and must, therefore, be restrained. As we shall see later, wage
restraint also dovetailed with other policies and interests of the AEU
leaders•
One of the other corollaries of the "national" policy was the
necessity of increasing production and productivity. This point was
hammered home with numbing repetitiveness. Tanner thus noted that
24
"for us production transcends everything", while Gardner wrote:
It is as certain as anything can be that to overcome the
immediate difficulties of our own country we must depend upon
our own efforts. Ihat is why our own Union Executive has felt it
necessary to impress upon our membership responsibility for
assisting industry to attain the production targets set ... in
the Government's Export Programme. (25)
Similar statements had been made before and would be made again in
26
later years. In the interests of increased production, the TUC
General Council and the AEU Executive Council called for the "suspension
of numerous workshop practices and customs to secure maximum output (in
23. Compare HPNC, 1950. p. 237.
24. Journal. August 1947, p. 235.
25. Journal. November 1947, p. 235.
26. Journal. February 1946, p. 33; April 1946, p. 97; November 1946,
p. 322; March 1947, p. 66; June 1947, p. 166; April 1948, p. 98;
July 1948, pp. 225-26; August 1948, p. 258; October 1948,
pp. 304-05; December 1948, pp. 353-54; April 1947, pp. 97-98;
August 1949, p. 235; October 1949, pp. 289-90; November 1949,
p. 322; April 1950, p. 102; November 1950, p. 326; March 1951,
p. 65; July 1951, p. 201.
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order to meet) the clamant needs for engineering products to renovate
and expand our own national economy and to meet the urgent needs of the
27
whole world", They called, too, for the acceptance of greater
28
mechanization in order to permit greater productivity. In the post¬
war economic conditions, increased productivity was no longer seen to
pose the same threat to employment as it had done before. Indeed,
insofar as it contributed to national prosperity, it was deemed to be
in the workers* interest.
Apart from the acceptance of the need for wage restraint and
increased productivity, another hallmark of the AEU leaders* pursuit of
their conditions of employment goals was their emphasis on a "new wages
structure". Before the war the AEQ had "pressed for a national agree¬
ment to establish grade rates for particular machines", but with little
29
success. The postwar "new wages structure" was based on a different
approach to the problem, more in keeping with the changed nature of the
Union and the changed economic conditions. Before the war it had been
thought necessary to protect the skilled members' jobs by making it
just as financially unattractive to hire an unskilled man as to hire a
skilled one to operate a given machine, ®hen the Union contained many
more unskilled and semi-skilled workers and when it seemed possible to
ensure that there would be jobs for all workers in the industry, it
27, Journal, November 1946, p, 322* compare September 1947, p, 258,
28, RENO. 1945. pp. 220-21; HPNC. 1950. pp. 244-45,
29, Branson and Heinemann, p, 113; see also Jefferys, p, 246,
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became possible to press for a widening of wage differentials0 These
had narrowed considerably over the years and were substantially narrower
30
than in other industrialized countries.
The new plan had emerged from a 1944 National Committee resolu-
31
tion demanding a change. Together with the National Engineering Joint
Trades Movement and then with the CSED, a framework was developed and
approved by the CSEU Executives at their 1949 Annual Meeting, It called
for the establishment of a six-grade scheme with a differential between
32
the lowest and top grades of about 30 per cent of the basic wage.
These proposals found the employers willing to negotiate, but the
discussions were repeatedly interrupted by other issues, emergencies and
claims, like the shorter working week, the fuel crisis and the £l claim.
Tanner had explicitly opposed the £l claim, not on the grounds that it
ran counter to the policy of restraint favoured by the Executive, but
because "the pressing of this immediate claim would lead the ecployers
33
to defer consideration of the proposed new wage structure". At the
next meeting he told the NC that he had been proved right. The £l
claim had inhibited discussion of the new wages structure, and the
34
minimal progress on the claim in no way made up for the loss.
Obviously, the Executive emphasized the New Wages Structure part-
30, CSEP Annual Meeting,. 1949, p, 59,
31, The Times. 20 June 1944, p. 2,
32, The Times. 9 May 1945, p. 2; HPNC, 1945. pp. 222-23; CSEO Annual
Meeting, 1949, pp. 58-70,
33, The Times. 25 JUne 1949, p. 2,
34, RPNC. 1950. p. 238; compare RPNC. 1951. pp. 280-81.
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ly in order to serve the interests of the Union "aristocracy", its
skilled members. In serving their interests, moreover, the leaders
also sought to maintain the skilled members' commitment to the Union
and the leadership. The leaders argued, too, that especially in a time
of restraint, the expansion of differentials was a necessary, and not
necessarily very costly, incentive to increased production. It was a
35
contribution, therefore, to the strengthening of the national economy.
The New Wages Structure was thus seen and/or represented as being consis¬
tent with the Executive's "national" orientation. As we shall see
later, this policy had other functions as well,
2, Welfare Benefits
While the Union's conditions of employment goals continued to be
the AEU leadership's major preoccupation, far less importance was now
attached to the organization's welfare role, as Table 1 In Chapter III
indicates. This change was a direct result of the extension of state
social services, Bie Union ceased to act as the Government's agent in
36
the administration of the National Insurance scheme. Moreover, even
the benefits still provided by the Union became less attractive to the
members because they were less necessary. The state schemes were seen
to provide adequately for pensions, funerals and so on, and the pre-war
tendency continued for new members, even skilled ones, to join "less-
skilled" sections of the Union, in which lower subscrptions bought fewer
35, For example, HFNC, 1946, p. 211; RPNC, 1950, p. 239,





Just as there was continuity in the primacy attached to the
Union's conditions of employment objectives, so, too, was there
continuity in the low priority attached to social transformation goals.
There was a great deal of talk of socialism, but the leadership nonethe¬
less left little doubt as to the relative operative importance of
socialism and of the more traditional goals0 In their statements to the
National Committee and in the pages of the Journal, they stressed that,
since the period that they were going through was a transitional one,
since they were still only en route to a socialist society, the Union's
role as defender of the worker would remain supreme and unhampered. Of
course, in performing this function, the organization would take into
account the needs of the community as a whole.
The clearest statement of this view was made by Tanner in his
address to the 1946 NC, the first held under the new Government. The
election of a labour Government, he said, "introduces new values, new
considerations in relating our own policy to the overriding needs of the
national plan", but the Union would brook no dictation from any authority
on the way these values and needs were to be incorporated into its
considerations. The trade unions must remain the "authorities on the
subject of wages and hours". "We make this reservation", he continued,
37. Jefferys, p. 208.
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"we must make it -— not in any narrow sectarian spirit, but as a
guarantee against the many pitfalls and dangers on the road to
38
socialism."
These "new values, new considerations" would lead, of course, to
certain changes, but they were changes of policy or, as Gardner put it,
"of trade union practice", not of purpose or function. Full employment
and the need for the "maximum output of the most modern mechanized in¬
dustrial equipment" meant that those "traditional trade union practices
(that) involve a limitation of output ... are obsolete, as the unions
can better protect the interests of their members now than in the old
39
days of ruthless and unscrupulous capitalist exploitation".
The situation thus seemed straightforward enough during these
first years after the war. In mid-1949, however, Tanner told the NC
that the transition to socialism actually placed more constraints on
the Union's behaviour than had hitherto been conceded. The Union and
its achievements, he noted, were products of the capitalist system and
of an attempt to cope with it, not of any effort to change its "funda¬
mental laws". The Union could hardly act as if these laws did not
exist, so "most of our present demands are necessarily of a capitalist
nature". Consequently, "we must not confuse ourselves by imagining
that they (our demands) contain some virtuous socialist principle".
Nevertheless, he continued, "we must also relate our demands to our
58. KPNC. 1946. pp. 215-16.
39. Journal. September 1947, p. 258.
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socialist objective and take the greatest care not to endanger our
transition to socialism by demands more suited to capitalism as it was
40
in this country 50 years ago."
On closer examination, however, this apparent reversal of
priorities turns out to have been nothing of the kind, Tanner's state¬
ment, in fact, was part of a plea for wage restraint which, as we have
seen, had less to do with building a socialist Britain than with
assisting the expansion of the capitalist economy. The post-1945 Execu¬
tive Council had no more than its predecessors made the transformation
of society its primary objective,
A full-scale demonstration of the leadership's operative
indifference to or ambivalence about such elements of socialism (in its
various contemporary conceptions) as planning, workers' control and
nationalization is beyond the scope of this thesis, but some parts of
the arguments and attitudes regarding these factors should be noted.
Planning, which, according to the leadership, was feasible only
41
within certain limits, was conceived, not as an element of a socialist
society, but as a tool of reconstruction,, It was an aid in establishing
42
the expanding national economy necessary to full employment. This
conception accorded with the Labour Government's own lack of interest in
43
developing a coherent planning system.
4°, KPNC. 1949. pp. 245-46.
41, See HPNC, 1945. p, 220; The Times. 16 June 1948, p, 5,
42, HPNC, 1945. p. 220; Journal. July 1945, p, 225; The Times.
7 October 1946, p, 5,
43, See above, pp. 44-45,
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The Government also relegated the controls that might have made
planning something more than mere prediction, projection or indication
to the status of necessary but temporary evils of the period of recon¬
struction® As far as the Union was concerned, one of the controls, the
direction of labour, was not only an evil encroachment on the operations
44
of trade unions, but unnecessary too. Other types of controls were
deemed useful, however, in the special circumstances of reconstruction
45
or the "semi-war" conditions of the Korean War. Controls, thus, were
related not to principles but to circumstances. The relevant circum¬
stance, moreover, was not the building of a socialist Britain but
remedying the disruption of the capitalist economy.
Even though the AEU leadership saw only limited value and limited
possibilities in economic planning, it evinced great interest in the
formal planning apparatus. In late 1945, for example, the NEJTSi called
for the establishment of an Engineering Advisory Board, "to assist the
Government to draw up and carry through a practical plan for the
46
engineering industry". The AEU Executive treated the notion very
seriously. Tanner even wrote letters to The Times about it and called
for a body with a permanent chairman and secretariat, a body v&ich would,
47
moreover, involve unions, employers and consumers.
Without a system of controls actually to direct production, the
44. Journal. December 1945, pp. 353-54.
45. BHKi. 1948. pp. 218-19; iffNC. 1947. p. 269; HPNC. 1951. p. 288.
460 The Times. 9 November 1946, p. 5.
47. The Times. 7 October 1946, p. 5; 9 November 1946, p. 5.
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Planning Board envisaged by the Engineering leadership would have
produced little more than, an indicative plan. The close involvement
of the unions, employers and consumers, however, might have made the
plans more realistic and more coherent than in the existing "planning
system" in which "the makers of ,,, machinery (were) sometimes consulted,
the British user rarely (was), and the organized worker who (made) the
48
machines never".
The Minister of Supply rejected the engineering unions* ideas
and decided instead to establish an Engineering Advisory Council which
was little more than the sort of body that Tanner characterized as a
49
forum for "polite conversation round a table every two months". The
unions agreed and appointed representatives to the Council but con¬
tinued to express their dissatisfaction. At the 1948 Annual Meeting of
the GSEO Executives (the AEU had joined the Confederation in 1947), the
AECJ and the Foundry Workers sponsored a resolution calling for the
Government to establish a co-ordinated and integrated planning structure
for the engineering industry. The new structure would include sectoral
subcommittees and parallel regional and district committees and involve
50
the workers in the shops through JPCs,
Since the function of such structures and planning was not to
create a socialist economy, one must look for another reason for the
48, The Times. 7 October 1946, p, 5,
49, The Times, 9 November 1946, p, 5,
50, CSEU Annual Meeting. 1947, pp. 56-57; 1948, pp. 85-86,
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leadership's concern to involve the unions and the workers in the
planning system. One such reason, suggested by Tanner himself, was
that the system would help create trust and so increase production:
It is worse than useless to lecture the man who, on the analogy
of past experience, fears that by increasing his efforts now he
will merely "work himself out of a job". Hie positive way to
convince him that a policy of expansion is being genuinely
pursued is to enable him to participate in drawing up and
carrying out a plan for full employment...0
In the production drive to-day it is idle to expect the same
response, initiative and creative improvization which character¬
ized the industrial war effort. It is, indeed, hopeless, when
no one knows where or how his individual endeavour fits into the
scheme of things. (51)
Involvement of the workers and their representatives at all levels in
the planning and management of industry thus had little to do with
socialist planning or workers* control, but was intended, as the JFCs
had been during the war, to help meet the overriding national need
for increased production.
As the 1948 AEU-AUFW resolution indicates, involvement in
planning councils and JPCs were all part of the same programme. Most of
the JPCs had lapsed shortly after the war, tdien they were no longer
52
required by the Government. There were various reasons for their
decline, but the principal one seems to have been that no one thought
53
them worth fighting for. Yet the Union leadership consistently
preached the involvement of workers in the planning and management of
51. Hie Times. 9 November 1946, p. 5.
52. William Monaghan, "Hie Shop Steward in British Industry", Co-exist¬
ence. 3 (1966), 75-86 (pp. 85-86).
53. Compare Managhan, pp. 85-86.
-151-
production. Ihere were, however, changes in emphasis and interpreta¬
tion, The stress on immediate and direct involvement through JPCs and
54
planning boards, gave way to a concern for the promotion of indivi¬
dual workers to managerial positions, to training working people for
these positions and to training shop stewards in order to make them
capable participants in JPCs,
This change was reflected in the remoulding of the Union's
education programme. The rather broad and unfocussed courses offered
by the AEU's week-long summer schools in 1946 and 1948 gave way in later
years to courses with a narrower focus and a clearer emphasis on the
members• role in the Union and the Union's role in the national
economy. The earlier courses had included lectures and discussions on
the history of the Union, trade unionism and politics, engineers and
reconstruction, the causes of unemployment, the history of the inter¬
national trade union movement, the "Working Class Flan for Britain" and
so on. In 1949 the summer schools offered only three courses : 1*} the
part of the trade unions in reconstruction; 2) "Planning labour Britain",
and 3) the structure and operation of the AEU. In 1950 week-end schools
were introduced, and they concentrated on the structure and functions of
the Union, while summer schools that year dealt with "industrial
55
management". A similar pattern was followed in subsequent years.
54. HFNC. 1945. pp. 215-16; RRJC, 1946, pp. 210-11; HFNC, 1947, p. 271.
55, Journal. October 1946, pp. 304-05; November 1948, p. 332; April
1949, p. 100; October 1950, p. 315; January 1951, p. 10.
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The emphasis on management training seems to have been a
response to increasing dissatisfaction among activists in the rank and
file, particularly in the internal opposition, with the lack of change
in management personnel and methods in the nationalized industries. At
the 1949 NO, for example, a resolution was passed which called for the
nationalization of the engineering industry and its control "by elected
56
committees of workers and technicians". Yet the following year,
Tanner spoke of the need "to help members to equip themselves to exer¬
cise ... control" of the nationalized industries and to democratize
these firms by extending joint consultation, "leading to active partici¬
pation in management", the creation of "adequate machinery for training
and promotion within them and ... greater working class representation
57
on the Boards". The contrast with the National Committee resolution
is striking. The leadership's approach was not even gradualist; it did
not envisage anything more than "active participation" in management and
the integration of individual workers into existing managerial structures.
Anything else might have disrupted an already disrupted economy and
endangered the full employment which was now the leadership's principal
operational goal. It would also have established competing centres of
power, disrupted patterns of authority in the Union and, ultimately,
58
challenged the Union's very raison d'etre.
56. Carew, p. 166.
57. RPNC. 1950. pp. 235, 244.
58. See below pp. 177-78.
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Nationalization seems to have been regarded as even less useful
and important than planning, but the leaders continued to expound on its
virtues in response to NC and other rank-and-file resolutions, The
Executive did not reject nationalization out of hand. It was suitable
to some industries, as Tanner told the National Committee in 1945:
We know that some basic industries — mainly fuel and transport
at this stage can never be organized effectively under
private ownership and that their future development, on the
only lines which will meet to-day's requirements, depends
primarily on their nationalization. (59)
Other basic industries eventually would be nationalized, but in engin¬
eering all that was really required was some planning and the continua¬
tion of controls. The point of nationalization was evidently to develop
60
an industry so that it might effectively serve "to-day's requirements".
Bringing industry under popular control was thus a means, not-an end.
In the summer of 1948, Tanner told the assembled National Com¬
mittee delegates that nationalization was no panacea for Britain's
difficulties and, in effect, questioned its value as a means of
"efficient administration, ... equitable distribution of our
61
own resources". The NC, however, voted "for 'immediate* nationaliza-
62 63
tion of the steel industry", and the Union's spokesmen fell into line.
Even so, Gardner continued to write in the Journal of the alternatives
59. RTNC. 1945. pp. 220-21.
60. Compare Journal. September 1948, p. 258.
61. RENC. 1948. p. 224.
62. Harrison, p. 145.
63. See, for example, Journal. September 1948, p. 258.
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64
to nationalization as a system of "social ownership".
In accordance with Union policy, the ABU Executive voted for a
carefully worded resolution moved by the Draughtsmen and the Foundry
Workers at the 1949 CSEU Annual Meeting. The resolution instructed the
Confederation Executive to conduct an inquiry into the engineering
industry in order to discover which sections were suitable for
nationalization and which for other kinds of public supervision and
control. The ensuing study took two years and had as its terms of
reference the criteria determined by the 1944 Post-War Reconstruction
Report of the TUC General Council. Utese criteria were so carefully
constructed as to be ideologically neutered. For example, they raise
the possibility of selective nationalization of individual firms in
order to ensure competition within an industry. Hie CSEU's Plan for
Engineering, which emerged from this study, could not help but be a
65
moderate document.
By 1951, however, nationalization was being presented by many
in the labour and Trade Union Movements as an issue that would frighten
the voter. The AEU Executive, nevertheless, obeyed Union policy and
supported the Plan, until the labour Party Conference of October 1951,
held after the General Election had been called, when Tanner came down
firmly on the side of the "consolidationists". He polled the members of
the Union delegation and announced that the time was not ripe for the
64. Journal. January 1949, p. 2; March 1950, p. 70.
65, CSEU, Plan for Engineering (London, n.d. (1953?)).
-155-
66
immediate implementation of the Plan. The proximate cause for this
reversal seems clear: Tanner and his delegates were won over to the
belief that nationalization was a danger to the Party's electoral
chances. This should not be seen, however, as a sacrifice of principle
on behalf of the Party, certainly not as far as the leadership is con¬
cerned. As we have seen, the Union Executive did not attach much value
to the principle of nationalization. They may even have regarded the
imminent election as a good pretext for shelving the issue.
In general then, the postwar AEU leaders showed as little prac¬
tical interest in social transformation as the prewar Executives had
shown. Measures dubbed "socialist" were supported and advanced but in
very diluted form and with the intention not of achieving the Union's
"socialist objectives", as Tanner called them, without attaching too
precise a meaning to the term, but of furthering the goals relating to
conditions of employment.
4. Partisan and Parliamentary Activity
The Union's traditional attitude to the labour Party was one of
intermittent instruiaentalism, and Richter's description of the 1945-1951
67
periods ranks it with the periods of dormancy of the relationship. In
comparison with later periods this is perhaps so. In comparison with
previous years, however, this period emerges as one of greatly heightened
activity. This is demonstrated most clearly by Table 3, belcw. The ac¬
tivity began, as we have seen, during the war and took the form of the
66. See above p. 48; Richter, p. 47,
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the mobilizetion of the members to contract in to the Balitical Fund
and generally to support the labour Party.
In the wartime advertisements for the contracting-in campaign
it was the stated aim to match the Union's industrial power on the
political front. The implication was that the Union thus would somehow
be able to influence policy, but the main appeal was to considerations
of prestige. The postwar advertisements developed the main theme that
the increase in the Iblitical Fund would ensure the maintenance and
68
expansion of the social services. It is likely that, since the party
already was committed to the extension of the social services and
already had begun the process, influence within the Party's councils
with regard to this issue was not a vital consideration. To ensure
better social services it was necessary, rather, to ensure that the
Party continued in power. Contracting-in to the Political Fund would
do that by helping to fill the Party's coffers.
Of course, once the 1946 Trade Disputes Act and Trade Union Act
changed the basis of contribution from those who contracted in to those
who failed to contract out, it became easier to get money to the Thrty.
However, the Union also faced the problem of tdiat to do with the huge
sums left over after the membership had been affiliated to the I&rty.
It is in this area, in channelling money to the Party rather than in
trying to influence its policies by greater activism within it, that the
67. Richter, pp. 45-48.
68. Journal. 1946. There was an advertisement and very often one or
two short articles on the subject in each issue of the Journal.
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1944 9240 19857 2831 1482 483 7025
1945 11627 24458 3853 3665 504 15187
1946 12262 21535 1000 . 4892 871 8733
1947 24364 37165 16401 5003 754 23535
1948 48043 61675 15544 7655 687 33233
1949 51610 70053 14858 13191 1613 50927
1950 51121 80247 14515 12681 2197 40021
1951 50200 90588 14656 13193 3725 48512
Source: AEU, Financial Report. 1944-1951.
(a) All figures are rounded to the nearest pound.
(b) Levy receipts plus other receipts (interest, etc.) plus balance as
of 31 December of the preceding year0
(c) Total payments ami allocations including items not mentioned in the
table.
AEU concentrated its partisan and parliamentary activities. In 1946,
the last year of the contracting-in system, almost 29 per cent of the
69
members paid the Political Levy. In 1947, over 82 per cent did. The
amount paid in affiliation fees rose accordingly. Special grants were
made to the Party's General Election Fund and for other purposes:
£2000 in 1945, £5900 in 1948 and £15,900 in 1949, Direct election
69. Richter, p. 246.
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expenditure by the Union itself was just short of £3500 in 1945, over
£7240 in 1950 and almost £13,863 in 1951. As Table 3 shows, more and
more money was allocated to District Committees to spend locally on
branch affiliations to the Constituency Labour Parties (CLFs), propa¬
ganda and the like.
Money spent on constituency election agents and/or on
70
maintenance grants to CLPs also rose dramatically after 1948. This
was due, in part, to a change in Union policy with regard to its Parlia¬
mentary Panel, that is, its candidates for selection by CLPs as their
candidates for Parliament. In 1946 one of the AEU's sponsored MPs had
suggested that the rule according to which the Ifenel was "selected by
71
and frcsn the members paying the Political Levy" be changed to give
the Executive Council control of the selection process. He maintained
"that centralized control of the Parliamentary Panel at Head Office was
necessary in order to obtain the type of candidate who would win the
approval" of a CLP. He argued that more MPs would match on the politi-
72
cal front the Union's strength on the industrial front. The success
of the programme is indicated by the increase in maintenance grants
after 1948, as shown in Table 3. The increase in spending under this
heading shows that more Panel members were being accepted as constituency
candidates. The programme, apparently, was less successful in later
70. These and the preceding data are drawn from the AEU Financial
Heport. 1944-1951.
71. Rule 45:3.
72. Richter, p. 54.
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years, however, and it was not until 1958, after the ceiling was raised
73
on the maximum permissible grant, that the 1951 figure was surpassed.
74
It should be noted that the ceiling had also been raised in 1947 to
enable the Ihrty to take advantage of the extra money coming to the
union Political Funds under the terms of the 1946 Trade Disputes and
Trade Union Act and to enable the unions to shift their extra money
into Party coffers.
Clearly, as Richter points out, considerations of Union prestige
were involved in the desire to increase the number of AEU-sponsored
75
MPs. This is evident in the arguments used by the initiator of the
plan. Such considerations, apparently, were also a factor in the origi¬
nal campaign to increase contracting-in, as the advertisements used in
it show. Richter has also argued that increased spending was due, in
part to the growth in the Fund itself: some use had to be found for
76
money that could not be spent on non-political activities. This was,
no doubt, an element in the case, but it must not be forgotten that the
Union and its leaders had sought to raise more money and had been allo¬
cating more money to Party and political purposes even before 1947.
Thus they cannot be said simply to be coping with an issue that they had
not consciously tried to create.
The increased support for the Party was related to policy issues,
too. As the original contracting-in campaign showed, it was a matter of
73. Harrison, pp. 80n, 83.
74. Harrison, p. 80n.
75. Richter, p. 54.
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support for the party of the social services. It was support, also,
for the party characterized by the spokesmen of the Executive as the
party of full employment. The Conservatives, in contrast, were the
party of unemployment. While the Labour Government's employment policy
was criticized occasionally, the target of that criticism was the
inadequacy of the methods used; no doubt was expressed about the sin¬
cerity of the political leadership's devotion to the cause of full
77
employment. In his 1949 National Committee speech, Tanner reviewed
the achievements of the Labour Government:
Perhaps the greatest thing of all has been the maintenance of
full employment. Some critics have suggested that it is not
Government policy that is responsible for this, but the
general demand for our products in world markets• Nothing
could be further from the truth. Without the control and
planning of economic policy by the Government, we should have
experienced, long before this, as high a level of unemployment
as exists in many European countries and in the U.S.A....
I have not the slightest doubt that if the British people were
foolish enough to return the Tories to power again, unemploy¬
ment would soon be a major problem for us once more. (78)
In addition to fulfilling this basic goal, the Labour Government
furthered the interests of the trade unions directly by protecting and
enhancing the system of free collective bargaining. Tbe 1927 Trade
Disputes and Trade Union Act not only inhibited trade union political
action. The act "forbad general strikes and most sympathetic strikes,
76. Richter, p. 70.
77. See, for example, RPNC, 1945. p. 218; HPNC, 1946. p. 210;
RPNC. 1948. p. 222; RPNC. 1949. p. 243; KPNC. 1950. pp. 232-33;
HPNC. 1951. pp. 281-82.
78. RPNC. 1949, p. 232.
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imposed fresh restrictions on picketing, and forced the Civil Service
79
unions to leave the T.U.C. and the Labour Thrty"0 It is hardly
surprising that in the run-up to the 1945 election Gardner reserved
some of his harshest criticism of the Conservatives for Churchill's
refusal to consider repeal of the 1927 Act, "one of the most shameless
and unscrumlous pieces of class legislation that even the Tory Party
80
has ever enacted". It was the Labour Government which removed these
disabilities in its 1946 Act.
The Labour Government, moreover, refrained from imposing a state
wage control policy and settled for voluntary restraint in 1948 to 1950,
Even after the unions rejected restraint, the Government rejected
control by legislation. This was appreciated by the unions, and, in a
generally unsympathetic account of the 1951 Budget, Gardner took the
trouble to emphasize the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement that
the Government had come definitely to the conclusion that the
established system of industrial wage regulation machinery can
be trusted. It puts its faith in the sense of responsibility
which it believes to have been engendered on both sides of
industry, as a result of the free development of voluntary
collective bargaining during a century or more, (81)
The AECJ leadership thus had ample grounds for its support of the
labour Party. This generalized loyalty to the Party, however, did not
82
entail loyalty to all aspects of Party policy. The AEU spokesmen did
79. Eric Wlpfcam. Trade Unions (London, 1956), p. 38.
80. Journal. April 1945, p. 97.
81. Journal. May 1951, p. 130.
82. Compare B.C. Roberts, "Trade Unions and I&rty Politics", Cambridge
Journal. 6 (1953), 387-402 (pp. 394-95).
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preach to their members about loyalty to the Party and sometimes even
83
went so far as to preach loyalty to Party policies. In 1945 the
Executive circulated a notice forbidding members who campaigned on
behalf of anyone but official labour Party candidates "to indicate
their office or any position they may hold in the Union". This
instruction was based on the Union's affiliation to the labour Party
84
under the rules. In 1950 another notice, which cited as its authority
a 1949 National Committee resolution expressing support for Labour in
the forthcoming elections, stated that it was the Union's duty to oppose
the opponents of Labour candidates and policies and that it was incum¬
bent on branch secretaries to forbid "correspondence from opposition
85
bodies to be submitted to the Branches".
The Executive's spokesmen, however, do not seem to have been
bound by thi3 injunction themselves. They criticized labour policies
quite freely and unselfconsciously, except when elections seamed
86
imminent. As in the case of wage restraint and the de-emphasis of
nationalization, the AEU leadership tended to support those Labour Party
policies in which they believed or to which they were half converted
already. It was in relation to such policies that the leaders invoked
loyalty to the Party. This suggests that the Executive had another use
83. For example, KFNC, 1947. p. 267; EPNC, 1949. p. 239.
84. Journal. August 1945, p. 227.
85. Richter, p. 960
86. See, for example, RPNC, 1950, pp. 237-39; RFNC, 1946. pp. 210-U;
RPNC. 1947. pp. 265-66; RFNC. 1948. pp. 219-20.
for Labour: the maintenance of internal discipline.
This does not mean that the Party leadership was totally
without influence on the members of the EC, The complexity of Iferty-
Union relations clearly Involved the exposure of each side to influence
by the other. The speed and firmness with which suggestions of a state
87
wage-control system was slapped down and the criticism of Government
policy by the Union leadership, however, show that there were clear
limits to whatever influence the Party may have had on the AEU Executive,
(The Government's rejection of a state scheme, on the other hand, clear¬
ly demonstrates its own sensitivity to pressure by the trade unions.)
Indeed, there was nothing in the history of AEU-Iabour J&rty relations
or of the individual members of the Executive Council that would lead
one to think otherwise. In the past the Union had used the Party, from
time to time, to advance Union interests. While there were labour Party
members among the EC, there were also members of the Communist Party and
88
fellow travellers. Once the AEU Executive had adopted its "national"
line, however, persuasion by the Party was easier because the area of
89
basic agreement was broader than it had been. Moreover, on some
issues, as we shall see, the AEU leaders publicly supported party
policies for reasons entirely different from those which had led the
Government leadership to adopt them.
87, Journal. October 1947, p. 290.
88, On Tanner see Chapter IV-A above. On the political line-up in the
postwar period see The Times. 9 February 1948, p. 5.
89, Contrast Panitch, pp. 50-31,
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5. Pressure Group Activity and Organizational Growth and Maintenance
Goals
As the discussion thus far has shown, organizational growth and
maintenance goals continued to be an important consideration in the
leadership's postwar policies. Amalgamation was pursued consistently
and loyally but with little success, except in 1945 when the 6000-strong
Amalgamated Society of Vehicle Builders, Carpenters and Mechanics became
90
the Vehicle Builders* section of the AEU, Other engineering unions
tended to be wary of the AEU and its proposals. Thus of the thirty-two
unions invited to a meeting on amalgamation in May 1951, "only eight
91
attended". Given the failure of the direct approach, the Union
continued to seek more unified action by other means. In 1946 the mem¬
bers voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining the CSEU. 'While it was
agreed that the Confederation was not entirely satisfactory, Gardner
stressed "the fact that historically such bodies have done useful work
92
in paving the way towards large scale amalgamations of kindred unions".
The CSEU thus became the principal channel for collective bargaining
with the employers. The Confederation was also used as a pressure group
to lobby the Government and the TUC about policies of particular import¬
ance to the engineering workers and their industry. Thus the questions
of trade with the USSR and of nationalization, planning and control in
90. Journal. July 1945, p. 193.
91. RHTO. 1951. p. 279.
92. Journal. October 1946, p. 289; compare RPNC. 1947. p. 270.
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the engineering industry were pursued through the councils of the
93
CSEU.
The other main channel for political lobbying was the Trades
Union Congress, In contrast to earlier periods when the AEU had
zealously opposed any significant centralization of power in the TUC
94
General Council, and although it continued to except collective
bargaining from the tasks the TUC might fulfil, the leadership in 1947
called for the delegation of powers "so that the General Council can
act with the speed required, subject to the endorsement of affiliated
unions afterwards if necessary". Tanner argued that the
General Council must be able to speak and act more authoritative¬
ly, representing millions of workers, not only to outside bodies,
but to the workers themselves. The need arises from the changing
situation, which is inescapable, and not from any academic or
autocratic motive. (95)
Since the AEU leadership now shared the "national" outlook of most
British trade union leaders, such a delegation of powers presented far
fewer difficulties than it would have done before the war. Indeed,
such a delegation of powers can even be seen as an attempt to further
"national" interests by making it more difficult for AEU members and for
the members and leaders of other unions who did not subscribe to the new
line to block cooperation between the trade union movement and the
Government•
93, See Journal, July 1946, p. 232; December 1946, p. 353; April 1947,
p. 105; September 1947, p. 262; January 1948, p. 7; Kay 1948,
p. 134; June 1948, p. 167; September 1948, p, 263; and above
Chapter IV-E-3.
94. See above Chapter III-A-5.
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It- was generally as representatives of the TUC and occasionally
96
of the CSEU that the members of the AEU Executive sat on the various
tripartite advisory councils, panels and boards established by the
Government0 Richter writes that in the 1950s and 1960s "the unions
were not interested in serious instrumental use of the representation
97
they obtained on planning and industrial training boards". A similar
attitude prevailed in the AEU in the late 1940s, when Tanner spoke
98
disparagingly of the existing tripartite advisory councils. As we
saw earlier, however, the potential value that the leaders apparently
saw in such bodies was less substantive than symbolic, that is, as a
means of gaining the members' confidence in the policy of collaboration.
6. Summary
This section has demonstrated that during the period 1945-1951
questions of conditions of employment were the chief concern of the AEU
leaders. A concern for social transformation, on the other hand, was
not a primary operative objective of the leadership. Whatever the
ideological attitudes of the individual members of the EC, collective
action by the Executive, the nature of the policies it supported and the
manner in which it advanced them, show that the leaders were more
occupied with working within a tempered capitalism than with building a
socialist Britain.
95. RHTC. 1947, pp. 270-71.
96. CSEU Annual Meeting, 1947.
97. Richter, p. 54, Italicized in the original.
98. The Times, 9 November 1946, p. 5.
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This did not keep the AEU's spokesmen from using the "building
of socialism" as a major theme in communications with their members.
Tanner's NC addresses tended to give that theme great prominence,, In
general, the objective of social transformation was used to justify the
"national" line and its corollaries like wage restraint« I do not wish
to imply that the EC spokesmen were insincere. Tanner seems to have
believed quite honestly that the "national" line was consistent with
99
socialist change. The question of sincerity is not of major concern
to us here, however. What is important is that socialist arguments
were used to justify policies that did not conform obviously and
unequivocally with socialist ideas (as opposed to practice by socialist
parties) prevalent at the time.
This use of the "socialist" argument to justify "national"
policies is most clearly demonstrated in Tanner's 1949 Ifetional
Committee speech. The heart of the speech is an appeal for wage
restraint, and it is in this context that the contradiction between
100
socialist objectives and short-term economic advantage is pointed out.
These factors, the leaders' direct involvement in enhancing
Thirty finances and the nature of their pressure group activities
through the TUG and the CSEU indicate how much of a mistake it would be
to underestimate the AEU Executive's political interests and concerns.
Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter III show that political and pressure group
99. Compare Richter, p. 49.
100, See above pp. 146-47.
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action took up but little of their reported work; this does not mean
that it was unimportant to them. State intervention in the economy was
crucial to the Union's full employment policy. "If we are to get and
maintain full employment and produce efficiently", Tanner said in 1946,
101
"the Government's powers must be used to the full." It was accepted
that the labour Party was predisposed to use "Government powers" and in
a way less dangerous to the workers than the Conservatives. The trans¬
fer of funds to the labour Party was meant to help the Party attain
power. At least the dangers of Tory rule would be avoided; at best
policies beneficial to the workers would be instituted. If influence
had to be exerted, the Union at least had the advantage of a greater
area of basic agreement than it had with the Tories. In these circum¬
stances, there was little pressure to establish new channels of
influence. Attempts to affect Government policy were best carried out
by those bodies, like the TUC and the CSEU, which had traditionally
been used in Union lobbying. It was only later, when the possibility of
a more radical Party leadership arose, and with it the spectre of
differences in principle between the unions and the Party, that the
102
Union turned to action within the Party apparatus. Thus, while the
value attached to political action was clearly limited, to argue that
there was no interest in politics by the AECJ leadership because there
was no belief in the efficacy of political action is wrong in both
103
premise and conclusion.
101. RPNC. 1946. p. 210.
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C. Ibwer Distribution Goals
Just as the themes of full employment and the "national" line
were central to the ends sought and means used by the AEO Executive
during the years 1945-1951, so the related theme of centralization of
tasks and powers ran like a red thread through the system of functional
and power relationships within the Union itself. As we saw in Chapter
III, the centripetal forces set in motion in the late nineteenth
century had been dominant through most of the interwar period. The
recovery and development of certain sectors of the engineering industry
in the mid-1950s and the far greater impact of the war set in motion
countervailing forces which increased the control of the workshop
organization over the terms of employment of the workers in the shop and
increased their independence of the central authorities. Nevertheless,
by and large the labour discipline needed for war production
was maintained. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this -
thesis, although it seems fair to say that neither the authority of the
national officers nor (despite the fact that many believed it) the
parallel authority of the communist-dominated internal opposition was
104
an important factor in it.
The original impetus for centralization had cone from a reaction
102, See Bicbter, pp. 137-39,
103, See Richter, pp, 45-48, 221,
104, See above pp, 115-16,
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105
to and was reinforced by developments in the organization's setting.
The leadership's conversion to the "national" policy during the Second
World War gave even more force to their perception of the need for
centralization. Cole argued that the British trade union leaders'
acceptance of policies of restraint
has been forced on them by their knowledge of the precarious
condition of the British economy, despite the high profits
which have been made; but it is very difficult to explain
the necessity to their members, and this difficulty forces on
them the need to establish a strong central discipline and to
damp down any militant tendencies among their followers,.,. (106)
Such a policy does not merely require, or seem to require, a centralized
disciplinary system. When it is the good of the nation that is involved,
a central authority must also make policy for the organization as a
whole. Only such a central authority is capable of judging the overall
situation and of dealing with other centralized bodies like the Govern¬
ment and the employers. The corollary of strengthening the authority
of the national officials is to weaken the competing centres of power,
the workshops.
It was, in fact, on this oblique approach of weakening the
periphery that the national officials tended to concentrate their
arguments and actions. Their stated objective was to make the Union
more efficient. Thus, shortly before the 1945 Holes Revision Meeting,
Gardner claimed that the Union was inefficient. Union officers, he
106. Cole, p. 22.
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sa id , were so overburdened with "heavy administrative tasks and
responsibilities" that they could not deal "expeditiously" with
"matters of urgency". He did not mention that many of these onerous
duties had been carried out successfully by shop stewards during the
war, and he did not suggest that these responsibilities be peiroanently
shifted to the shop organization. That would have been inconsistent
with the customary attitudes and the "national" outlook of the leader¬
ship. To have shifted these tasks back to the centre would, indeed,
have overburdened it, but to leave them in the hands of the stewards
was not an option either. Instead, he suggested that these powers be
delegated to other full-time officials:
Seme sort of intermediate machine is required between
Branches and Districts and Executive Council to reduce the
amount of detailed correspondence now receiving the attention
of the governing authority. It may be desirable and possible
for the Regional Officer, located in the E.C. Division, to act
as a kind of Sub-Executive Councilman and to deal with many
matters, only remitting to E. C. those involving high policy.
(107)
In his 1946 NC speech Tanner referred to the progress made by
the Rules Revision Commission set up by the previous year's Meeting.
He, too, stressed the need for efficiency. He asserted that
it is very desirable to have machinery that preserves control
by the rank and file, but our constitution limits the initiative
and restricts the activities of the Executive Council and other
officers to an extent, in relation to modern trends, that
upsets the desired balance between democratic control and
efficiency even safety. (108)
107. Journal. May 1945, pp. 129-30.
108. RRNC. 1946. p. 214.
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The Executive, however, did not want to make its assault on the
powers of the shop and regional organization too obvious, nor did it
want to overburden itself. So, when resolutions were presented to the
1951 NC, "calling for national negotiations on behalf of members whose
wages and conditions have been adequately catered for in the past by
local officials and District Committees", Tanner rejected them as a
"waste (of) the time of the national officials and the money of the
109
Union".
The EC succeeded in persuading the Rules Revision Meeting of the
110
virtues of centralization only in relation to the Parliamentary Panel,
However, in 1945 the Meeting had amended Rule 15:18 to permit the
Executive to call for the election of new full-time officers as and
111
when they were necessary. This power of appointment was to form
one part of the three-pronged centralization policy that the Executive
pursued. The three elements of this policy were the strengthening of
official structures, the disciplining of disruptive elements and the
reinterpretation of National Committee policies.
The strengthening of the full-time officers* cadres was
reflected in the transformation of lay posts into full-time ones, the
creation of new offices and the redistribution and rationalization of
tasks among full-time officers. From December 1945 on more and more
109. RFNC. 1951. p. 280.
110. See above pp. 158-59.
111. Journal. February 1946, p. 38.
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Dietrict Secretaries became full-time officers. The EC was not particu¬
larly enthusiastic about this source of manpower, however, and stuck
firmly to the guideline that only when a district's membership rose
112
above 4000 would its secretary become a full-time officer.
Apparently, it feared that full-time District Secretaries would be too
hard to control. Indeed, in order to assert its authority and ensure
discipline, the EC resorted to the exemplary punishment (that is, to
the second prong of its centralization offensive) of two full-time
District Secretaries who had failed or refused "to give effect to
Executive Council's instructions". Their punishments, fines and
suspension, end their signing of "an undertaking to abide by the Rules
of the Union and the Executive Council's instructions" were publicized
113
in the Journal.
• In February 1946 the EC announced that, in accordance with
revised rule 15:18, it was calling for the election of Assistant
Divisional Organizers in nine of the Union's twenty-six divisions. The
new officers would, "subject to the Executive Council's approval, be
under the direction and control of the Divisional Organizer, and their
duties will include attendance at conferences, meeting employers,
conducting negotiations, attending at D. C. meetings and dealing with
114
correspondence". These appointments seem to have been an attempt to
112. Journal. December 1945, p. 356.
113. Journal. July 1948, p. 195; January 1951, p. 3; February 1951,
P • 36 «
114. Journal. February 1946, p. 38.
increase official supervision of the District Committees and to stop
the loophole in the rules according to -which the DC might, in an
emergency and -when the Divisional Organizer was unavailable, negotiate
115
without any full-time officials being present. Again, the point was
to undercut the power of the lay officialdom of the AEO.
In May 1947 an attempt was made to rationalize the tasks of the
three National Organizers. Henceforth, instead of acting merely as
generalist trouble-shooters in district negotiations, they would "be
located at the General Office and ... be Secretaries of the Union's
116
Advisory Committees". These were internal Union bodies which grouped
lay and full-time officials who were concerned with employers in
specific industries, with individual large firms like ICI and with
certain Government ministries which employed members of the Union. Hie
Advisory Committees had existed for certain sectors, like the railway
shopmen, at least since the early 1920s. Their action had previously
been only intermittent, however0 By extending to these bodies the
bureaucratic framework, the Union gave them greater continuity and also
absorbed them into that framework so that they could be better
controlled.
The extension of state welfare schemes and the end of the
Union's role as agent of the state in administering national insurance
made possible another reallocation of duties. Hitherto, one of the
115. Hale 13.
116. Journal. March 1947, p. 68.
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Assistant General Secretaries had been responsible for "trade union"
affairs and the other for insurance. The latter role was now redundant
so the 1947 Kules Revision Meeting "amended Rule 16, clause 1, to read:
'there shall be ... two Assistant General Secretaries ... who shall be
allocated such duties, including Political and Educational, as defined
117
by the Executive Council.'" It is noteworthy that it was after 194S,
when the new rule came into effect, that the character of the Union's
.118
educational programme was changed.
Much of the disciplinary action taken by the Executive pertained
to the breaking of the rules about electoral procedures, ranging from
tampering with the returns to negligence. The EC's responses varied
with the seriousness of the offence and the frequency of similar
offences. More severe punishments, like suspension from office and
the deprivation of the right to hold office, were explicitly intended
119
to be exemplary.
The third prong of the Executive offensive against centrifugal
forces, the reinterpretation of National Committee resolutions and
Union policies in such a way as to transfer functions and power from
the shops and the regions to the centre, seems to have been the
favourite one. It was, in any event, the one the leaders pursued most
117. Journal. January 1948, p. 30
118. See above pp. 151-52.
119. Journal. February 1945, p. 35; May 1945, p. 131; June 1945,
p. 163; August 1945, p. 227; May 1949, p. 131; December 1949,
p. 357; March 1950, p. 73; February 1951, p. 36.
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consistently and to which they devoted the most efforts, Two important
examples of such reinterpretation were the New Wages Structure,
discussed earlier, and the attempt to develop a new Procedure for the
avoidance of disputes with the Engineering Employers' Federation.
As we saw, the New Wages Structure was initiated by a 1944 NO
resolution which was based on a concern to expand differentials among
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled grades. In 1945 the Executive
presented a framework scheme, but its aim was more than simply to
establish proportional relationships between the grades. "The avowed
object is to abolish the varying rates that now obtain in different
120
parts of the country", the General Secretary wrote. Under the terms
of the EC's proposals, "instead of the present system of district rates,
bonus and differential- payments, there would be three main grades of
workers each with a guaranteed weekly wage". What the Union wanted,
121
Tanner said, "was to establish national standards".
Four years later, however, when the CSEO had finally developed a
six-grade scheme, Tanner had learned the value of circumspection. When
questioned by the representatives of the Confederation District Commit¬
tees about the implications of the proposals for district bargaining,
his replies were soothing and evasive. In fact, the scheme left only
very limited room for bargaining in the districts and the shops and that
122
chiefly with regard to the top grade of skilled worker. The local
120. Journal, July 1945, p. 194.
121. The Times, 9 May 1945, p. 2.
122. CSEU Annual Meeting, 1949, pp. 58-70.
wage bargaining function would thus be minimized, while the centre's
would be expanded, (This scheme, it should be noted, referred to time-
workers' rates, but the leadership was concurrently trying to standard¬
ize the rates for piece-workers too, thus further undercutting one of
123
the principal tasks and sources of power of the shop stewards, ) In
discussing the CSEU scheme with the 1950 NC, Tanner noted that it bore
on two concerns : the narrow differentials between craftsmen and other
workers — a theme he developed in detail and, almost in passing,
"the great disparity between the earnings of our members in different
124
districts".
The Procedure debate provided another opportunity for centrali¬
zation through reinterpretation. Since 1898 the Union's relations with
the Engineering Employers' Federation had been governed by a procedure
that at one and the same time provided formal confirmation of the
ultimate authority of the Executive in the Union and fed unrest and
dissatisfaction in the shops. Under the Procedure for the avoidance of
disputes, disputes which could not be resolved in the framework in which
they arose (shop, works, district) were referred to the next higher
instance (works, district) until they reached the Central Conference,
There representatives of the EC and, later, of the CSEO Executive
dealt with national representatives of the Enployers' Federation, Only
123, RBJC. 19457~p. 222,
124. RPNC, 1950. p. 238,
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■edaen Central Conference registered a failure to agree, when Procedure
was exhausted, could the original parties to the dispute resort to
125
methods other, than negotiation. This Procedure was confirmed by the
1922 agreement with the employers, which also affirmed the right of
126
management to manage without interference by the workers,
Thrtly in order to circumvent the long, drawn-out process,
127
which far too often ended in a failure to agree, the workers
involved would resort to unofficial strikes vhich "were often
unannounced and unapproved, and sometimes even unrecorded by union,
128
employer or government officials". Tanner, it is said, regarded the
argument that the Procedure was too lengthy and inefficient as a mere
129
pretext and that opposition to the system was "politically inspired".
Rank-and-file activists, however, objected both to the Procedure
and to the exclusion of workers from exercising some control of
managerial functions, and they sought more power for shop stewards.
The 1946 National Committee demanded that J.P.C.s be given
real authority and executive powers and that joint machinery be
established at all levels of industry so as to give the workers
an opportunity of joint participation in management And
in 1947 the E.A.T.S.S.N.C. (Engineering and Allied Trades Shop
Stewards' National Council) adopted a policy that J.P.C.s be
given statutory powers to examine books, figures and programmes
and that managements be obliged to consult J.P.C.S and shop
steward committees on all questions of production, (130)
Richter, p. 116.
Jefferys, p. 226.
Thus in 1951, 59 of the 125 items discussed at Central Conference
ended in a failure to agree. See Journal. 1951, "Abstract









The response of the Executive, working through the NEJUI and
later through the CSEU, was to emphasize the "participation" aspects
of the opposition to Procedure. In 1947 the Confederation developed a
new scheme which would eradicate the distinction between negotiations
involving stewards and works committees and the consultative JPCs. It
suggested setting up a hierarchy of committees running from the works
to the district to the national level,, On these committees employer
and union representatives would negotiate about traditional questions
of conditions of employment and about "all other questions affecting
131
the industry". The employers, not surprisingly, rejected the
132
scheme. At the 1949 CSEU Annual Meeting a revised draft proposal
133
was submitted and approved. In this plan the works and district
levels of the original proposals disappeared entirely; it dealt exclu¬
sively with the structure of the proposed Central, that is, National,
Council. This, then, is what the NC*s original intention to strengthen
the position of the steward in the workshop and of the workers vis-a-vis
management came to: rank-and-file members were to be given neither
greater autonomy from higher union structures nor greater control over
their own conditions in the shops. If any section of the Union organi¬
zation was to benefit, it was the national Executive.
In the discussion of the scheme at the CSEU Annual meeting, one
130. Carew, p. 170. ~~
131. CSEU Annual Meeting. 1947, pp. 74-75.
132. CSEU Annual Meeting. 1948, pp. 195-96.
133. CSEU Annual Meeting, 1949, pp. 86-89.
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delegate complained that "the proposed constitution was too elaborate.
What was wanted was machinery that would deal quickly with disputes as
they arose in the workshop." Tanner, who was chairman of the
committee which elaborated the scheme, replied :
despite many attempts, no progress had been made in obtaining
improvements to the Provisions for Avoidance of Disputes, and
the Executive Council (of the CSEU) were now concerned with
getting a complete new set-up of industry. In his opinion,
just to approach the employers and say we wanted a quicker
method of settling disputes would not be satisfactory. (134)
Of course, from the type of proposals that the leadership put forward,
it seems clear that they really were not interested in a system for
settling disputes rapidly if it meant too much local autonomy. Nor, as
we saw earlier and as the ease with which the Executive dropped the
works and district parts of the scheme shows, did the leaders want to
see a radical system of workers' control established. When faced with
rank-and-file resolutions demanding such things, they were able to
interpret and re-interpret their instructions in such a way that they
did not have to bargain with the employers about these subjects serious¬
ly, if at all, and so did not have to undermine their own power. They
also could add features to NC resolutions, as in the case of the
centralizing aspects of the New Wages Structure, to further their own
interests. If the employers had been more cooperative, this third prong
of the leadership offensive probably would have been the most effective
of the three.
134. CSEU Annual Meeting. 1949, p. 262.
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During the period 1945-1951 the balance of power in the AEU was
still in doubt. Indeed, the national leadership's position seemed to
be someviiat stronger than the regional organization's and the political
opposition's. The evidence available is indirect and incomplete or too
gross, but it does suggest that, whether because of the Executive's
centralization offensive or of some other factors, the centripetal
forces were at least holding their own.
Some of the evidence is provided by the record of industrial
disputes during this period and is summarized in Table 4.
TABLE 4: INDUSTRIAL STOPPAGES IN METALS, ENGINEERING, SHIPBUILDING
AND VEHICLES, 1945-1951
NUMBER OF STOPPAGES WORKERS DIRECTLY OR WORKING DAYS LOST
BEGINNING IN EACH INDIRECTLY INVOLVED THROUGH AH, STOPPAGES
YEAR YEAR ('OOOs) IN PROGRESS ('000s)
1945 591 125 528
1946 449 162 1084
1947 291 111 579
1948 266 107 898
1949 250 50 285
1950 227 61 294





Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics.
The most striking feature of the table is the decline in
stoppages from 1945 to 1950. The number of workers affected and the
number of working days lost indicate greater variability in the magni-
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tude and, perhaps, the bitterness of the disputes. Here too, however,
1949 and 1950 were the trough of the cycle. It would appear from these
figures (assuming that the number of unreported and unrecorded strikes
was negligible) that by 1949 the more militant shop and works
organizations were "under control", and that it was only the improvement
135
in the workers' bargaining power and the inflation and other dis¬
locations brought about by the Korean War which led to another increase
in unrest • It is unclear whether one can attribute this muting of
conflict to any action by the national officials. The quieter years
overlap with the years of wage restraint (1948 to early 1950), so the
relationship with this policy can hardly have been direct. Nor can any
other policies pursued by the Union be seen to have had a direct impact
on the behaviour of the rank and file during these years.
The stewards' influence and importance seem to have declined
somewhat in the immediate postwar years. In part this was due to the
removal of employee protection as the repeal of the Essential Work
136
Order of 1941 exposed many stewards to victimization by the employers.
In any event, the relative decline in the importance of the stewards as
137
wage bargainers is clearly indicated by the available data. For
pieceworkers, who.comprised the majority of the skilled workers covered
138
by the data (69.9$ in 1942, 60,8$ in 1948), the proportion of
135, Through the increased demand for labour.
136, Carew, p. 169,
137, Knowles and Hill, p. 293.
138, K. G. J. C. Knowles and D.J. Robertson, "Earnings in Engineering,
1926-1948", Oxford University Institute of Statistics Bulletin.
13 (1951), 179-200 (p. 187),
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earnings derived from agreements negotiated at other than the national
level declined drastically in importance after 1942, from 47 per cent
in that year to 31 per cent in 1948, The precise date of the turn¬
around is unclear. By 1953 the proportion had risen again to almost
139
39 per cent, Knowles and Hill contend that this second turnaround
took place in 1951-52, as a result of the increased demand for labour
in the arms-related engineering industries and (in motor vehicle
manufacture) of increased productivity. For the minority of skilled
workers paid according to time rates, non-nationally negotiated payments
grew in importance steadily but slowly,, For unskilled workers
supplementary payments declined in importance very slightly and very
140
slowly. Obviously the stev/ards had not yet learned to exploit the
system of payment by results to increase their control "over the pace
and intensity of work and (the workers') level of earnings" and thus to
141
increase their own influence on the shopfloor.
The evidence that the stewards were less important as wage
bargainers should not be taken as evidence that the stewards were not
important at all.. As in the Second World War, their functions were far
wider than mere wage bargaining. In this connection, it is significant
that the major local and works disputes that erupted into strikes in
these years revolved not around wages questions but around such issues
139. Knowles and Hill, p. 293.
140. Knowles and Hill, p. 293.
141. Contrast Carew, p. 173.
-184-
14£
as victimization, redundancies, dilution, deskilling and the like.
Clearly, in the years 1945-1951 the struggle for power between the
national organization and the rank-and-file activists in the shops and
the works was still undecided.
Can the changes in the militancy of the engineering workers be
attributed in any way to communist influence? As we saw in Chapter III,
although changes in CPGB policy seem to have had little impact on the
level of strikes in the metal industries during the war, the communists
themselves claimed to have had great influence over the workers, and
these claims were widely accepted. During the years just after the war,
the communists apparently continued to dominate the organized opposition
within the Union, the Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards
National Council (EATSSNC). Thus EATSSNC continued the wartime policy
of collaboration and expounded on the view "that co-operation in the
143
interests of efficient production was the overwhelming need".
However, the communists' change of policy after Britain and the
moderate trade union leaders' acceptance of the Marshall ELan resulted
in a similar shift in policy on the part of the Shop Stewards' Council.
Since the AEU leadership persisted in its "national" line, the
organized shop stewards were, in effect, going back into opposition.
Their reaction to policies aimed at increasing production and
productivity was now hostile. In 1948 the TUC published a document on
142. Knowles, Strikes. p. 238; Carew, pp. 168-70.
143. Carew, p. 165; Compare "Shop Stewards' Plan for Industry", Pie
Times, 17 March 1947, p. 2.
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proauctivity which called, inter alia, for the training of shop
stewards in such matters as "the elements of production and costing".
EATSSNC replied that these things had nothing to do with the stewards'
main job which was "to ensure that agreements are observed as minimum
conditions, and to build on them, to make sure there are no 'nons' in
the shops, and to ensure the greatest degree of unity among all sectors
144
in the factories against the employers". The days of collaboration
were well and truly gone.
However, a glance at Table 4, above, shows that there was no
clear relationship between communist and EATSSNC policy, on the one
hand, and industrial unrest, on the other, in the early postwar years,
just as there had been none during the war itself. Certeinly the number
of strikes in the industry did not increase after 1947. As for the
intensity of strikes as measured by the number of workers affected and
by the number of working days lost, 1946 was by far the worst of these
early postwar years, and the internal opposition was still cooperating
at the time. The pattern of strikes in 1948, however, may have
frightened the official union leadership, for, although there were
fewer strikes and fewer workers affected than in the preceding year,
the strikes that did occur seem to have been fought more bitterly: many
more working days were lost in this the first full year of the
opposition's reversion to the anti-"national" line. While the evidence
144. Quoted by Carew, p. 172.
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for the entire period, from the outbreak of war in 1939 until 1951,
indicates that the increase may well have been coincidental, one
cannot reasonably expect the leadership to have known this or to risk
acting as if it were. There was too much at stake from their stand¬
point. To have ignored the communists would have seemed foolhardy if
not foolish, but rather than resort to communist-baiting and -bashing,
the AEU leaders, apparently because of their perception of the internal
opposition's influence, adopted a more subtle approach in which communi¬
cation played a significant part.
D. Communication as a Tool for Goal Attainment
As we have see, the principal method used by the leadership to
deal with the shopfloor organizations and the internal opposition was
the three-pronged centralization programme. At the same time they
sought to mobilize the support* of the interested and active members of
the Union by using the communication channels they controlled. They
thus eventually denied the internal opposition access to the Journal,
and they expounded continually on the virtues of their own policies.
Direct attacks on the communists and their shop steward supporters,
however, are noteworthy for their rarity in Gardner's editorials. In
Tanner's NC addresses attacks on the policies of the Communist Party
became standard after 1948, but it was not until 1952 that he attacked
it and the "National Council of Shop Stewards which, as everyone knows,
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145
is under Communist leadership", explicitly and directly for the
policies they pursued within the Union itself. The most striking
feature of the leaders' propaganda was that it was not aimed at under¬
mining support for opposition policies by attributing them to some
communist Satan. Instead, it was concentrated on presenting arguments
on behalf of the Executive's own policies of cooperation, restraint,
productivity and (more rarely) organizational maintenance. That is,
the leaders argued in terms of their goal-attainment and organizational-
maintenance concerns rather than in terms of power distribution. As we
have seen, however, especially after 1S47, the leadership's goal-
attainment, organizational-maintenance and power-distribution goals
were almost inextricably entwined. This policy orientation does not
mean that the leaders* arguments were entirely reasoned and logical:
they tried, for example, to create a positive image of certain actors,
like the Labour Party, and to associate their own policies with these
146
bodies. As we shall see later, they also used negative models in
relation to other issues.
The policy of denying the opposition access to the Union's
communication channels, as we saw earlier, had been a prominent feature
of policy during the interwar years. Denial was never absolute,
however; as long as the opposition spokesman agreed with the leadership
view of a certain matter, he might be permitted to publish an article
145. RPNC, 1952, p. 260.
146. See above pp. 162-65.
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147
in the Journal. In the postwar period the internal opposition's
continued collaborationist policy meant that there was no reason to
exclude its publicists. After 1947, even though the opposition
renounced collaboration, the official leadership continued to display
remarkable tolerance. Ulus in the November 1948 Journal there appeared
an anti-ccsnmunist diatribe by one, Bro. W. J. Hiscox, which demanded
increased productivity (as the Executive wished) in order, as the title
148
put it, to 'Hake the Communists See Bed!" Two months later Gardner
permitted a communist member to publish a rebuttal and to defend
149
communist policies. Hiscox was given the last word, however, in
150
another article the following month.
By 1950 there was no longer room for such tolerance, or perhaps
there was no longer considered to be any need for it. The notice
mentioned earlier, forbidding the circulation of non-Labour Party
151
material through Union channels, was published in that year. This
152
document was not, as Richter would have it, "unprecedented". Indeed,
the expression of opposition opinion seems to have been tolerated more
than it had been during the inter-war period. The 1950 circular may
have been chiefly an attempt to help the labour Farty in an election
year. However, the similarity in format and content of this EC state-
147. See above Chapter III-C.
148. Journal, November 1948, p. 350
149. Journal, November 1949, p. 17.
150. Journal, February 1949, p. 46.
151. See above p. 162.
152. Richter, p. 96.
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153
ment to others issued between the wars leads one to think that it
was not only criticism of the Party but of themselves that the leaders
were trying to stifle. From this standpoint the Executive was using
the Party to further its own intra-organizational ends, just as it used
the Party to further its ends in the wider British society. Similarly,
the demands for loyalty to Party policy and not merely to the Party, an
injunction the leadership spokesmen themselves ignored, were associated,
as in the case of wage restraint, with attempts to drum up support for
154
the policies they supported. The positive image of the labour Party
thus was used to make their own policies (or those they shared with the
Party) more palatable. They themselves contributed to the creation of
this image by their emphasis on the achievements and benefits of
Labour rule. Their criticisms of the Party and its policies were criti¬
cisms of detail, not of principle, ana never attributed ill-will to the
political leadership but, at worst, a lack of understanding. Another
way of making more acceptable the policies the leaders supported was to
155
stress their "socialist" character.
These aspects of Executive argument reasoned statements
about specific policies and why they were needed, subdued criticism of
the Labour Government, an account of the Government's achievements, the
socialist nature of the desired policies and the socialist objectives
153. See above Chapter III-C. The similarity to the notice published
in the Journal, February 1953 (p. 10) is particularly striking.
154. See above Chapter IV-B-4.
155. See above Chapter IV-B-5.
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of the Union were nowhere more skilfully intertwined than in
156
Tanner's 1949 National Committee speech. It is in that same
address that we find the first explicit attack by either of the
leadership spokesmen on the British communists. Tanner did not bother
to attack their policies as they affected power relations within the
AEU. Given the nature of the NC and its own relationship with the
157
Executive Council, it probably would not have done the President
much good to claim that the communists' actions tended to undermine
Executive authority. Instead, he dwelt on the broader implications of
the communist policy of militancy in opposition to wage restraint and
on the need for the workers' "willing acceptance of self-discipline
and loyalty". The danger the communists posed was not merely to
anything so mundane as the members' conditions of employment but to the
whole fabric of society.
The communists, he said, reject the notion of a peaceful
transition to a more just society, "They don't want it to (succeed),
and they are doing everything possible to prevent it." They are trying
to achieve "the breaking down of the nation's economy, the weakening of
the Labour Government, in the hope that with the consequential scarcity,
unemployment and dis-satisfaction of the people, the workers will turn
to them". He said too:
Their policy and philosophy is to commandeer the means of
production and distribution and the liquidation of all those
156. HPNC, 1949, pp. 239-51.
157. See above Chapter in-B-3.
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who oppose them.
This means planned insurrection possibly Civil War
certainly the forcible overthrow of the Government as took
place in Czecho-Slovakia and the setting up of a dictatorship
of the Communist Party. (158)
This was the trap that the members might fall into unless they learned
"willing acceptance of self-discipline and loyalty". A little later
in the same speech Tanner warned against allowing the Union to be
"captured" by any outside group, for "we must remember that the A.E.U.
159
... is first and all the time a Trade Union". It was the prospect
of communist-insnired violence, however, that he raised again in his
160
1950 speech and yet again in 1951. Thus, once Tanner had determined
to make communism the object of attack in order to mobilize support
for his own policies, he showed very little restraint.
In the Journal Gardner refrained from attacking the communists
too explicitly or too often. Attacks on, or more precisely criticisms
of, the British communists and their allies occurred only very rarely
in his own editorials. Articles by other members of the Union or by
161
other contributors were not subject to the same constraints. For
the most part Gardner remained above the fray, in public at any rate.
When he did refer to the communists he would sometimes lump them
together with the Conservatives, damning them by association. Thus in
158. HPNC, 1949. p. 247.
159. RFKC, 1949. p. 249.
160. RPNC. 1950. p. 245; EFNC, 1951. p. 284.
161. For example, see the articles by Hiscax cited earlier and by
Bro. W. F. Hopkins, Journal, July 1949, p. 205.
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the first Journal to appear after Tanner's 1949 NC speech, Gardner
referred explicitly to the British communists in a negative fashion for
the first time. He wrote of the "Dismal Desmonds" of the right and the
left, the communists and the Conservatives who "are trying to persuade
our own people and the country that we are a suffering and decadent
162
nation, on the verge of collapse and annihilation". The following
month he accused the communists and Conservatives of "playing the same
163
game". Like Tanner, however, he did not use the argument that the
communists and their allies were undermining Executive authority;
164
criticism centred on their impact on national policies and politics.
It was only in an unsigned full-page article entitled "Democracy Run
Had!" that the policy of those who "believe in the 'Dictatorship of the
Proletariat *" to deprive EC of its formal authority over the workshop
165
organization was ever publicly assailed.
The general indirection of the attacks on the communists, that
is, the emphasis on the impact of CPGB policies on the nation as a
whole, was due, in part, to the leadership's awareness that the
authority of the centre was not one of the values nearest to the heart
of the attentive and active Union public. It would be wrong, however,
to say that they used other arguments only because they could not use
162. Journal, July 1949, p. 193.
163. Journal, August 1949, p. 226.
164. Journal. 1949, p. 193; August 1949, p. 226; March 1950, p. 70;
August 1950, p. 230.
165. Journal, July 1949, p. 207.
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this one. After 1947 communist policy ran directly counter to every¬
thing the AEU leaders believed in and deemed necessary for the good of
the members and the Union: the "national" line, cooperation in pursuit
of national prosperity, closer interest in and association with the
Labour Party, support for certain policies propounded by the Labour
Government, like wage restraint and increased productivity. The
communists attacked this fundamental approach on all fronts, in the
factories, the Unions and the electoral system. It was by attacking
leadership policy that the communists and the internal opj)Osition
challenged the leaders' authority and power.
In the circumstances, it is the tolerance and restraint shown
by the Executive in their public statements that is surprising. This
was not due to any underestimation of communist influence; Tanner's
and Gardner's statements would indicate that they took the threat
seriously. Indeed it was probably this perceived strength that led to
their caution. As late as June 1948 Tanner was still addressing very
166
concilatory statements to the internal opposition. As late as
January 1949 Gardner let the communists state their own case in the
Journal. The criticisms, when they came, were very broad and general.
Direct attacks on the internal opposition might have alienated more
members than they convinced. Many trade union leaders apparently
believed that a campaign against the communists in the Unions directed
166. RPNC, 1948. p. 223
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by the Executives would or could be ineffective, inefficient and
167
unjust.
The centralization of power and functions may be seen from this
standpoint as an attempt to limit the freedom of action of the regional
and shopfloor structures and their ability to disrupt the Executive's
pursuit of its own policies. Similarly, the leadership's educational
and propaganda programme concentrated on limiting the impact of
communist activity by educating the mass of shop stewards to accept the
norms dictated by the General Office; by dealing, in other words,
with the entire problem of shop steward autonomy rather than with the
aggravating problem of communist militancy. Thus the post-1948
education programme stressed teaching the stewards their proper role
168
within the Union and the Union's proper role in society. Hie EC's
stress on involving the Union in the "planning" process had a similar
169
purpose.
In their statements the iiEU leaders tried to close the gaps left
by their policy of constraining the membership. The EC's problem was
to persuade the rank and file to use their remaining room for manoeuvre
"wisely". Kather than criticize the opposition, the leaders tended
instead to emphasize the correctness and suitability of their own
policies. Criticism was generally removed to a level outside the Union
167. The Times, 10 February 1948, p. 5.
168. See above, pp. 151-52.
169. See above, pp. 149-51.
-195-
and to an issue (peaceful social change) on which a broad consensus
could be assumed to exist. In the circumstances, restraint, tolerance
and an emphasis on the justice of their own case was the most sensible
and responsible course that the spokesmen for the leadership could take.
E. Summary and Conclusions
During the period 1945-1951 the aEQ leadership pursued two
closely connected objectives; one in relation to its external setting,
the other in relation to power within the Union itself. The former,
which we have characterized as the "national" line, was a new departure
for the AEU, or rather an attempt to pursue the traditional policy of
protecting the members' jobs and incomes in new circumstances. One
outcome of this policy was the increased involvement in labour Party
affairs. Despite the party's importance, the leaders were not about to
subordinate their own interests to it. On the contrary, they sought
quite clearly to use the Party to serve their interests with regard to
both the "national" line and power relations in the Union.
The "national" policy itself also fit in with and reinforced
the historical centralizing proclivities of the AEU leaders. Central¬
ization was conceived as a means of ensuring the unified pursuit of
Executive policies. Accordingly the Executive tried to lessen organi¬
zational dependence on the shop and regional lay structures and
officials by strengthening the full-time officialdom, reinterpreting
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rank-and-file policy and. exercising disciplinary powers. Although it
is probably going too far to suggest that these actions were part of a
well-prepared and integrated attack on the internal opposition and local
autonomy, they do reflect a basic concern to assert the authority of the
centre and to undermine that of the shop stewards and the internal
opposition.
Education and propaganda, too, were used to further the national
officers' interests and policies in the face of centrifugal and
opposition forces. The basic aim was to establish a willing acceptance
of the "national" line, its corollaries and the policy of centralization.
The chosen course involved exploiting the labour Party's association
with the Union and with the specific policies concerned as well as the
historically inoperative but ritualistically endorsed socialist object¬
ives of the Union. The apparently dead provisions of the Union's con¬
stitution could be revived in the proper social, political and economic
setting to provide symbolic satisfaction when substantive satisfae-
170
tion was deemed impracticable. As we shall see in the chapters that
follow, the explanation of policy and propaganda on behalf of the
Executive's policies also involved the exploitation of actors and
relationships outside the United Kingdom and the projection of




THE CONTENT OE COMMUNICATION: BRITAIN AMONG THE NATIONS
Communication, as I pointed out in the introductory chapter, is
a tool of organization. In Chapters III and IV we looked at what the
AEU's leaders were trying to achieve and how they were trying to
achieve it. Because they were faced with formal and informal competing
power centres in the organization and by a membership whose lives were
not defined solely by the Union, the leaders could not simply issue
orders and expect automatic and instinctive compliance. To attain
their ends they tried to restrict and constrain their members'
behaviour, to make it difficult for them to behave otherwise than in
the desired manner and to compel them to act "correctly". These
trends are reflected in their attempts to centralize power and to under¬
mine their opponents and competitors.
They also used the communication channels available to them to
try to persuade the members to accept the policies they propounded.
This attempt to change the members' attitudes, knowledge and behaviour
through communication was important to the leaders because there were
limits to the constraints and compulsion that could be imposed in a
voluntary organization like the AEU. Even within those limits, however,
exclusive reliance on the tools other than communication would have
been costly and, perhaps, even counterproductive.
Messages about the international system played a conspicuous
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part in these leader-to-rahk-and-file messages. Consenuently the image
of international affairs that emerged was less a function of a
disinterested analysis of world politics and economics than of the
immediate objectives of the leadership and of power relations within
the AEU. In general the international setting figured in intra-
organizational communication insofar as it was or could be shown to be
related to or to affect the objectives, modes of action, division of
labour and distribution of power of the Union. The international
setting was thus a resource that the leadership could exploit in order
to further its aims within the organization. Since the most important
of the AEU's operative objectives were related to the protection and
improvement of the members * conditions of employment through
collective bargaining, the Executive's spokesmen focused on this theme
and described how the international setting affected the engineers'
welfare and the Union's ability to protect it. This relatively
straightforward, framework, however, was complicated by the Union's
other formal, historical and contemporary objectives: by ideological
and partisan considerations and by the relations between the Executive
and activists in the rank and file.
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A. The International Setting as Scapegoat
The international system depicted in communication from the
leaders to the rank and file in the AEU in the years 1945-1951 was
essentially and overwhelmingly hostile, a source of hardship and
difficulty that could not be contained or controlled. Even if
sometimes it could be seen to give with one hand, it seized with the
other. This projection of an image of danger, if not evil, beyond the
country's boundaries was a concomitant of the "national" line which the
Union leadership had adopted during the war.
In the image projected by the AEU's leaders, the world outside
the UK could have adverse effects on the members' work and welfare
because Britain was a trading nation, dependent on imports of food and
raw materials and on exports of its manufactures in order to pay for
1
them. Wars, conflict, greed and ignorance among nations all affected
Britain's international commercial and financial relations, which in
turn affected the way the worker performed his job, the goods he could
buy, the size of his wage packet and his very employment.
1. Journal, February 1946, p. 33; March 1946, p. 65; April 1946,
p. 97; March 1947, p. 66; September 1947, pp. 257-58; March
1948, p. 66; April 1948, pp.97-98; October 1948, pp. 304-05;
April 1949, pp. 97-98; October 1949, p. 290; November 1949,
pp. 321-22; April 1950, pp. 101-02; July 1951, pp. 193-94;
RING, 1948. pp. 214-20; RING, 1949. pp. 242-43; RING. 1951.
pp. 286-87. Sometimes the impact on particular industries was
direct. See the discussion of rearmament below.
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Although, as we have seen, same time passed before the AEU
leadership realized the contradiction between its "national" line and
the short-term material benefit of the members, it realized fairly
quickly that there was a necessary conflict between production for
export and production for domestic consumption. It was obvious that .in
a world of severe shortages, priorities must be determined. The
Government gave priority to exports in order to right the balance of
2
payments and to prevent inflationary price rises. The General
Secretary, Gardner, on the other hand, argued that exports must not be
expanded at the expense of domestic consumption. After six years of
austerity, he said, high priority should be given to the production of
household goods in order to give the workers an incentive to increase
total production. He repeated this point a month later in response to
3
sharp criticisms by the national press and others.
By early 1947 the members were being told that the problem was
more complex: the domestic market was competing with the export
market for capital equipment as well as for consumer goods. This
difficulty and its implications were brought home to everyone by the
Fuel Crisis of the winter of 1S47, when the lack of coal led to a
sudden but short-term rise in the number of unemployed. Gardner
commented:
2. See above Chapter II.
3. Journal. February 1946, p. 33; March 1946, p. 66.
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The Government is faced with an inescapable dilemma.
Production for export, especially of machinery, is a necessity
of the situation. We cannot pay for what we import in food and
raw materials without a very great expansion in the volume of
our exports. Yet machinery that is sold abroad is urgently
needed at home, particularly by the fule and power industries.
(4)
Tanner had voiced doubts about the validity of the policy of priority
for the export of capital equipnent in a letter to The Times a few
5
months earlier. Gardner did not express doubts or offer the Government
advice in his editorial but merely pointed to the difficulty of the
situation.
The only apparent solution was to try to increase production
enough to meet the demands of the home and foreign markets. Gardner
had already noted the necessity of this course of action and its
impact on the way the engineer did his work. Both the TUC General
Council and the Union's own EC, he reported, were calling for the
"suspension of numerous workshop practices and customs to secure
maximum output (in order to meet) the clamant needs for engineering
products to renovate and expand our own national economy and to meet
6
the urgent needs of the whole world".
As Britain's economic plight worsened during 1S47, international
difficulties were seen to cut even closer to the bone. After the UK's
retreat from its disastrous experiment with convertibility, Gardner
wrote:
4. Journal. March 1947, p. 66.
5. The Times. 7 October 1946, p. 5.
6. Journal. November 1946, p. 522.
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Frankly, we are up against it now, in deadly earnest. We have
to accept the consequences of our inability to buy food and
raw materials freely from most countries that require to be
paid in dollars....
So we are faced with the certainty that our imports of
food frati the United States and other dollar countries will
have to be cut down; and, in fact, have been cut down. Reserve
stocks of food cannot be drawn upon beyond a certain limit.
Rations, therefore, will have to be cut.
Since, Gardner continued, there is a limit to how much rations can be
cut, it is urgently necessary to increase exports, particularly of
engineering products, in order to earn the dollars to pay for these
7
vital imports.
In addition to affecting what manufactures and food the worker
could buy and what he could produce and how he was to produce it,
Britain's international trading position could affect his earnings too.
Thus in a sympathetic discussion of the TUC General Council's 1948 wage
restraint policy, Gardner interpreted its arguments in the following
manner. To cut Britain's trade deficit the country had to sell more
abroad and to increase sales production had to increase while prices
had to be competitive. "Increases in wages, unless accompanied by
improvements in manufacturing methods, are necessarily a cause of
8
prices going up." In other words, the end of the international
9
sellers' market, long predicted and long feared by the Union leaders,
meant that wage rises would have to be limited. Similar arguments were
7. Journal. September 1947, pp. 257-58.
8. Journal, April 1948, p. 98.
9. The Times. 7 October 1946, p. 5.
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used after the massive devaluation of sterling in the autumn of 1949,
when Gardner again gave a sympathetic account of the General Council's
10
new wage restraint proposals.
Finally, to complete the picture of the problems the engineer¬
ing worker faced as a result of Britain's international economic
difficulties, Tanner pointed out that his very job could be affected if
raw material imports had to be cut because Britain could not pay for
11
them: the outcome would be "large-scale unemployment". He made this
point in the course of a discussion of the necessity of Marshall Aid.
In general, therefore, the impact of the outside world on the
life of the British engineering worker was seen to be pernicious. It
placed his job and his earnings in jeopardy, limited the food he could
buy for himself and his family, as well as his general standard of
living, and put "pressure on him to change the way he worked. All this
was seen to be the result of Britain's dependence on foreign sources of
food and raw materials. Yet industrial Britain had long been dependent
on foreign sources of supply and had still managed to prosper for a
good deal of the time (or rather the British in aggregate had prospered;
the condition of individuals and groups was another matter). The
question that begged to be answered, therefore, was: Why had Britain's
international economic situation become so difficult?
Oddly enough, the articles and statements by the AEU's leaders
10. Journal. December 1949, pp. 353-54.
11. RPNC, 1948. p. 215.
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do not indicate that the question was at all obvious to them. Or
perhaps they thought the answer too obvious to mention. In his March
1946 editorial, Gardner noted that British industry's main problems
were "the manpower position", that is, the shortage of labour, "indus¬
try's immediately pressing needs", namely capital equipment, "the
country's financial circumstances in relation to the .American dollar
12
loan, and the export-import situation". This statement is suggestive
but can hardly be called an analysis of the situation. In the spring
of 1947, in a defence of the Labour Government and of the Union's links
with the Party against Conservative and Liberal attacks, Gardner
attributed the Government's economic and political setbacks to "the
fuel and power crisis, the bad weather, the disturbed international
outlook, and the divisions inside the counsels (sic) of the Allied
13
Governments ...." In an earlier editorial Gardner had noted that the
fuel and power crisis was due to the need to supply capital equipment
to foreign buyers at the expense of the domestic market, especially
14
the coal and electricity supply industries. Thus the country's
problems were attributed, in the main, to factors beyond Britain's
control: its dependence on foreign suppliers, acts of God and the
relations among states. This theme was expanded and elaborated as the
UE's difficulties were seen to impinge increasingly on the lives of the
people.
12. Journal. March 1946, p. 65.
13. Journal, May 1947, p. 129.
14. Journal, March 1947, p. 66.
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In an editorial published after the 194V convertibility crisis,
Gardner wrote:
The causes of the crisis are complex .... But the major
decision taken by the Government to suspend the free exchange
of currencies (which was a condition of) the Anglo-American
Loan Agreement, emphasizes the salient fact that the
United States, holding the whip hand, has used it to its own
ultimate disadvantage, as well as to the detriment of the
rest of the world. America has not yet learned what it
means to be a creditor nation ....
The £937 million loan, Gardner continued, could not be used to buy
food and raw materials, because it was almost all gone. The Government
had not been prodigal with the money, but "other countries that earned
net balances on trade with this country claimed payment from our
reserves of dollars under the convertibility clause of the Anglo-
15
American Loan Agreement." The "they" upon whom Britain's troubles
could be blamed was becoming more concrete and more definite.
Gardner's summary of the situation is striking, not only
because the United States is saddled with the blame, but because he
does not deem it necessary to ask, for example, why the loan was needed
in the first place, what shortcomings it was supposed to make good.
Also striking is what is included, the selection of information about
the loan itself. The Americans are represented as mean creditors
"holding the whip hand" who would suffer as a result of their own
folly they use their position "to (their) own ultimate disadvan¬
tage" while "the British people ... learn ..., the hard way what it
15o Journal, September 1947, p. 257.
means to be in debt". Such statements may make gripping melodrama,
but they do not constitute much of an explanation. Rather, they seem
to be an attempt to evoke an emotional response from the members.
17
The US loan had never been popular in Britain. One of the
AEU's sponsored MPs had commented, after the parliamentary debate on
the loan and the associated Bretton Woods agreement, that the "general
feeling" in the House of Commons was "that while the loan was necessary
18
... (it) bore few marks of generosity".
The problem was, apparently, that the loan was not the free
19
grant that the British thought their due. The .Americans were
certainly guided by considerations of their own advantage in setting
20
the terms for it, but, if Britain's expectations had not been so
great, the terms might have appeared magnanimous. There was no
interest to be paid on the $5750 million loan for the first five years,
and thereafter it was to be repaid over fifty years with interest at
two per cent. Interest payments could be waived if Britain's economic
difficulties were too great. Furthermore, $20,000 million of British
debts under Lend Lease were cancelled, while an additional $6000
million of Lend Lease goods were sold to the UK for $532 million.
Goods already ordered or en route to Britain under the wartime agree-
16. Journal. September 1947, p. 257.
17. Northedge, Descent «... p. 44.
18. Journal. January 1946, p. 10.
19. Northedge, Descent .... p. 41.




merit were also sold at a low price. To be sure, the fact that
interest had to be paid meant that the debt repayment would hurt most
in the early and, therefore, more difficult years, but, given the
domestic political pressure in the United States, it was a remarkably
22
generous arrangement,
There were, however, conditions attached to the loan,
23
including the free convertibility of sterling. The UK also had to
agree not to apply quotas to dollar imports, to dismantle the
Imperial Preference system and, as a more general measure, to ratify
24
the Bretton Woods agreement in order to stimulate world trade.
These terms were based on .American self-interest and unwarranted
optimism about the speed of Britain's recovery. When, in reaction to
the 1947 crisis, the British effectively reneged on their promise not
to discriminate against American goods and coordinated their policies
more closely with other Sterling Area countries, the Americans did not
25
remind them of their earlier agreement. The probable "impurity" of
the United States' motives does not detract from the fact that it was
letting London off the hook.
Furthermore, although in the end the convertibility clause was
to have a disastrous impact, it was not the only reason why the loan
21. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 163.
22. Northedge, Descent ..., p. 41; Paterson, Soviet-American
Confrontation, pp. 169-71.
23. See above pp. 49-51.
24. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 163,
25. Strange, pp. 62-63.
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ran out so quickly. Free convertibility may have been the coup de
grace, but the loan had been haemorrhaging badly even before it was
instituted. British export earnings, impressive though their expansion
had been, had not expanded enough. The fuel and power crisis of the
winter of 1947 was another drain on reserves. "Occupation costs in
Germany siphoned off considerable sums. Inflation in the United States
meant that Britain had to fay more in dollars for American goods, and
this further pinched British funds." Indeed, in the first half of 1947
26
the UK spent $1450 of the loan. Crosland, looking back on the crisis
from the peace of opposition, wrote that between July 1946, when the
loan was first taken up, and August 1947, $3350 million were spent.
Of this, $2345 millions were required for net dollar expenditure
by the U.K. (i.e. about 70 per cent); $620 millions for the
net dollar requirements of the (Sterling Area); while $385
millions represented the conversion of sterling into dollars
by third countries mainly in Europe. (27)
It hardly seems possible to sustain the image of ogre America
or even of ignorant and unfeeling America that the AEU spokesman's
discussion of the episode implies. The information just cited was
freely available and freely reported and used by the Government's own
28
spokesmen in their explanations of events. One cannot deny that the
26. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 172-73.
27. Crosland, p. 70.
28. Crosland, for example, cites articles published in The Banker in
the autumn of 1947; Crosland, p. 70. Much of the information
could also be gleaned from Parliamentary debates, ministerial
statements and press reports. All the following references are
to 1947 issues of The Times: 1 July, p. 4; 9 July, pp. 4, 6;
16 July, p. 4; 17 July, p. 4; 23 July, p. 4; 25 July, p. 5;
30 July, p. 3; 2 August, p. 5; 5 August, p. 5; 7 August,
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external reasons for the crisis were crucial, whether America was to
blame or not. However, as even certain contemporary economists
recognized, much of the fault lay not in the international setting but
29
in Britain itself. The growth in production was indeed great but was
still inadequate in terms of the contry's needs, and this inadequacy
had a long historical background. As we shall see, for a number of
reasons it would have been impolitic to raise these issues at this
time. Attacking the United States was, from this standpoint, an easy
option.
Gardner returned to the subject of the source of Britain's
difficulties later in the year, as the Government and the TUG General
Council advanced policies of greater austerity, stricter rationing,
more production for export, more manpower for high priority industries,
longer working hours and price regulation. The General Secretary now
refrained from casting blame on the United States, or indeed from
making any specific statements at all beyond asserting that the crisis
was not the Government's fault; "neither (did) it arise from any
slackening of the great body of the working people. The crisis is
30
world wide. No one country can solve it by unilateral action." The
reason for this change of emphasis is clear from the context of the
statement: a discussion of the talks that were then being conducted in
p. 4; 8 August, p. 4; 21 August, p. 4; 22 August, p. 4;
23 August, p. 4; 25 August, p. 4.
29. See, for example, Balogh, The Dollar Crisis, pp. xxiii-xxiv, 28-32;
Hawtrey, pp. 98-105.
30. Journal, November 1947, p. 321.
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Europe about the American proposals for what would become the
European Recovery Programme. Since, as we shall see in Chapter 71,
the Executive wished to ensure rank-and-file support for ERP, it would
hardly have done to blame the potential donor for their troubles.
Gardner did not attempt a more detailed investigation of the
problem until the following spring when the immediate threats and
dangers were passed. In an editorial about the need for wage restraint,
he pointed out that Britain used to be able to pay its own way in the
world, buying food and raw materials abroad with the proceeds of its
exported manufactures:
But even before the war we could not pay wholly for our imports
by our exports. We made up the balance of overseas payments
by our "invisible exports"....
Our "invisible" credit of hundreds of millions has
turned into a deficit, through our forced sale of foreign
investments, loss of shipping, reduction of earnings from
financial and insurance business, and our heavy borrowing ....
The loss of these invisible earnings was due to the exigencies of the
war. The consequent necessity of ensuring the competitiveness of
British exports which now had to bear the burden of paying for imports,
he pointed out, was the reason for the TUC and the Government's wages
21
policy. The reason for the inadequacy of British exports before the
war was not something Gardner thought to dwell on.
In addition to the war there was another development beyond
Britain's control which exacerbated an already difficult situation:
51. Journal, April 1948, p. 97.
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the terms of trade had turned against British manufactures. The
General Secretary told his readers that in 1947 Britain's "increased
exports brought us only three-fourths of the amount of imports we
obtained prewar. This was because prices for the goods we buy abroad
32
have gone up against us."
The former importance of invisibles would not have been news to
regular readers of the Journal, since it had been pointed out by a
33
contributor in the spring of 1947. Nor should the worsening of the
terms of trade have surprised attentive members of the British public.
Government ministers had stressed that this was the prime cause of the
34
.American loan crisis. The cause of Britain's woes could no longer be
personified in the Americans, but it was still something external,
something beyond the UK's control.
While Gardner had been more or less consistent in developing
this line, pronouncements were less unbalanced. Nevertheless,
for him too, the international setting was the major source of
difficulties. In his first NC speech after "VE-Bay (but before the
General Election), Tanner rejected the arguments of those who claimed
"that Britain can only hope to regain her export trade at the expense
of wage cuts and a reduced standard of living at home". He pointed out
32. Journal. April 1948, p. 97.
33. Journal. Kay 1947, p. 143.
34. See above, this chapter, footnote 28.
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that "only the poor organisation, our obsolete and inefficient plant,
our out-of-date methods give rise to the high price of British raw
materials which go into our finished products for export". This
situation could be remedied by the removal of the "monopoly strangle-
35
holds" on the basic industries like coal, iron and steel. Britain's
trade difficulties, therefore, would seem to derive not from any
external factors but from internal ones: from the system of ownership
not of all industry but certainly of a part of it. It was again in
a discussion of the members' wages that Tanner noted the following
year that "Production suffers if industrial organisation and equipment
36
is (sic) poor and antiquated." Thus, when defending the Union's wage
claim or, more generally, the members' right to a living wage, in a
context in which the contradiction between the interests of the workers
and the employers was clear and unavoidable, the President could
respond to the employers' arguments by pointing out, implicitly or
explicitly, that they were to blame for Britain's troubles since they
were responsible for the organization and equipment of industry. It
would be wrong, therefore, to ask the workers to pay for the employers'
shortcomings by cuts in their standard of living.
As Tanner came to accept the relevance of wage restraint, how¬
ever, he no longer had any interest in making debating points in this
way, and he came to adopt a line similar to the one that Gardner had
55. HPNC. 1945. p. 221.
36. HPNC, 1946, p. 211.
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been propagating, again largely in the context of discussions of the
need for wage restraint. As early as the summer of 1947, before the
convertibility crisis broke, Tanner moved to the external-forces
argument. He told the NC :
we have less positive financial and economic influence abroad,
at the present time when the success of our national plan is
increasingly dependent on the policies and prosperity of other
countries. (Our) economic rehabilitation depends ... on
foreign conditions. (37)
The following year he carried the argument even further, after
a hurried genuflection in the direction of the internal sources of
Britain's problems. He told the National Committee that the "recent
war ... precipitated the present crisis in our affairs, (but) we have
been drifting towards it for years". It was not only the two world
wars but "the mismanagement between them" which "lost us a large part
38
of our former influence in world affairs, and in the world's markets".
He did not elaborate, however, on this theme of mismanagement or on the
relationship between "influence in world affairs, and in the world's
markets", that is, between political and economic relations. Instead,
he listed the external factors involved, most of which Gardner had
already dealt with: the loss of income from invisible exports, the
cost of political and military commitments abroad and the deterioration
in the terms of trade, all brought about by the war. It was, therefore,
39
vital, he argued, that Britain join Europe in accepting Marshall Aid.
37. HPNC, 1947. pp. 261-62.
38. HHSC, 1948, p. 213.
39. HFNC, 1948, pp. 214-15.
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A few months later, in a special article for the Journal, he
rehearsed these points, omitting, however, any mention of domestic
mismanagement. He stressed the worsening of the terms of trade as a
result of the global increase in demand for food and raw materials in
war-ravaged Europe and among the "backward peoples" of the developing
world. Consequently, other "countries are no longer forced to send us
their products at any old price", Britain could "no longer dictate
the terms of trade and obtain cheap food and raw materials in return
for expensive machinery and manufactured goods". Tanner stressed
these national difficulties in order to persuade the members to accept
the unsatisfactory award decision of a Court of Inquiry on the new
collective agreement with the Employers' Federation, National circum¬
stances made it necessary for the membership to acquiesce in the award
and not to allow their dissatisfaction to be exploited "by outside
interests (trying) to incite our members to fall back on direct
40
action".
It was in the context of an explicit plea to the members to
show restraint in their wage demands that, in the summer of 1949,
Tanner laid even greater emphasis on uncontrollable external factors as
the cause of the EE's problems.
Our national resources are dependent on world
conditions ....
We are dependent on foreign supplies for most of our
necessities, (The deterioration in the terms of trade) is a
40, Journal, October 1948, p. 504.
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situation of which we have little control .... (There) is
little we can do to compel other countries to change their
views or their ways (with regard to raw material prices).
(We) do not control world conditions and cannot, there¬
fore, promise freedom from emergencies and crises. (41)
While Tanner refrained from erecting any particular non-British
actor into the source of the UK's economic woes, Gardner returned to
the American theme in the autumn of 1949:
Our problem is to a very considerable extent the problem
created by America's economic and political unreadiness to act
internationally as this country acted when its industries were
producing for the world market, when its capital resources
were available for large-scale capital investment abroad and
its financial and shipping services were on a scale that added
enormously to the balancing of its trade. (42)
It is obvious that America is being blamed for doing, or rather not
doing, something. The precise nature of its sins are unclear, however.
After all, the US was giving Britain and the rest of western Europe
substantial aid under the ERP and was investing considerable sums there
43
too. Much of its production was directed to overseas markets, and,
since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, it had assumed responsi¬
bility for some of the UK's overseas commitments. Neither its motives
nor its actions can be said to have been any more or less virtuous than
Britain's in its days of glory, so Gardner's statement seems, on the
face of it, absurd. Nevertheless, Gardner charged much "of the trouble
in the world to-day" to
41. RPNC, 1949. pp. 242-45. Emphasis in the original.
42. Journal, October 1949, p. 290.
43. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 6 and 6n.
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this change in the relative position of this country and other
highly industrialised countries. The changes themselves can
be traced mainly to the direct effects of the war on our
economy. Some of the difficulties, however, were and still
are, a reflection of the changing pattern of world trade. (44)
One can argue about the importance of the direct effects of the war,
but otherwise these last statements are acceptable enough. They do
little to clarify the attack on the United States, however.
Again the context of the discussion is important. These
remarks occur in an article interested but sceptical in tone
about production methods and productivity in the United States.
Indeed, Gardner's argument is that, because so much of Britain and the
world's problems are due to external factors, lessons about American
production methods are of limited value. The acerbic comments about
the United States thus are meant to underline the point that it has
little to teach the rest of the world. British national amour propre
was closely involved in this and, as we shall see later, other
expressions of belittlement of the experience of others. The outcome,
in any case, is an argument in which the war, the United States and the
changing patterns of trade are deemed responsible for Britain's decline,
which has in turn been detrimental to the whole world.
In late 1948 another international factor came to be included
in the concatenation of elements affecting econoiaic conditions in the
UK: the growing political and military tensions between the Soviet
44. Journal, October 1949, p. 290.
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Union and. Its erstwhile allies to the west. Despite the importance
45
which the AEU attached to trade with eastern Europe, the EC's
spokesmen did not discuss the manner in which the division of Europe
hindered trade and reconstruction during the period under review.
Instead, they dealt with the direct impact of East-West tensions on the
allocation of resources in Britain itself, that is, with the allocation
of workers, money, goods and services within the country between
consumer and capital goods manufacture, exports and imports and
armaments and social welfare. What is most striking about their dis¬
cussion of these factors, however, is that the attitudes expressed by
the AEU spokesmen were rather more ambiguous than those regarding the
international system in general.
The increased level of conflict between East and West was
marked by the British Government's embarkation on a rearmament
programme in the late summer of 1948. On 14 September Herbert Morrison,
the Lord President of the Council, told Parliament of the Cabinet's
"decision on measures to strengthen the Armed Forces in view of the
deteriorated world situation". Members of the armed services due for
release were to serve an extra three months while recruitment was
accelerated and the Civil Defence forces were reorganized. Furthermore,
the "improvement of the equipment position, especially in the fields of
air defence, armour and infantry weapons would be accelerated". The
wartime stocks that the forces still relied on "were becoming depleted
45, see below Chapter VI'-A.
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and partly obsolete". The repair and renovation of these stocks was
being speeded up, "and the Service and Supply (Departments) were
increasing their manpower for this purpose". Aircraft were to be an
important element in the programme. In this regard, Britain
had to meet not only (its) own production needs, but also those
of other countries, including the members of the Western Union,
who were using British types. Entra work would be required in
some factories and measures would be adopted to double the
present rate of output of certain fighters, whilst older types
of fighters in store would be reconditioned. (46)
In his first editorial to appear after this statement, Gardner
summarized these points and clarified their implications for the
members of the AEU. The lead-in to this discussion was a review of
the findings of the 1948 Court of Inquiry and the consequent debate
within the Union of the Court's recommendations. The Union, he said,
might not have gained much for its members in material terms, but it
had made important procedural advances and was establishing a way of
working within the system to achieve its ends. More specifically, it
had "gained the advantage of being able to press for the improvement of
the wages structure of our industry in a constitutional, orderly and
practical way as a strong and responsible body of organized workers
47
should do, in these difficult and dangerous times". In the circum¬
stances, this was the best way open to the Union, and there was no
place for organizational indiscipline and militancy, for the "direct a
48
action" that Tanner warned against in the same issue.
46. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 7 (11-18 September 1948), 9504.
47. Journal. October 1948, p. 290.
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He pointed, out that the cessation of demobilization and the
acceleration of recruitment would have "a considerable effect upon our
manpower problem", that it would exacerbate the labour shortage in
certain industries. A new Schedule of Beserved Occupations, that is,
of workers not subject to conscription, would have to be drawn up.
This would ensure, on the one hand, that essential industries did not
run short of workers and, on the other, that many members of the AEU
would be spared the necessity of doing National Service.
The need to manufacture more armaments, Gardner told his
readers,
involves inevitably a diversion of some of the nation's
resources from the recovery programme; it means that a good
deal of America's economic aid will be similarly diverted; and
as a consequence it seems that the re-equipment of British
industry for production to meet consumers' needs will be slowed
down or temporarily halted again.
Nevertheless, amid the gloom, Gardner could point to one bright
spot: there would be no need to worry about unemployment "since the
recovery programme combined with rearmament and remobilisation must of
necessity make more work than the workers available are able to do."
The overall effects could not be good, however, "for the national
economy cannot stand that kind of stimulus, since it will seriously
49
intensify the current distortions and dislocations." These state¬
ments by the General Secretary are an implicit recognition, very rare
in the period of the "national" line, that the interests of the workers
48* See above p. 214.
49. Journal. October 1948, p. 290.
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and of the national economy as a whole might not always coincide.
In relation to the first part of his editorial, Gardner's
discussion seems a rather peculiar attempt to use the tensions between
the Great Powers and the concomitant rearmament policy as both carrot
and stick; as a warning to the membership that "difficulties and
dangers" make it all the more important to maintain discipline and as
an indication that since they need not fear for their jobs, direct
action was out of place.
This theme faded from consideration in the two years that
followed because there were no major new departures in Britain's
50
rearmament programme during that period. Indeed, in October 1949
cuts of £30 million in defence spending were announced in the wake of
51
the devaluation crisis. Opposition to military expenditure did
attract seme support among some members of the Labour Party and other
groups. There was, in addition, a campaign under the aegis of the
52
v'forld Peace Committee, concerned principally with atomic weapons. It
was against this backdrop that a number of "peace" resolutions found
their way on to the 1950 National Committee agenda.
These resolutions were probably in Tanner's mind when he
conducted his survey of developments "in the international sphere"
50. Although on the diplomatic level military planning had culminated
in the establishment of NATO.
51. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 7 (22-29 October 1949), 10297-98.
52. The Times. 23 August 1949, p. 2; 24 October 1949, p. 2;
Journal. August 1950, p. 230.
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during his opening statement to the NC. The survey was an attack on
Soviet policy which, he said, was an important factor in the level of
international tension. He argued:
The result is that enormous sums are now being spent in every
country on armaments. This is a most tragic situation, for
this expenditure can be ill-afforded and is one of the chief
hindrances to economic recovery and standards of life
everywhere including the Soviet Union. We can but hope
that seme agreement will yet be reached which will lead to
the international control of atomic energy and a vast reduction
in the defence expenditure of all countries. (55)
He thus sought to undercut the peace campaigners* attacks on
the British Government's arms and military policies. Tanner was saying,
in effect, that although rearmament is a bad thing, Britain alone can
do nothing about it. The National Committee apparently agreed and
passed two resolutions, one calling for international disarmament
negotiations, the other congratulating the labour Government for its
54
contribution to the "efforts to end the danger of atomic warfare".
Tanner himself seems to have been voicing little more than the conven¬
tional pieties, rather than any serious concern for the effects of
rearmament, which had not, after all, been as great as expected
yet.
The Korean War, which broke out less than a fortnight after
Tanner made this speech, changed all that. "A rapid and sweeping
build-up of the armaments of the United Nations has to be undertaken",
53. KPNC, 1950, p. 239.
54. Journal, August 1950, pp. 241-42.
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Gardner wrote, and the "position of the Unions in our group of trades
will be deeply affected by large-scale industrial mobilisation". A
new Schedule of Reserved Occupations might be introduced, but, given
the lack of any major pool of unemployed, the supply of manpower to the
armaments industry would be more difficult. Furthermore, JPCs would
have to be developed "on a more effective scale than in the last war
55
war". Gardner did not question the need for rearmament, and he
pointed out that, although it would create difficulties, it would also
present the Union and the workers with opportunities which they might
exploit for their own benefit.
The emphasis on the opportunities offered by rearmament was
evident in Gardner's editorials. "None of the Unions will be left
untouched by the measures the Government is taking to meet the possibi¬
lity of general war resulting from the conflict of arms in Korea."
Again he stressed the importance of developing "the consultative and
advisory machinery for industry". It-will be recalled that, about this
same time, the CSEU was elaborating its plans for greater involvement
by the unions, particularly at the executive level, in the decisions of
the employers. Given the experience of the Second World War, the out¬
break of war in Asia must have seemed to the leaders an opportunity for
advancing the interests of their organizations.
Gardner could not deny, however, that there were drawbacks to
rearmament. Some "of the country's limited resources" would have to be
55. Journal, August 1950, p. 229.
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diverted from the recovery programme.
The full effects of this diversion will not be felt immediate¬
ly. But the more we spend on preparations for war, the less
will there be available for developing the Welfare State. On
the other hand, we may find same consolation in recognising
that a goodly proportion of the £5,400,000,000 it is proposed
to spend will go in wages and salaries. Haw materials must be
sought, munitions must be manufactured, transport must be
provided -— and all this means employment and employment
means wages. (56)
The phrasing and style suggest that Gardner could indeed find some
consolation in this. Given what we have learned of the operational
objectives and priorities of the AEU leadership, it is hardly surpris¬
ing that this should be the case. The Union was "about" jobs and wages
more than it was "about" anything else. However, given the formal and
oft-expressed concern for socialist values and the perceptions of the
strength of the communists and their allies in the Union itself, dis¬
plays of enthusiasm for rearmament would have to be tempered and the
evil effects of the process would have to be given seme prominence.
It was the negative attitude that prevailed in subsequent state¬
ments, especially following the January 1S51 upward revision of the
defence estimates for 1S51-54 to £4,700,000,000. Insofar as the
programme caused disquiet among the AECJ leadership, it was the scale
rather than the fact of rearmament that did so. There were, however,
no demands for unilateral cuts in spending, and the Executive spokesmen
56. Journal, September 1950, p. 261. It was announced on 12 September
1950, after this editorial appeared, that £5,600,000,000 would
be spent over 1951-54; Eatwell, p. 140.
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coneentrated on ways of overcoming the difficulties it entailed. For
difficulties there were. Nevertheless, Gardner, in particular,
refrained from attributing the problems to the rearmament programme
itself; rather, it was economic circumstances that often seemed to be
making rearmament harder. Thus, in February 1951, Gardner wrote that
industry faced "serious problems" in its attempts to cope with "the
task of rearmament".
One is the (shortage) of manpower (in the war-related
industries); another is the shortage of essential raw
materials; the third is the shortage of fuel and power
supplies; and there is a fourth, which is conditioned by
these shortages — namely, the question of priorities as
between the essential and less essential needs of the
situation. (57)
These were fundamentally the same points as those the General Secretary
had raised in his discussion of the'comparatively small rearmament
programme of 1948. Gardner stressed that these problems, in fact, were
soluble. Once the NATO and OEEC talks which were then being
conducted "for setting up international commodity groups to deal with
raw material problems" — were completed and other measures were taken
domestically, these difficulties would be overcome and the "relatively
58
small and scattered pools of unemployment" would be absorbed as well.
It was again with ways of removing the impediments to the
rearmament programme that Gardner dealt in his next statement on the
subject. The projected increase of expenditure to £4,700,000,000 for
57. Journal. February 1951, p. 33.
58, Journal. February 1951, p. 34.
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three years, "not counting what must be spent for stockpiling food and
raw materials", drew no other comment than that a "very large
proportion of these vast sums ... will affect mainly our ovm group of
trades".
Sections of the industry, especially those producing aircraft,
vehicles, radio and radar equipment, and machine tools will
have to be turned over progressively to arms production, and
therefore those sections now engaged in producing goods for
current consumption will have to take some of the strain of
producing components and the like .... They will also have to
expand exports, as some other industries, too, such as textiles,
will be called upon to do. Obviously, the sections of our
industry that are concentrated upon arms production cannot also
be producing for export: so the rest of industry must do
this. (59)
In other words, the capital goods production of heavy engineering firms
would have to yield to arms production. The manufacturers of light-
engineering consumer goods and of other products would have to do some
munitions work too and direct their consumer products to the export
market. Provided one can get througli Gardner's nicely understated
formulations, the implications are clear: there would be few capital
or consumer goods for the domestic market.
Even after the 1951 Budget resulted in cuts in the Health
Services and three ministerial resignations, Gardner understated the
impact of defence spending on conditions of employment and standards of
livingo He was critical of the resignations but sympathetic to the
ex-Ministers' criticisms of the effect of the defence estimates on the
"economy". The "solid ground" of their argument, he said, was the
59, Journal. March 1951, p, 65.
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contention that "the immense amount of money provided for the defence
programme cannot he spent without wasteful, extravagant and futile
attempts to buy raw materials and essential equipment -s&ich is simply
60
not available". Nowhere, however, did Gardner say that the introduc¬
tion of prescription charges was due to the size of the defence budget.
Iterhaps he thought it obvious, or perhaps he did not want to make it
too clear. After all, guns did signify jobs and wages, and when
weighed against the social services, greater importance was attached to
the former,
Rising prices, one of the principal factors in the trade unions'
inability to maintain the policy of wage restraint (as Gardner pointed
61
out ), were again to become the focus of interest in 1951. Once again,
it was Britain's reliance on imported food and raw materials, its
status as a trading nation, which made it so vulnerable to the western
nations' rearmament policies. The General Secretary wrote of the
reflection of the rise in "world prices for both raw materials and food
... in this country's wholesale prices" and of the consequent
"necessity for a return to the wartime system of international
commodity controls 0.. in view of the situation arising among the
countries that are building up a concerted system of defence for the
free world." Again there is an understatement of the link between
military spending and the raw materials scramble by the western
60, Journal. May 1951, pp. 129-30.
61. Journal. July 1951, p. 193,
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countries, especially by the United States. Any doubts about the
worthiness of the enterprise are dismissed by pointing out its
62
essential nobility, as "defence for the free world".
Tanner, in his 1951 National Committee address, offered strong¬
er criticism of the programme. Again, however, it was with the scale
not the fact of rearmament itself that he found fault. He pointed to
the deterioration in the economy over the preceding year, to the fading
"hopes of steady improvement in our standard of living", and ascribed
it to "the marked deterioration in the international situation". Hie
tensions between the Great Powers, which were due to Soviet policy,
were the cause of and justification for western rearmament. He was,
however, worried by the "scale and tempo" of the British plans. He
maintained that Britain's "economic stability" and capacity to "con¬
tinue the great social advance" set in motion by Labour were threatened
by the massive allocations to the arms build-up. This threat was bad
not only in itself, but because improvements in the British people's
standard of living and the UK's ability to offer aid to "peoples who
are at a lower stage of development than ourselves brings support to
our cause and is a deterrent to attack." The cuts in the Health
Service as a result of the defence programme were consequently to be
deplored. Living standards were also being eroded by the rise in
prices as a result of the growing demand for raw materials by all
62. Journal, July 1951, pp. 193-94.
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states, especially the USA.
The criticisms are clear and straightforward, unusually so when
compared with Gardner's, but the prescriptions Tanner offered for
resolving these problems are singularly muted. The £15 million gained
through Health Service charges could have been raised through taxation,
he said. The US could continue its subsidies for arms and equipment.
The unions could help to raise productivity and to channel manpower to
the essential arias and export industries. There is no demand for cuts
63
in the defence estimates. It might be argued that the demand is
implicit, indeed obvious, in the argument. Given that the President
does list the things that ought to be done, however, the omission is
glaring and indicates a certain ambivalence in Tanner's attitude. The
leaders' ambivalence is even more strikingly apparent in another of
Gardner's editorials in which he attacked the "Bevanite" arguments for
defence cuts and quoted approvingly Gaitskell's denial of any link
64
between price increases and Britain's arms programme.
It was only in September 1951, in a criticism of the TUC
General Council's inability to offer any guidance on the question of
wages and inflation (that is, its refusal to suggest further wage
restraint), that one of the negative effects of rearmament was stated
clearly and concisely. Gardner condemned the TUC statement "that a fall
in the standard of living in the circumstances created by rearmament and
65. HPNC. 1951. pp. 284-85.
64. Journal, August 1951, p. 226.
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rising world prices can only be countered by increased production" as
platitudinous "almost a cliche". On the contrary, he argued, there
is simply no way of improving living standards because rearmament "re¬
quires a large and increasing diversion of labour, raw materials, and
equipment for production for the home market, of goods and services
which contribute to our present standard of living". Little "increased
65
production of consumer goods" is possible "for the next three years".
Gardner did not, therefore, conclude that the aims programme be
cut. He accepted it as a given of the situation. Unrestrained wage
claims were his target, and he spoke of the Government's ability to
keep prices in check, and of the potential value of increased taxes on
profits, a capital gains tax and the limitation of dividends. Such
measures would indicate that all classes were sharing in the burden and
would make wage restraint more palatable. In this wage-restraint
context, Gardner's statement about the impact of rearmament on consumer
goods production may have been intended to imply that there was little
sense in higher wages when there was little to spend them on and, per¬
haps, that any wage rises would simply drive prices even higher.
In general, the negative impact of international political
tension on the workers' conditions of employment and standard of living
through rearmament was presented in a rather muted fashion by Gardner
and (albeit differently) by Tanner. Gardner tended to understate or
even to deny the bad effects. Tanner pointed to the effects but
65. Journal. September 1951, p. 257.
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concluded that they were something the members must adjust to rather
than something to be eradicated by cutting defence spending. For both
such expenditure was inevitable given the nature of international
political tensions, tensions which, it was emphasized, were in no small
measure due to Soviet policies.
The differences between Gardner's and Tanner's discussions of
the issue may have been due to the latter's more radical background
66
before becoming President. As we have seen, however, the general
policy line that he espoused during this period was hardly radical. It
is more likely that the differences were due to differences in the
medium and the audience they had to deal with. The nature of the NC
67
and its membership meant that if Tanner had not raised these points
someone else would have. By presenting them himself, he could put them
in the best possible light and draw the most limited conclusions. By
accepting some of the opposition's arguments he could cut the ground
from under them. Gardner, who did not have to worry about immediate
responses to his statement by third parties (that is, someone other
than the reader), did not have to make the same sort of concessions
as Tanner.
The reason for this generally muted reaction is apparently that
rearmament was not only unavoidable but desirable. The leadership's
support for the build-up is evident in their concern to resolve the
66. See above Chapter IV-A.
67. See above Chapter III-B-3.
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problems entailed in realizing it. Of course, the long-maintained
organizational habit of trying to cope with reality rather than to
change may have helped make this the easier response. Patriotism may
well have contributed to this attitude as well. The fact that it was
Labour Government policy also may have been an important consideration;
the return of the Conservatives to power did nothing to temper the
68
Executive's support for the policy, however. It seems that, as in
the case of wage restraint, if the labour leaders were persuasive, the
Union's leaders were eminently persuasible. For, apart from any
nationalistic considerations, the policy ensured the maintenance of the
policy of full employment in the engineering industry, and that was,
after all, the Executive's fundamental and overwhelming concern. The
point about jobs had been made in Gardner's earlier statements on the
issue, but for internal political and ideological reasons had
disappeared from public consideration. In the circumstances, the lead¬
ership adopted the safest public attitude: they criticized the scale
of the programme but refused to question its necessity.
One can understand the leadership's willingness to risk a
secondary concern like the welfare state. It seems odd, however, that
they should accept putting at risk the whole policy of reconstruction,
intended to ensure employment in the short and long term, by supporting
a rearmament policy that could promise, at best, only short-term
W. RENC. 1952~P. 264.
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advantages. The AEU Executive, on the other hand, may have reckoned
that staying out of the rearmament race presented greater short and
medium term dangers than staying in. As we have seen, they recognized
Britain's dependence on foreign markets and recognized too the global
inflationary situation engendered in part by the raw materials scramble.
What sort of market for its exports could Britain have had in such cir¬
cumstances, assuming that it could outbid the Americans for raw
materials? What effect would low demand have on British engineering
jobs? In these circumstances, a rearmament programme that would take
up the slack demand may well have seemed the most logical course to
follow.
The falling expenditure on many kinds of consumer goods in the
United States during at least the first part of the Korean War indicate
69
that such calculations, if they were made, were not far wrong. More¬
over, during the latter part of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, there
was a continuous rise in the number of unemployed in the UK. In
general, however, the metals, engineering and shipbuilding industries,
which were the main beneficiaries of the rearmament programme, ran
70
counter to this trend as employment in them increased.
Gardner's mixed response to the 1948 rearmament programme can
perhaps be understood in a similar way. At the time Britain's own
69. See H. S. Houthakker and Lester D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the
United States: Analyses and Projections, second edition
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 61-144.
70. Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics. 72 (1951),
Table 25, p. 18; Table 28, p. 21.
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prosperity depended on that of the United States, through Marshall Aid.
There were, however, continued and widespread apprehensions among mem¬
bers of the Labour Left and among trade unionists that the American
bubble would burst, that America would crash into another depression
71
and drag its dependents down with it. From this standpoint, rearma¬
ment could be seen as a form of insurance and therefore desirable
despite the difficulties it entailed.
Finally, the prospect of an industrial war effort conjured
up for the leadership the image of opportunities for the organization
to expand its influence in industry and in the wider society. This,
after all, had been the experience of the war just ended.
While these factors may have tended to bolster support for
rearmament, others introduced an element of ambiguity. Hie Union's
formal and, as we saw, oft-verbalized social transformation goals, and
the leadership's wish to undercut the arguments of the internal opposi¬
tion and, on one occasion, the usefulness of the argument to the dis¬
cussion of wage restraint -— these factors led the Executive's spokes¬
men to play down the positive aspects and to criticize the build-up.
It was, in many ways, a symbolic response which relieved the leadership
of the need to take any undesirable action -— like non-cooperation,
for example.
71. LeonD. Epstein, Britain Uneasy Ally (Chicago, 1954), pp. 104-05.
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Thus, for a variety of reasons, the image that emerged from
these discussions and explanations of Britain's economic decline and
difficulties in the postwar world was one of a country buffeted by the
uncontrollable winds of fortune, winds which came almost invariably
from outside the United Kingdom. Even when an attempt was made to de-
emphasize one foreign source of problems (international political
tensions), another (world prices) arose to take its place. There were
occasional references to "mismanagement between the wars" or "the
72
employing classes'" unwillingness to accept lower profit margins.
From time to time, in the course of discussions about the nationaliza¬
tion of a specific industry, bad management and restraint of production
73
by the employers were blamed for the industry's difficulties. The
problems of the economy as a whole, however, were attributed to the
effects of the wars, world prices, international tensions and so on;
The aEU leadership thus ascribed Britain's industrial and trade
difficulties and their consequences for the life and livelihood of the
British worker to external factors, to developments beyond the control
of the British government and people.
Indeed, it seems to have been important to them to assign the
blame for Britain's parlous state to non-British actors and forces. It
is impossible, of course, to deny the importance of external factors in
72^ KPNC, 1950T~P. 236.
73. Journal, May 1946, pp. 12:9-30; July 1947, p. 193; August 1947,
p. 225; November 1948, pp. 321-22; August 1949, p. 226.
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the UK's economic problems, but it is significant that the Executive's
spokesmen should stress them while de-emphasizing the problems'
domestic roots, of which they were clearly aware. Tanner had acknow¬
ledged, after all, that Britain had been "drifting" towards the
economic crisis "for years" and had pointed to interwar "mismanagement"
and to "poor and antiquated" equipment and organization. There is,
moreover, implicit acknowledgement of the domestic sources of the
problem in the discussions of proposed solutions; as we shall see,
most deal with domestic matters. Implicit in positing solutions based
on increased productivity and production, the suspension of restrictive
practices and the introduction of more up-to-date and simply more
mechanization is an awareness that low production and productivity,
restrictive practices and mechanization were part of the problem.
The tendency to stress foreign causes seems to have derived
from a number of factors. One of these was the specific context of the
statements. This is clear, for example, in the case of some of
Gardner's statements which defended the Labour Government from attacks
by the Conservatives and others, as in the aftermath of the convertibi-
74
lity crisis. Tanner, in his arguments for wage increases, could
blame employer incompetence for industrial difficulties, but when he
75
pleaded for wage restraint, the causes were "denaturalized". Evident¬
ly, therefore, the image projected of Britain's relationship with the
74. Journal. May 1947, p. 129; September 1947, p. 257.
75. See above pp. 211-16.
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outsiae world was not part of a well thought-out plan, of a special
concern to project this image and. not another. I&ther, in the course
of arguments about other matters important to the Union, ammunition was
drawn from wherever possible. There was, thus, a certain haphazsrdness
about the arguments, resilting in inconsistencies and discontinuities.
It is all the mors striking, therefore, that the inconsistencies were
so limited, that there was so little tendency to blame domestic actors
and forces for current problems, even when it was the Labour Party that
was being defended.
The major exceptions to this tendency occurred in the run-up to
elections or when elections were expected. Then the interwar sins of
the Conservative Party and the hardships they caused were recounted and
rehearsed. Even here, however, there was a peculiar development. In
1945 the links between the Conservatives and the employing classes and
their ccmmon responsibility for the woes and disasters of the 1920s and
76
1930s were made explicit. Later the Tories were still blamed, but
they were now presented as an almost totally deracinated grouping,
whose social base and the class basis of whose policies were hardly
77
mentioned. The denial or disregard for the class basis of British
political and economic relationships was reflected elsewhere, most
notably in the explanations of the causes of Britain's current difficul-
75. RPNC, 1945. pp. 218-19.
76. Journal. August 1949, p. 226; July 1950, p. 198; November 1950,
p. 326; October 1951, pp. 290 and 292.
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ties. Indeed the attribution of difficulties to external forces during
the postwar period seems to have been a substitute for the class-based
explanations of the interwar years.
Even at the height of the global depression, the international
roots of the UK's economic problems were minimized: if British
engineering was uncompetitive, the AEU's leaders would claim, it was
the fault of the employers. The perceived causes of the problems of
Britain's engineering industry are evident from the following summary
of suggested improvements made in 1931 by the President of the AEU,
W. H. Hutchinson: "It is ... in financial reorganization, in the
saving of capital charges, in the rationalising of directors, in the
administrative efficiency of the industry ... that the engineering
employers have the greatest opportunity of helping the industry back to
78
prosperity."
In the early part of the war Tanner and the General Secretary,
Fred Smith, continued this theme of blaming the employers and the Tory
Government for the difficulties and shortcomings of British industry in
the war effort. Thus, after the swift defeat of British, Commonwealth
and Greek forces on Crete by an airborne Genaan assault, Tanner charged:
The retreat from Crete ... had its roots in the mismanagement
on the home front. (We) have a right to expect that if we make
our utmost efforts to produce munitions, those efforts shall
not be turned to nought by a group of incompetents.... We
repudiate any responsibility for delays and checks in produc¬
tion. The fault lies with the Government and the employers. (79)
78. Journal. August 1931, p. 56. See also: February 1924, p. 56;
March 1924, p. 46; June 1924, pp. 9-11, 45; July 1924, p. 46;
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As the system of consultation developed during the war, however,
changes occurred. Tanner never entirely repudiated the theme of "those
80
who, in their own financial interests, still impede production", but
now he differentiated between good capitalists and bad capitalists, be¬
tween those willing to cooperate with the workers in order to improve
war production and "the obstructive kind of management". Tanner now
argued that many of the production difficulties were due to the
"improvisational" nature of the industrial war effort, "and the uneasy
feeling that we have not developed our full productive capacity has had
81
its effects on managements as well as men".
At the same time Tanner began to speak of a new postwar role for
the trade unions; it was, in fact, at this point that the Union leader-
82
ship embraced the "national" line. "In the past", Tanner told the
assembled National Committee delegates in 1942,
Trade Unions have mainly been protective and defensive
organisations, and in regard to many matters, quite negative.
We must become more positive and constructive in our outlook
and approach to the issues now confronting us and those that
will arise in the future.
If we are to stand still, deeply entrenched behind our
traditional rights and ... traditional grievances, while
history is marching forward at a terrifying pace, overturning
as it goes all the accepted social, political and technical
February 1925, pp. 12-13; March 1925, p. 16; April 1925, p. 47;
June 1925, p. 48; December 1925, pp. 13-14; January 1931,
pp. 35-38; August 1931, p. 44; January 1932, pp. 39-40;
May 1932, p. 29.
79. KPNC, 1941, p. 227; compare Journal. June 1940, p. 194;
February 1942, p. 33.
80. RENC. 1942. p. 291.
81. HPNC, 1942. p. 291.
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ways to which we are accustomed causing Tory Governments
to conclude alliances with a Socialist State, upsetting all
preconceived ideas and changing, less perceptibly, perhaps,
the methods of production on which we base ourselves if we
were to stand still we would not be left to play a decisive
part after the war, but would be swept aside.
The enemy, Tanner said in a vein more populist than socialist, would
then be the "powerful vested interests", the "great monopolists" who
seek "enormous and destructive powers ... in what they claim to be the
National interests of post-war Britain, but which would actually be
83
harmful to the country".
Tanner's 1942 National Committee speech marks the public turn¬
ing point in the development of the leadership's attitudes to coopera¬
tion with the employers and lays the groundwork for the "national" line.
It is noteworthy,that, in the same month that the President gave notice
of the new departure in Union policy, the General Secretary published
an editorial summarizing the progressive views of a number of capital¬
ists the chairman of Courtaulds, the Federation of British Industry
84
and the London Chamber of Commerce.
The "national" line was developed through the war as the leaders
followed the path of collaboration with the "progressive" employers.
The 'Monopolists" and "monopoly capitalism" were attacked, but Tanner
also spoke of "going forward ... in co-operation with the democratic-
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ally-minded managements". When the end of the war seemed imminent,
82. See above Chapter III-A-1,
83. HPNC. 1942. pp. 299-301.
84. Journal, June 1942, pp. 145-46.
85. RFNC, 1943, p. 221, 217.
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the attacks became more explicit, but, as the General Election
approached, it was the Conservative Party, with its base among the
86
capitalists, which was portrayed as the arch-villain. These attacks
subsided again after the war. Talk of progressive capitalists and
obstructive capitalists vanished. All employers were now people to be
cooperated with in pursuit of the greater good of the nation as a
whole; the "national" line had reached maturity.
The pursuit of the "national" policy had to be based on the
assumption that the specific objectives pursued were shared by those
with whom one collaborated. The goodwill of the labour Government
could be taken for granted, even though it might go about things in the
wrong way from time to time. The question of the employers' goodwill
could have presented certain public relations difficulties : How could
one cooperate with those who, it had always been claimed, were the
cause of so much hardship and so many problems? During the war the
solution had been to preach that there were good capitalists as well as
bad ones, that many employers had see the light and been converted. In
the postwar period the solution was to suppress or minimize the issue of
employer responsibility for current problems and to focus instead on
external causes. By locating the "enemies" of economic recovery and
social progress outside the country, short-term collaboration with the
employers could be justified on the grounds of a convergence, if not a
Q&l KPNC, 19447~P. 252; RPNC, 1945. pp. 218-19.
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congruence, of interests. By disregarding the role of the owners and
employers in bringing about the current difficulties, a basis could be
established for longer term cooperation. Hie Executive's spokesmen, in
effect, were denying the reality of a conflict of interests between
workers and employers and, consequently, denying the relevance of more
radical policies.
The location of the source of Britain's economic difficulties
abroad served to divert attention not only from more radical analyses
of the role of the employers but also from more traditional analyses of
the role of the Union and its responsibility for the condition of the
British engineering industry. The basic inefficiencies and uncompeti-
tiveness of the industry could certainly be traced to the employers'
incompetence, but the Union's own policies had not helped either.
Tanner's 1942 statement about the need to forsake "traditional
grievances" indicates that he knew this; the suggested solutions to the
87
problem show that the leadership was generally aware of it. The AEU's
interwar policy of non-cooperation, justifiable at the time as a means
of saving jobs, could not but have contributed to the industry's long-
term shortcomings, and so could not be justified in terms of the post-
88
war "national" outlook. The earlier attitude and these policies were
best forgotten as the Union advanced into the new age. By providing the
87. See below Chapter VI.
88. See above pp. 76-78, On the resistance to mechanization between
the wars see, for example, Jefferys, pp. 245-46; V. L. Allen,
Trade Unions and the Ctovernment (London, 1960), p. 280.
-242-
members with a contemporary external enemy, the Union leadership was
drawing a veil over its former more consistent hostility to the employ¬
ers and over the consequences of that policy for engineering.
B. The Necessity of British Resurgence
However useful the image of a beleaguered and helpless Britain
in a hostile world, however much it served the purposes of the Union
leadership, it could not, in fact, be sustained. There were two main
reasons for this. One was, as we have seen, that the leadership did not
have a consistent and coherent policy of painting the outside world in
the blackest shades: emphases changed in the context of different argu¬
ments. The underlying concern in projecting this image was not so much
to assign the blame to foreign actors and international forces as to
ensure that it was not attached to domestic actors; the hostile inter¬
national system was a means not an end. As I pointed out earlier, the
international setting was a resource which could be used in various
arguments and contexts, and not in all circumstances was it useful to
portray it in so harsh a light.
Furthermore, it was important not to overdo the image of
Britain's helplessness, for, if the country's difficulties were indeed
insuperable, what was the point of all the sacrifice and hardship? A
better tomorrow was a necessary justification for current deprivations.
Formal ideology, the leadership's perceptions of the internal opposition
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and its need to mobilize the members' support for its policies led the
Union's Executive spokesmen to temper somewhat the image of Britain's
place in the world. Britain battered and bruised would rise to
pre-eminence and prosperity once more.
Accordingly, there developed a secondary image of the inter¬
national setting, one which was less difficult and might even be help-
89
ful or a source of inspiration. This image was itself tempered by a
another tendency: that of stressing the UK's independence and achieve¬
ments and the inspiration which it offered the world and which the
world sought from it. The positive aspects of the international setting
had themselves to be muted in order to highlight Britain's own merits.
In late 1945 Gardner commented on the negotiations with the
Americans about the ill-fated $3,750 million loan and maintained that
Washington must not try to impose too many conditions on it. He pointed
out that although "two world wars (had) transformed (Britain) from a
creditor to a debtor nation and wrested from British industry its
primacy in industry and international trade", the trade unions would
•support the Government's refusal to allow the UK "to be made the
economic fief of any country". They rejected "any financial arrange¬
ments with the United States which will make this country dependent upon
and subservient to the economic royalists and Big Business interests of
the United States". The US Congress, financiers and industrialists were
89. On this image see below Chapter VI.
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warned "that we are going on with our programme of socialisation
90
whether America likes it or not". Again, it will be noted, the inter¬
national setting, or at least the American part of it, was shown to be
91
hostile to the British experiment.
This assumption was not constantly or consistently maintained,
however, for one way of demonstrating the value and importance of
Britain's economic and social development, was to portray it as an
example for the whole world. Thus in 1947 Tanner cautioned against
Britain's alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union.
It was not necessary from Britain's standpoint or desirable from that
of the rest of the world:
And we are not so helpless as our economic situation would imply.
We are giving the world an example of a great experiment of plan¬
ning with freedom. All progressive peoples are hoping for our
success as much as we are determined on it, for it would have
profound effects throughout the world ....
If there is one thing that we, and only we, can do in this
international situation, it is to give a courageous socialist
lead. (92)
Britain, downtrodden though it may be, is the site of the New Jerusalem
and, consequently, a light unto the nations. It could and, indeed, had
to act, therefore, independently in world affairs. The context of the
statement was a discussion of aid for reconstruction. Tanner was
90. Journal, December 1945, p. 354.
91. There were indeed hostile elements in the US who were prominent in
the debates about the Loan. See Faterson, Soviet-American
Confrontation, pp. 169-71.
92. RENC, 1947. pp. 262-63.
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ealling on the Government to use its influence to ensure the participa¬
tion of the Soviet Union in the Marshall Plan the better to prevent
.American intervention in Britain's "socialisation". In the course of
the argument, however, he suggested that whatever .America's attitudes,
other countries supported the UK and its Government.
Tanner returned to the theme of exemplary Britain in a warning
to his members about the pitfalls on the coxomunist route to socialism
and, more particularly, about the consequences of communist militancy
in the Union. The communist path, he said, is the path of violence.
There is, however, another course, and Britain is showing the way.
There is another aspect an encouraging aspect of
the great experiment our movement has initiated in this country.
We have been told that the peples of other countries are watch¬
ing not only with interest, but with hope for its success.
I have found this to be true, during the recent visit to the
United States, among people of various classes. Not only are
they interested and hopeful of the outcome, but they were glad
it was the British, with their stability, self-control and
tolerance, who were making the attempt. We are they believe
the nation most likely to succeed blazing the trail for
others to follow. (93)
By mid-1949, then, even America was looking to Britain.
Gardner, too, resorted to this type of argument, though he did
not stress it in the same manner. In discussing the new labour Party
manifesto in 1949, for example, he reviewed the Government's accomplish¬
ments since 1945 and remarked that the UK's welfare state was "the envy
94
of the whole world".
93. KPNC. 1949. pp. 247-48.
94. Journal. June 1949, p. 161
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The Executive's spokesmen often referred to Britain's indepen¬
dent achievements, to what it had achieved without outside help or over
and above what could be explained by the help received from the US or
any other source. The context was generally a defence of the labour
Government's policies against the opposition on the left and the right.
All the work and sacrifice, Tanner and Gardner were saying, was in fact
paying off. To counter the arguments of "both the Communists and the
Tories (who) are trying to persuade our own people and the country that we
are a suffering and decadent nation on the verge of collapse and econo¬
mic annihilation", the President and General Secretary would mark the
progress made in increasing manufactures and exports and eliminating
the trade deficit, eradicating unemployment, expanding agricultural
95
production, ensuring the health of the people and building houses.
Another way of making the same point was to compare conditions
in Britain with those abroad and remark, for example, that the British
were so well off because of Government policy and cooperation of the
workers, or that the British would be a lot worse off were it not for
the labour Government. Thus, in discussing the Government's housing
programme and housing was a particularly sore point among large
95. Journal, July 1949, p. 193. See also: October 1948, p. 290;
December 1948, pp. 353-54; February 1949, p. 34; April 1949,
pp. 97, 108; September 1949, p. 257; February 1950, pp. 33-34;
September 1951, p. 258; HFNC, 1948, p. 220; RFUC, 1949,
pp. 244-45; HFDC, 1950, pp. 232-34; RPNC, 1951, pp. 281-82.
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sections of the population during the latter part of the period under
96
review Gardner remarked : "Though material has been in short
supply, more has been achieved in this field than in the rest of
Europe put together, and more even than in the wealthy United States of
97
America." A few months later he pointed out how much more British
Droduction was increasing than the rest of Europe's and how Britain's
98
industrial productivity was growing more quickly than the USA's.
Sometimes, too, conditions in other countries were used as a
warning against certain courses of action. Thus the violent policies
of the communists were compared with the Labour Party's promises of
99
peaceful change. The political divisions in the US over the Korean
War and rearmament were contrasted with the unity of views in the UK
despite the resignation of Bevan and his colleagues. Gardner commented
that "it would be tragic beyond words if disagreement inside our
Government or our party unloosed such controversies as those that dis-
100
tract and divide the American Congress and people."
Even when they drew models of behaviour and policy from the
international setting, the Union's spokesmen would often downgrade them.
They would make unfavourable comparisons on another matter or claim that,
of course, all this was known anyway, or that the lesson was of limited
96. See Eatwell, pp. 128, 130, 152.
97. Journal, June 1949, p. 161.
98. Journal, November 1949, p. 322.
99. RPNC, 1949, p. 247.
100. Journal, Kay 1951, p. 130.
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relevance to Britain's situation. Similarly, the importance of foreign
assistance in the country's recovery was said to be rather limited.
Thus when a communist member of the Executive Council, J. R.
Scott, wrote about the benefits of mechanization in the United States,
he also pointed out that in socialist societies the position on pay
101
and production was necessarily better than in America. Clearly,
such unfavourable comparisons stemmed from Scott's political position.
However, ideology, or rather the formal ideology of the Union, and the
reluctance to alienate the internal opposition were reflected in
similar statements by Gardner and Tanner.
There was thus a distinct reluctance to cite the American pro¬
duction model; for about the first half of the period under review
the relevance of American industrial experience was rarely considered.
At times this reluctance seems irrational and wilful. In his 1947 NC
address Tanner said: -"Unlike the American problem of distribution, the
problem for the rest of the world is production." Presumably,
therefore, the US had managed to overcome the production problem, but
the President did not suggest that anything of relevance might be
gleaned from the American experience. Instead, he cited the Soviet
system of pay incentives and "other Russian methods" which "could use-
102
fully be considered for adoption here." As a short-term and partial
solution to the production problem during the transitional reconstruc-
101. Journal, January 1946, p. 12.
102. HPNC. 1947. pp. 265, 269.
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tion period, incentives could well have been useful. However, they
could not have replaced technological change as a long-term solution;
Tanner's own statements since 1942 had made this clear enough. As for
the incentive system referred to a payment-by-results scheme with
"a steeply rising scale for each article produced above an agreed norm
103
noim" it hardly seems relevant to the sort of mixed economy that
Labour, with the support of the AEU Executive and moderate unionists in
general, was trying to establish. By raising the marginal cost of each
additional unit, the idea, indeed, seems designed to ensure that
managements would try tc limit production were they ever forced to
accept it.
In this case, there was clearly no direct intention to upgrade
the image of the UK. The antipathy to capitalist and wealthy America
and the concomitant willingness to look instead to the USSR despite
the doubtful relevance of its methods are symbolic responses to the
dictates of formal ideology and the perceived strength of communists
and fellow travellers in the Union itself. The latter group, thus, was
paid off for its support of the "national" line. Such statements
required no substantive action, which the employers in any case would
have rebuffed very firmly, but showed that the leaders' collective
heart was in the right place. The impression that Tanner was conscious¬
ly exploiting a symbolic pay-off in order to avoid doing anything more
103. RFUC, 1947? p. 265.
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radical is strengthened when one considers that during the war he had
referred explicitly to the lessons that might be learned from the
104
Americans. Only after the development of the Marshall Plan and the
communists' return to opposition did the USA regain some of the
respectability it had had during the war, and could it once again be
used as a model.
Even then it was used at first reluctantly and warily. In 1948
Sir Stafford Cripps proposed the establishment of an Anglo-American
advisory body, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACF), to be
composed of British and American employer and trade union representa¬
tives. The Council would "bring to bear upon the problem of increasing
production the best scientific and technical experience available on
both sides of the Atlantic". Gardner's first response was tepid.
"American industry may have something to teach us", he said, but the
"American experts" who were to come to Britain to study conditions
there must not "have any prejudices, either ideological or political".
The US, he continued, tended to look down on Britain's recovery efforts.
(Yet) British industry has been making progress even without
financial or economic aid from America ... under the guidance of
a labour Government, and through the co-operation of the Trade
Unions. We should ... resent it very deeply if the proposal to
set up (this body) is taken as an admission of economic back¬
wardness on our side; or is taken from the American side as a
mandate for the experts and technicians to tell us where to get
off. But we are willing to learn. (105)
104. HFNC, 1945, p. 223.
105. Journal, August 1948, pp. 225-26.
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The sensitivity to criticism evident in this statement, the
assertion of the validity and value of Britain's own experience and
success, show that more than ideological or political sources of
antipathy to the United States were at work here, Gardner's appeal
was based also on a sense of damaged amour pro pre; it was degrading
in some way for Britain to look upon America as a model. This need for
self-respect, for asserting one's own value and importance, may have
been a factor in the statements about Britain's achievements referred
to earlier as well.
However important this emotional factor may have been, one must
not forget that such statements were also useful in defending the AHJ
leadership's policies, particularly those shared with the Labour
Government, and in justifying the people's sacrifices, the rationing,
the austerity and the wage restraint. The depreciation of the American
model, of the magnificent industrial achievements of a capitalist
country, similarly served both rational and nonrational ends. It
soothed British pride and communist and fellow-traveller prejudices.
Furthermore, so long as even a minimum of controls were considered
necessary, it preempted any argument from the right that wartime
controls be dropped in the UK as they had been in America.
Thus in September 1S48 Gardner quoted approvingly from Flora
Hancock's presidential address to the TUC. She had said, in referring
to the AAGP, "that we invented many of the productive techniques which
other countries have carried farther". Gardner commented "that if
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industrial leadership is in question, this country is surely not behind
other countries in the practice of collective bargaining for the
106
improvement of wages and conditions of employment".
Later that same year the General Secretary wrote that the AACP's
American members maintained that the higher productivity of industrial
workers in the United States was due mainly to more extensive "use of
industrial power and higher mechanization"; the Americans suggested
that more power tools be used in British factories. Gardner made no
direct comment but noted that an earlier meeting of British trade union
Executives, convened by the TUC General Council had come to "much the
107
same conclusion". In other words, the Americans were not telling
them anything they had not already known. What use, then, was the
AACP?
A few months later an editorial reported on the organization of '
"productivity teams" under the auspices of the AACP. Hie teams would
travel to the US in order "to study factory administration,
organisation, lay-out methods and operating conditions" in various
industries. Gardner noted, after summarizing the improvement in
Britain's export performance: "We may have something to learn
from American technology; but assuredly we have nothing to be ashamed
108
of in what our industries are accomplishing under present conditions."
106. Journal, September 1948, p. 258.
107. Journal, December 1948, p. 354.
108. Journal, February 1949, p. 34.
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Similarly, although the Executive's spokesmen acknowledged, the
importance of Marshall Aid and, as we shall see later, were determined
to "sell" the Plan to their members, they also felt it necessary to
ensure that the workers did not take the aid as a signal that they
might relax their production efforts. The result was a muting of the
image of dependence that a stress on ERP might have entailed and an
emphasis on a picture of the UK pulling itself up out of the quagnire.
Thus in the summer of 1948 Tanner remarked that, despite the dollar aid,
the onus was on the British people to achieve the nation's industrial
109
and economic reconstruction. A little less than a year later
Gardner remarked that without US aid, the country's economic problems
would have been "immensely more difficult, if not insurmountable".
Once he had made this point he moved on, not to a detailed description
of what help the money had been, but to an extended discussion of the
"sustained national effort to increase production". His purpose in the
article was in part to vindicate the policy of restraint pursued by the
110
unions in 1948 and to encourage further progress in production.
To sum up, statements were made about the UK and its relationship
with and standing among other states which tempered the image of the
country's helplessness and haplessness in a hostile world. The reasons
109. HFNC, 19487 p. 216.
110. Journal, April 1949, p. 97. Compare Gardner's special article in
the same issue: "How are we getting on? Progress Heport on
Britain's Economic Recovery", p. 108.
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for this were numerous: patriotism and. national amour propre; the
wish and need to defend the Executive's policies and those policies of
the Government which it approved; the need to mobilize the members*
active support for these policies; the dictates of the Union's formal
ideology and the wish, during the first postwar years, not to alienate
the internal opposition and indeed to offer them symbolic pay-offs for
their continued cooperation. All these factors helped create the
image of a Britain which could overcome and was overcoming its diffi¬
culties. Present circumstances might be beyond its control, and it
would have to adapt to them, but it was pulling itself up by its own
bootstraps and would maintain its leading position in the world.
Britain, according to this view, could, would and did act independently
and rely on itself for its own salvation.
The emphasis in these discussions on the achievements of
"Britain" may reflect one of the aspects of the "national" line0 The
premise that the good of the worker depends on the prosperity of the
nation means that aggregate improvements can be used to indicate
progress when the individual may be able to see little or no improve¬
ment in his own lot. The AEG leaders did not neglect to point out the
way the individual worker benefitted from labour rule. For many workers,
however, especially those who had been employed in the expand¬
ing industries before the war, their personal material condition may not
111
have seemed all that much better. The nation's economic progress
111. Thus, while the average weekly earnings of engineering workers
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was thus, in some measure, a substitute for current hardships and a
promise of better times ahead for the individual, whose prosperity
depended on that of the nation. Aggregate advances could thus be used
to furnish symbolic satisfaction when little could be offered in the way
of material advantage to the individual.
The cumulative effect of this image of a resurgent and
independent Britain on those willing to listen to Executive statements
could not but have been to encourage a belief in the country's
continuing Great Power role and standing, a belief that the postwar
decline was somehow an aberration. The inclination to such a view was
reinforced by the tendency to minimize the importance of the deep domes¬
tic roots of the national crisis and to locate the "enemy" outside
Britain. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with the country,
nothing that more machines and wage restraint and the like could not set
right.
From such a standpoint, participation in a united Europe is un¬
necessary and undesirable; high levels of defence spending are accept¬
able; a Suez invasion, an independent nuclear deterrent and the deploy¬
ment of the Royal Navy east of Suez and/or a "Third Force" policy are
right and proper; and a conception of unilateral disarmament by Britain
increased by 45.3% between 1938 and 1948, consumer prices rose
by 43.7$; Knowles and Robertson, p. 195; Feinstein, 1133.
This, of course, does not take into account the effects of
different levels of taxation and the "social wage", but the
redistribution impact of these factors had not been negligible
before the war either; Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War
Economy (New York, 1970), pp. 371-74.
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as an example other countries would follow is eminently logical.
Again, as in the case of the "hostile world", it was not the Executive's
primary intention to project an image of Britain restored to its
"rightful" place. The image was the outcome of the needs of other
arguments. However, the fact that such an image emerges so clearly
probably reflects a fundamental belief among the AMI'S spokesmen. They
were not alone; the attitude was implicit in the policies of the
Government and the various oppositions to the left and the right in
this and later periods. By adding their voice to the chorus, the AEU's
leaders may have helped to perpetuate the attitude among those members
of the rank and file who were attentive to them and to discourage alter¬
native images of Britain's capacities and capabilities. For reasons
which had little to do with foreign policy considerations, the AEU
leadership helped to maintain a certain image of the country's ability
to act internationally and thus helped to maintain its public's
acquiescence in the general course of British policy, exemplified by
the actions mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, a policy which
112
was itself unsuited to the UK's capacities.
112, See, for example, the material cited above, Chapter I, footnote 5.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CONTENT OE COMMUNICATION:
THE EXTERNAL ELEMENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND TEIE SELLING OF TEE COID WAR
The role of the British and, to a greater extent, the American
trade unions in fighting the cold war abroad has been dealt with in a
1
number of studies. There was, however, also a domestic dimension to
the unions* cold war activities. Among other things, the leaders of the
the AEU, in their statements and messages to their own constituents,
joined in the cold war chorus and echoed the ideas transmitted by other
sources in the wider society. They thus confirmed the image of a world
divided, of a Soviet Union hostile and agressive and of an America, if
not downright friendly and progressive, certainly less hostile and
reactionary than it had previously been painted.
The leaders of the AEU may have come to believe in or to accept
Labour's foreign policy out of loyalty to Britain, the Labour Party or
2
Ernest Bevin. However, they did not make anti-Soviet and pro-American
statements purely out of national, partisan or personal loyalty. On
the contrary, such statements were closely related to the Executive's
1. See, for example, Allen, Trade Union Leadership; Walter Kendall,
The European labour Movement (London, 1975}; Joseph C. Goulden,
MIeany (New York, 1972); Hero and Starr; Lewis L. Lorwin, The
International Labor Movement (New York, 1953), and others listed
in the Bibliography below.
2. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 295; Eatwell, p. 135; Harrison,
pp. 144-45, 217-20, 223-24.
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pursuit of their own primary objectives at the time: to the mobiliza¬
tion of the members' support for the "national" line, for policies of
reconstruction and full employment in the face of an internal
opposition that threatened those aims.
Harrison pointed out that a trade union leader is generally
reluctant to take a film (and public) stand on political issues, despite
his "wider discretion on political than on major industrial questions"
and his consequently greater "scope for autocracy".
(Just) because political issues are usually less important to
him, he is less likely to commit his power and prestige to get¬
ting his way. In unions torn by political and religious
factions, the leadership finds it morally impossible to fight
for its views on every resolution. It is usually ready to give
way on some to ensure victory on those it considers really
important. (3)
In order for a leader to take a firm stand on a political issue,
that issue would have to be of major importance to his own goals and
concerns as a trade union leader.
On such crucial issues as wage restraint (the TUC General
Council thus) fought pitched battles; on peripheral questions,
such as Greece or Spain, it was good tactics to talk left and
accept extreme resolutions, in order to keep goodwill for more
important battles« The leadership could not move too far or too
fast. Voting on foreign policy matters was often profoundly
influenced by such tactical considerations: it might have
differed markedly had anything vital been at stake. (4)
In the early postwar period the AEQ leadership seems to have act¬
ed in a similar fashion vis-a-vis its own Ifctional Committee in criti-
5
cizing Labour and US policy on Greece, Spain and Eastern Europe.
3. Harrison, pp. 185-86.
4. Harrison, p. 223.
5. HEWC. 1947. pp. 263-64.
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Probably this was due less to a desire to retain the goodwill of the
internal opposition, which in any case pursued a collaborationist policy,
than to a wish to offer it symbolic payment for its collaboration. In
other words, in exchange for leftist and communist support on vital
matters like reconstruction, the Executive propagated leftist and
communist views on matters, like Greece and Spain, which were of less
importance to the organization.
Particularly after 1947, however, such criticism of Government
foreign policy became less and less frequent and the EC's spokesmen
made statements that came closer and closer to the Government line.
This change coincided with the internal opposition's renunciation of
collaboration. There was thus no incentive for making pro-Soviet, anti-
Beviri pronouncements. What incentive was there, however, for taking the
opposite tack? Was a new type of exchange with a new partner in opera¬
tion now? Or was it that foreign policy was no longer the "peripheral"
issue that it had been?
Writing about two different situations, Harrison suggests various
reasons for trade union leaders to take fimer public stances on politi¬
cal and foreign policy issues. He argues that the TUC General Council's
"falling support for extremist views from 1948 onwards was partly a
genuine reflection of changing attitudes within the movement: but also
the discrediting of the Communists enabled the leaders who had consolid¬
ated their positions to turn and fight motions they would have had to
6
let pass in the immediate post-war period". There are two problems
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with this approach, one more general, one, perhaps, more strictly
applicable to the AEU, The first has already been mentioned : the fact
that there is no longer any advantage in following one course does not
mean that there is necessarily an advantage in taking the course
diametrically opposite0 There is, after all, the option of saying
nothing at all in order not to exacerbate an already difficult
situation. Nor can it be said that the AEU Executive had consolidated
its position in the organization. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter IV, the
outcome of the tug-of-war between the centre and the shopfloor, which
was complicated by the resumption of hostilities between the official
leadership and the internal opposition, was more in doubt than it had
been for many years.
Elsewhere, Harrison writes that the 1951-55 period was "a rare
exception" as trade union executives proved willing to take firm political
stands. "Several union leaders, considering that the controversies
over the rearmament programme, nationalization, or the European Defence
Community, involved the whole future of the (Labour) Party, committed
their strength at (the Party) Conference and within their own organi-
7
zation to an unprecedented degree." As Richter points out with
respect to certain of these issues, the leaders* concern was not
exclusively with the "whole future of the Party" but at least equally
with how that future might affect the unions' ability to carry out their
6, Harrison, p. 223.
7, Harrison, p. 186.
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8
primary function. We have seen too that the Executive's position on
Government policy was at least as much a function of the relevance of
specific policies to the EC's main concerns as to the enunciation of
these policies by the Party leadership.
It seems logical that the enunciation of anti-Soviet and pro-
American views, therefore, might fall into this same category of issues
relevant to the trade union concerns of the EC : conditions of employ¬
ment, organizational maintenance end the internal distribution of power.
Indeed, the direct and immediate interests of the Union and its members,
as these were understood by the Executive, seem to have been closely in¬
volved in such statements. Hie AEU leaders' expressed opinions about
America and the USSR varied with the perceived utility of these
countries and of favourable or hostile images of these countries to
Britain and the engineering workers' economic well-being through trade,
aid and the maintenance of full employment. Eavourable attitudes about
the relationship with the USSR were expressed as long as Soviet trade
was considered vital to reconstruction. Hostility to the USSR was
expressed when it was considered a threat to this goal. The image of
an agressive USSR was also valuable justification for the maintenance
of the rearmament programme which, as we have seen, seems to have been
thought important to ensuring full employment. An improvement in
America's image developed as ERP came to be considered vital to
8, Richter, pp. 138-39,
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recovery, and more favourable images of the USA vrere projected when
that country seemed to provide a useful illustration of the operation
and success of the "national" line,
A. Trade, Aid and Shifting Attitudes to the USSR
A central part of the solution to Britain's economic problem
proposed by the AEU's leaders was export, Britain had to produce more
goods for sale abroad in order to buy the goods its people needed in
order to survive and to produce more manufactures, Britain's overseas
trade had been disrupted during the war for a number of obvious reasons
the difficulties of transport, the need to switch most production
to what was essential to the war effort and so on. After the war
Britain had not only to try to recover its former markets but to
develop new ones to make up for those it could not recover and for the
losses in invisible overseas earnings. The Executive spokesmen's dis¬
cussions of these matters are in part reports on the progress made in
carrying out the resolutions of the National Committee: reports, in
other words, on what the leaders were doing for the members' prosperity.
In part, too, these discussions may have reflected a concern to pander
to the prejudices of communist and fellow-travelling opinion in the
Union, In any event, for the AECJ, the most likely and potentially most
valuable trading partner seemed to be the Soviet Union. Tanner told the
National Committee in 1946:
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Britain needs exports, yet trade with the Soviet Union and the
rising democracies of South-East Europe is at a standstill.
It is in the interests of Britain as a whole and of engineering
workers in particular, to develop long-tena, stable markets for
engineering products. The Soviet Union offers such a market on
a vast scale. (9)
The USSR was not only a market for British manufactures; offi¬
cial AEU policy, Gardner reminded his readers later that year, was
"to do whatever possible to extend credit facilities and exchange raw
materials and manufactured goods on deferred terms". Eastern Europe
was important not only because it needed the goods that the UK had to
sell, but also because it produced the food and timber Britain needed
10
to feed its people and rebuild their hones.
A great deal of the Union's lobbying activity, generally conduc¬
ted through the CSEU in direct approaches to ministers and officials,
11
dealt precisely with this problem. It ceased in the summer of 1S48,
however, and was not resumed until later years even though, in 1949,
the NO instructed the Executive to encourage trade "between this
12
country and theU.S.3.R. and the Eastern democracies".
One of the reasons for rank and file support of increased trade
with the Soviet Union seems to have been fear of Britain binding itself
too closely to American capitalism. In 1947 the NO voiced its "alarm"
at "the signs of an impending slump in the U.S.A." and expressed its
9. RPNC, 1946, p. 209.
10. Journal, December 1946, p. 353.
11. Journal, April 1947, p. 105; September 1947, p. 262; January
1948, p. 7; May 1948, p. 134; June 1948, p. 167; September
1948, p. 263.
12. Journal, August 1949, p. 242.
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fear "that the Labour Government's present trade policy tends to take
this country with it (the USA) if and when this occurs". To prevent
such an eventuality Britain should diversify its trade and enter into
13
"trade agreements with European and other socialist countries". As
we saw earlier the leadership, too, may have been prey to such appre¬
hensions and so may have shared this reason for seeking increased
14
trade with the Soviet Union.
The principle reason for the importance attached by the leader¬
ship to trade with the Soviet Union during this period, however, was
probably the perception of the importance of such trade in the interwar
years. Then trade with Russia had been one of the main themes of AEU
pressure group activity and there were frequent demands for trade
treaties with and export credits for the USSR. Engineering components
were seen as a particularly large component of this trade. After the
war Tanner noted: "We would have been far worse off in the great de¬
pression if orders from Russia had not proved the salvation of sections
15
like machine tools and electrical equipment."
The potential value of Soviet trade was distinctly and
increasingly limited by a number of factors in the early postwar years.
The wartime damage to the USSR's economy and its own reconstruction
priorities meant that the Soviets had relatively little to sell abroad.
Immediately after the war much of the volume of the Soviet Union's
13. Journal. September 194V, p. 275.
14. See above pp. 232-33.
15. RPNU, 1946. p. 209.
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"imports", particularly of capital goods, was composed of reparations
from. Germany, and this lessened the demand for British engineering
goods. This might not have affected the longer tern prospects had not
political factors intruded. Particularly after 1947 the relative and
absolute value of Soviet trade was lessened by the growing importance
of the dollar and sterling countries and of western Europe, by the
restrictions on "strategic" trade with the USSR and by the concomitant
integration of the eastern European economies with that of the Soviet
16
Union.
While the possibility of developing the Russian market lasted,
however, it helped to give a rosy glow to perceptions of relations
with the USSR. Good political relations were deemed vital to good
commercial ties. Thus, as a prologue to the statement quoted above
about the opportunities offered by the Soviet market, Tanner said:
A most important factor is solidarity between British
workers and the Soviet people. While politicians and press
lords have blown hot and cold on Anglo-Soviet friendship
as it suited their book at the time we have adhered to that
principle as our policy.
Never was it more vital to reiterate and fight for our
policy of solidarity with the Soviet Union. It is at once a
bread-and-butter issue and a question of life and death. With¬
out it the future prospect is black indeed.
He then went on to speak of the importance of Soviet trade and warned:
"We cannot afford to become too exclusively dependent on the capitalism
of the United States. A sinister warning is the anti-labour legisla-
16. Sergej Mawrizki, Aussenhandel der Sow.jetunion Gestern und Heute




tion now being imposed on the American Unions by President Truman."
This last point is apparently a reference to the Taft-Hartley Bill
which was to become law in 1947. Truman actually opposed the Bill,
and Congress had to carry it over his veto. The perceptions of
desirable relationships with America and the USSR thus seem to have
been strongly coloured by the Union's official socialism, including a
sense of socialist internationalism, and perhaps, too, by a wish to
provide the communist and fellow-travelling activists with a symbolic
reward to the policy of reconstruction. Mixed with these motives,
however, was a strong, if not overwhelming, instrumental streak: the
USSR would make a good trading partner and so would help in the reali¬
zation of the prime objective of industrial reconstruction and expan¬
sion in order to ensure full employment.
On the whole, it must be said, operative ideology was a
relatively unimportant factor in determining attitudes to the Soviet
Union. This point is brought home most clearly when one notes how
little interest the leadership evinced for the Soviet model of economic
and political organization. The system of payment by results mentioned
18
earlier is an exception to this general indifference. In general,
there seems to have been little worth learning from Socialist Russia.
Discussion of the USSR tended to revolve around relations
between that country"and Britain, whether in terms of trade or, as we
17. RPNC, 1946. p. 209.
18. See above pp. 248-49.
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shall see later, of political and military action. In this the post¬
war leaders displayed a remarkable degree of continuity with their
interwar predecessors. Under the leadership of General Secretary
Arthur Smethurst and Presidents Brownlie and Hutchinson (till about
1933), the focus of interest in the Soviet Union was almost solely as
a market for British goods to help pull British engineering out of the
slump. Statements about the Soviet Union's economic and social pro¬
gress were used to demonstrate that the demand for British manufactures
19
existed. Under their successors, General Secretary Smith and Presi¬
dent Little, this sort of interest dropped off as the engineering
industry recovered, but an increasing number of favourable reports
about the Soviet Union, not always or usually written by the Executive's
spokesmen, were published in the Journal.
In 1936 and 1937 Union delegations visited the USSR, and long
and detailed reports of their generally favourable findings were pub-
20
iished. How much of this publicity was due to the Executive's prior
pro-Soviet leanings and how much to the leaders' response to Soviet and
communist courting during the period of the United Front is unclear.
19. Journal, February 1924, p. 56; September 1924, pp. U, 40-41;
January 1925, pp. 46-47; September 1925, pp. 37-38; May 1926,
pp. 51-52; August 1926, p. 45; June 1928,p. 49; July 1928,
pp. 55-59; January 1929, p. 38; April 1929, p. 43; May 1929,
pp. 38-39; June 1929, pp. 33-36; October 1929, pp. 5-8;
November 1929, pp. 7-8, 41-42; August 1930, pp. 36-39; July
1932, pp. 31-34; September 1932, pp. 34-35; October 1932,
pp. 30-32; December 1932, pp. 8-9.
20. Journal. January 1933, pp. 6-8; February 1933, pp. 38-39; April
1933, p. 39; July 1933, pp. 34-35; August 1933, pp. 31-32;
December 1933, pp. 39-40; March 1934, pp. 7-8; June 1934,
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Still, it was to the instrumental vision of the relationship that
Little returned in his 1939 National Committee speech. He spoke of
Soviet economic progress since the first five year plan fifteen years-
before: "Having regard to this development, I have not the slightest
hesitation in saying that both as a market for our goods and as an ally
against Nazi-ism, the Soviet Union is of tremendous importance to
21
Britain today." Inasmuch as Fascism was generally perceived as a
greater threat to trade unionism than to the United Kingdom (and this
is indeed the tone of discussions of the issue throughout the prewar
period), the organization-centredness of the instrumentalism is self-
22
evident.
The instrumental basis of the perceived relationship with the
Soviet Union is clear in Tanner's 1947 statement to the National
Committee. Again he expressed the commercial reasons for the Union's
wariness of the United States. In the Soviet trading relationship, it
seems, Britain would be able to exercise greater control. The UK
could exercise greater control over its commercial relations with the
United States too, but even so, one gathers, the balance is less
pp. 7-8; December 1954, p. 8; March 1935, pp. 9, 11, 24, 26;
October 1935, pp. 16-19; November 1935, pp. 24-28; December
1935, pp. 31, 35; November 1935, pp. 20-21; June 1936, p. 23;
July 1936, p. 18; August 1936, pp. 18-27, 36; January 1937,
p. 8; July 1937, p. 280; August 1937, p. 320; August 1939,
p. 338; September 1939, p. 372; October 1957, pp. 398-409;
February 1959, pp. 54-55.
21. Journal, July 1939, p. 286.
22. And compare Carl F. Brand, The British labour Party: A Short
History, revised edition (Stanford, 1974), p. 190.
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favourable to Britain.
We dare not tie ourselves exclusively to (either .America or the
USSR, he said) but, apart from any ideological considerations,
it is Russia that is in dire need of favour and the U.S.A. is
not. The mighty dollar has become almighty. One nation, the
U.S.A., has almost everything for which the rest of the world
hungers.... Although we are short of dollars, we are in a
better position to make a good bargain with the United States,
since the Americans cannot afford to lose such a market as
Great Britain.... The European trade policy of the Government,
with which we have been associated, is now bearing some fruit
and the trade talks now developing with Russia, Poland,
Yugoslavia and other countries are most encouraging. (23)
Although it was not trade alone which led the Union Executive to
comment on the USSR during this early period, comments on other aspects
of Soviet life and relations with Britain tended to be vague and
general. Thus Tanner's discussion of the findings of an AEU delegation
to Russia in 1946 were limited to mentioning: the difficulties of
travel in abnormal conditions, the "increased mutual understanding and
closer relations with the Russian people generally and Engineers in
24
particular" which resulted from the trip, the wartime suffering of
the Soviet people, their consequent desire for peace and the payment-by
25
by-results scheme. Detailed reports of the delegation's observations
were published, but not in the Journal where they would have received
greater publicity. The absence of such an article, in sharp contrast to
the prewar custom, may have been due to nothing more sinister than the
space limitations imposed by paper rationing. It did little, however,
23. RPNC, 1947. p. 263.
24. Journal, January 1947, p. 10.
25. RPNC. 1947, pp. 264-65.
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to create a view of the USSR based on something more than its value as
a market. Although such a "commercial" view tended to lead to the
expression of favourable attitudes to the relationship with the soviet
Union, its very instrumentalism meant that when the utility of the USSR
declined, the pro-Soviet statements could be discarded relatively easi¬
ly.
It is not surprising that opinions expressed about the USSR by
AHJ leaders should have been of this type. Whatever other reasons
there may have been for individual members of the Executive to speak
well of the Soviet Union internal politicking and jockeying for
power and so on from the standpoint of their collective assessment
of the goals and interests of the Union, commerce was the most important
aspect of the relationship. Since, as we have seen, they were but
little occupied with building a Socialist Britain, and certainly not one
in which there was planning and control of any significant kind, the
Soviet Union had little value as a model. With the end of the war, its
26
value as an ally also declined but did not yet disappear entirely.
There was thus little reason other than the commercial one for the AECJ
leaders to use their communication links with the active rank and file
to discuss that country during this period.
The commercial orientation was central to the thinking about the
Soviet Union among the active membership as well as among the leaders.
26. See below pp. 282-33.
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This is evident from Gardner's summary of the genesis of the 1946 tour
of the USSR.
In 1943 the National Committee unanimously agreed to a resolu¬
tion welcoming the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Hay 1942. One para¬
graph of the resolution provided that the AHJ should send
delegates to Russia when such a visit became practicable. This
resolution was re-affirmed at the National Committee meeting of
1944, and one of the objects of the Delegation was "to develop
relations with the Soviet Trade Unions." ...
The subject ... was further discussed at the ... 1945 and
1946 (NCs) with the terms of reference extended to include an
instruction to do whatever possible to extend credit facilities
and exchange raw materials and manufactured goods on deferred
terms. (27)
Once the members could turn their attention to the problems of peace,
trade relations came naturally to the fore. In stressing the commercial
basis for relations with the USSR, the Executive's spokesmen, in effect,
were doing little more than demonstrating their efforts to carry out
the expressed will of the members.
As we have seen, the importance attached to the Soviet market
was one of the arguments Tanner raised in opposition to the Government's
leaning too heavily towards the US or the USSR. As the value of the
Soviet market seemed to diminish thereafter, there were fewer state¬
ments attributing value to the maintenance of good political relations
between East and West. The decline in the apparent importance of Soviet
trade was due, in large measure, to the increasing importance of the
American and western European markets. This growth was due, in turn,
partly to sheer economic need as Tanner had pointed out, America
27. Journal, December 1946, p. 353.
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did have "almost everything for which the rest of the world hungers"
and partly to the pressures of the developing western economic,
political and military alliance (ERP, OSEC, Western Union, NATO). In
the Union's interest group activities, in lobbying and in tripartite
committees, more and more attention was paid to the problem of expand¬
ing trade with these other countries.
Thus Tanner reported in June 1947 that the CSUJ Engineering
Group Council had agreed on the necessity of directing "a higher
proportion of exports to the hard currency countries of North America,
28
Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Philippines." The Council realized
that this would not be easy but considered it vital. The dollar loans
from the United States and Canada were running out at an alaraiing rate,
29
while trade negotiations with the USSH proceeded at a snail's pace,
the price of imports from America rose and the only immediate sources
of supply of food and raw materials were the hard currency countries.
The development of these markets, therefore, was an urgent matter. It
was necessary to meet a short-term emergency that could not be met
through the Soviet market, which in any case was viewed as a potential
30
stable long-term market. For a time, therefore, interest in East
European and other markets could be maintained simultaneously, since the
utility of each of them was perceived to be different. From mid-1948 on
28. Journal, June 1947, p. 166.
29. See above, this chapter, footnote 11.
30. See above, this chapter, footnote 9.
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discussions of and references to trade dealt mainly with the United
States, Canada, France, Europe as a whole and the dollar countries in
31
general. Specific references to Soviet trade in statements directed
at the membership ceased after September 1948, even though the 194S NC
32
called for its expansion.
Given the centrality of trade in the development of the positive
image of relations with the Soviet Union, it is hardly surprising that
when for reasons to be discussed below the Executive deemed it
necessary to discredit the Soviet Union, the members' attention was
directed to Moscow's attempt to use trade as a political weapon against
Tito's Yugoslavia.
The trade blockade which they (the Soviets) have applied against
Yugoslavia is particularly noxious. The Soviet leaders have
always claimed that differences in the political system of other
countries should not prevent the development of the widest trade
agreements. We in the A.E.U. have agreed with that principle,
and we have done our utmost over many years to see it applied in
trade between Britain and Russia. (33)
To sum up, the AEU leadership stressed the value of developing
commercial links with the USSR as an outlet for British manufactures and
a source of raw materials, partly in order to demonstrate the Executive's
obedience to National Committee instructions and partly to demonstrate
the importance of increased production for export. To this commercial
perception of the relationship was added a political dimension: the
31. Journal. May 1948, p. 134; January 1949, pp. 6-7; May 1949,
p. 135; September 1949, p. 264; January 1950, pp. 6-7;
February 1950, p. 39.
32. Journal. August 1949, p. 242.
33. RFNC, 1950. p. 239.
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Esecutive spokesmen maintained that good political relations with the
USSR were necessary to the development of trade. This does not mean
that the members of the Sxecutive favoured good relations with Moscow
only because they saw the links as economically necessary. However,
given their perceptions of the Union's interests and the best way of
advancing them, it was logical that they should stress the narrow
instrumental basis of the relationship in their public statements.
Their role as trade union leaders concerned overwhelmingly with goal
attainment, organizational maintenance and power gave theim no other
basis for such discussions in the trade union context, or at least no
other basis on which so limited a resource as the members' attentiveness
could be spent. When other markets came to be seen as more valuable,
overt concern with the Soviet market and Soviet friendship waned; pro-
Soviet publicity simply was less necessary. It does not follow from
this that the relationship now had to become hostile; the development
of the image of the aggressive Soviet state was due to other factors.
However, the fact that the USSR was no longer as useful as it had been
in the attainment of the Union's goal of national recovery and recon¬
struction for full employment meant that there was less of an impediment
to the development of such a hostile image.
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B. Aid and Changing Attitudes to the American Link
Perceptions of trade patterns and of the contribution of trade
to national reconstruction and full employment led the Executive's
spokesmen to voice their support for closer relations with the USSfi.
America's domination of international trade was one of the factors that
led to the expression of less friendly and even hostile opinions about
the United States. From 1947 perceptions of the importance of foreign
aid and particularly of the European Recovery Programme (ERP) to
reconstruction and full employment were to lead to a revision of these
expressed attitudes. Despite their suspicions of the United States'
offer, the AEU's leaders came to consider it vital to the fulfilment of
their goals.
The Executive never denied the need for aid; rather, they
suspected American motives and feared that conditions would be attached
to the assistance as they had been to the loan two years earlier. The
Union leadership may have been persuaded of the acceptability of
Marshall Aid because their fears about such conditions had been allayed.
It seems more likely, however, that once persuaded of the importance of
the assistance, their suspicions became less relevant. If this is so,
then one may begin to suspect that the suspicions they voiced were not
real, but simply a way of providing symbolic satisfaction for ideologic-
ally-orientated activists and supporters of the Soviet Union.
In any event, in trying to convince the active members that it
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was in their best interest to support the aid, the A0J spokesmen did
their best to allay their members' fear about American policy.
Consequently, the earlier hostile image of the United States was
softened somewhat. This new view of America later made possible a
sympathetic discussion of its industrial expertise and these discussions
were in turn the basis of a more sympathetic picture of the United
States as a whole0 Without the softening of the American image in the
attempt to sell Marshall Aid to the members, however, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to resort to the American model of indus¬
trial production.
It was thought necessary to convince the members to accept EBP
because the workers' cooperation was considered vital to reconstruction.
The disruption of industry through strikes and political unrest or the
workers' refusal to acquiesce in continued rationalization and mechani¬
zation because of opposition to Marshall Aid would have rendered any
amount of foreign assistance useless. Such disruption and resistance
seemed a real possibility when the British communists followed the
Caainform line in rejecting ERP and terminated their collaboration with
the official Union leadership. The examples of France and Italy, where
the communists' return to opposition led to a wave of strikes and
unrest, and the perceptions, however unjustified, of communist strength
and influence in the Union could not but have given the leadership
pause. To prevent similar developments in Britain and in the
engineering industry because of communist and leftist proselytization
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and propaganda, the Executive continued the policy of undercutting the
34
Union's regional lay structures and strengthening the official ones.
It also embarked on a propaganda campaign of its own to mobilize the
members' support for the American plan,, It must be borne in mind,
throughout the following section, that however much Britain needed the
aid, American money was always portrayed as a secondary factor to the
35
effort and sacrifice of the workers themselves.
In their propaganda the Executive's spokesmen concentrated, as
they generally did, on explaining their view rather than on trying to
discredit the opposition. They did not neglect the latter method
36
entirely, but direct attacks on communists in the AEU were few.
There were, instead, hostile statements about the communists' foreign
sponsors and colleagues in the Soviet Union and the World Federation of
37
Trade Unions.
One difference between Tanner and Gardner does become evident in
the arguments that we shall examine in the rest of this chapter,
Gardner in his editorials is usually more forthright than Tanner, The
President was more prone to make equivocal statements, to make his
disagreement sound like understanding. Again this may have been due to
political and ideological differences between the two men. Apart from
these differences of expression, however, there is no evid.ence of policy
34, See above Chapter IV-C,
35, See above Chapter V-B.
36, See above Chapter IV-D,
37, See below Chapter VI-D,
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conflicts between the two leaders. Tanner, as I pointed out in Chapter
17, pursued moderate policies while voicing radical platitudes. There
is a similar tendency on his part to be more conciliatory with the
opposition while mobilizing support for policies consistent with the
Labour Government's cold war line. This difference in approach betxTOen
Tanner and Gardner may well have been due to the different contexts in
which they were operating and the different channels of communication
that they were using, Nobody could talk to Gardner in the pages of the
Journal without his permission. Tanner did not have the same protection
against contradiction in putting his arguments to the National
Committee, He also had to take care to avoid alienating the NC members
whose support he might need on other issues; hence his more
conciliatory approach on political matters, his unwillingness to allow
differences on specific issues to turn into across-the-board opposition.
When US Secretary of State George C. Marshall on 5 June 1947
publicly raised the idea of the Programme that was to bear his name, he
"said simply that the United States would help any European nation
38
recover through a joint reconstruction program". The British Govern¬
ment leapt at the opportunity and the TUC General Council followed suit.
The AEC Executive's public doubts and suspicions took longer to abate.
It was not that the EC did not want the dollars promised under the plan;
38. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, p. 28.
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rather, they voiced fears about .America's motives and the plan's
political implications. Since the United States at the time also was
being saddled Kith a large measure of the blame for the UK's economic
39
difficulties, the general tenor of discussion about the US was thus
maintained 0
The developing cold war was not the subject of major comment.
Union statements on the issue, however, generally were more sympathetic
to the USSR than to America. Since the conflict was not yet directly
relevant to the Union's interests and concerns or to the conduct of
arguments and debates within the AEU, comment was not really necessary.
In his 1946 address to the NC Tanner made some very general, reassuring
and platitudinous comments on foreign affairs in what seems like a pro-
foima statement of support for the labour Government» He did not
present detailed arguments in favour of the policy but called on his
audience to reserve judgment.
He spoke of the threat posed by the question of the "control of
atomic power" but pointed to the Baruch Plan put forward by the
Americans as "evidence that a solution is being attempted". He warned
against "undue pessimism" and cited approvingly Foreign Secretary
Bevin's statement that, given the level of international conflict and
hostility over the preceding decades, "it is fortunate that the present
situation is no worse". The nations were not heading in the wrong
39, See above Chapter V-A»
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direction "but .c. we are not going in the right direction quickly
enough." As for Britain's own foreign policy, he said:
It appears that diplomacy still could not be as open as could be
wished, Within these limitations it is not only fair, but also
intelligent, on our part to trust the Government, at least for
as long as it is necessary for the results of their policy to
reach fruition,, (40)
Tanner thus offered neither a stirring defence of nor a ringing attack
on Bevin's policies.
By the summer of 1947 such blananess could no longer be sustained.
The deterioration in relations between East and West had become far more
public, and that very spring the United States had enunciated the
Truman Doctrine. In Tanner's speech to the National Committee that
year, he attacked British foreign policy for leaning too much towards
the USA. He also admitted, however, that the UK had only limited room
for manoeuvre: "the basis and the potentialities of our foreign policy
depend on our economic recovery to regain some of our lost initiative
and independence abroad". Certain aspects of American policy made it
an undesirable ally, notably its attempts to use its wealth to further
its foreign policy objectives. Although "Roosevelt's America" had
"encouraged us to believe that American capitalism had learned the
lessons of the last decade, that rampant dollar imperialism leads to
disaster", these hopes were now dashed. "American capitalism, invigor¬
ated by victory and the power obtained as a consequence, appears to have
4°. RBSTC. 1S46. p. 208.
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learned little." Thus the House of Representatives had voted for
massive cuts in foreign aid "just when (it was ) most needed" and had
"decreed that no aid should be given to countries dominated by the
Soviet Union". It was not only Congress but "American statesmen" too
who had "spoken to the same effect, and American reaction to the recent
41
political events in Hungary has the same interventionary character."
It is interesting that, while condemning the Americans for using
their wealth to further their objectives internationally, Tanner called
for Britain's economic reconstruction, for the recovery of its
wealth, as a necessary prerequisite for the successful pursuit of its
aims. There was evidently assumed to be a qualitative difference
between the foreign policy aims and methods of the two countries:
Labour Britain would never use its wealth in the same manner as
Truman's America. Yet on the very issue of Hungary raised by Tanner,
Britain could just as easily have been accused of "interventionary"
policies as the United States, although its public reactions were less
42
far-reaching than Washington's.
It was the attempt to use aid to constrain and guide political
developments in the receiving countries that the Union's leaders found
most reprehensible in America, perhaps because it was the type' of
~ZT. RPNC, 1947*] p. 262.
42, The Times, 5 June 1947, p. 4; 4 June 1947, p. 4; 5 June 1947,
p. 4; 9 June 1947, p. 4; 12 June 1947, p. 4; 13 June 1947,
p. 4; 16 June 1947, p. 4; 19 June 1947, p. 4.
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pressure to which the UK itself was most open. Ostensibly, the A3J
leadership feared that, under American pressure, the full-employment
and governmental guidance aspects of the UK's recovery policy would
have to be dropped, and the Union and its members would suffer.
It was against this backdrop that the American Secretary of
State's offer was first judged and suspected to be a ploy for greater
US control of the internal development of the recipient countries.
Tanner thus told his audience at the 1947 NC:
(There) is no doubt that the American conception of a United
Europe is more like Churchill's than the one we want. We have
to wait and see what Mr. Marshall and the U.S.A. mean by a
United Europe. Friendship with Russia, which Mr. Churchill and
his friends refuse to consider, is essential. The inclusion of
Russia, as of Germany, in any plan for European development, is
necessary to its success, and for our own freedom to establish
a socialist economy. (43)
The inclusion of the USSR in the programme, Tanner said, was a guaran¬
tee against American exploitation of aid to limit the course of
Britain's economic development. He also claimed that the UK could use
its position as a major market for American goods to assume a more inde¬
pendent line. However, given his statement in the same address about
the objective limitations on British foreign policy initiative and
independence and the need for the Soviet Union to balance American
dollar imperialism, one may wonder how much he believed in the UK's
independent capacities. Indeed, one may wonder to what extent these
statements of suspicion of America, faith in Britain and friendship for
43. RENC, 1947. p. 262.
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the USSR were sincere or were merely attempts to soothe ruffled
nationalistic and pro-Soviet feelings in the Union. All these factors,
including sincere opposition to possible interference in British full-
employment policies by the United States (which is thus viewed in a
manner reminiscent of attitudes to the International Monetary Fund in
more recent years), were probably involved.
The doubts about American "intervention" were further stoked by
the US tendency to intervene only against the left. Tanner recognized
that, on this point, Britain's policies were just as distorted as
America's:
Pressure has been used and sharp protests have been made, by
Great Britain and the U.S.A., about the actions of the
Governments of Balkan countries against reactionary forces, still
active in those countries. But Franco can still suppress,
imprison and murder with impunity.
Domestic trends in the United States were seen to reflect the same
reactionary line; the Taft-Hartley Act, "a vicious attack on Trade
Union rights and freedom" was the most notable example of this. "How",
Tanner asked, "can the rest of the world trust the might of the United
States, and really believe it stands for democratic institutions, when
44
it attacks the whole basis of the freedom of its own people?"
By the following summer, however, all doubts were either dealt
with or forgotten, and the importance of the Soviet guarantee was swept
under the rug. This condition was aropped, or rather, disappeared as if
44~I HPNC. 194~P. 264.
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it had never been raised, and the AEU spokesmen resorted to arguments,
some of which they cannot but have known to be spurious. One suspects,
therefore, that the leaders did not decide in favour of ERP because
their fears were allayed, but because they thought the aid was too
important to lose. The basic premise of the leaders' argument was that
Europe needed US aid in order to buy food and raw materials, because
world trade had not yet recovered sufficiently for the Europeans'
exports to earn them the currencies those countries needed if they were
to pay their own way in the world. American aid, thus, was a stopgap
measure to permit Britain and Europe to maintain high levels of produc¬
tion. It was thus a crucial factor in maintaining the course of
reconstruction and full employment in the short and medium term. With¬
out the food and raw materials that only American dollars could buy,
British living standards would suffer and British industry would grind
to a halt. It was of this point that the AEU Executive wished to
persuade the members.
After the summer of 1947 statements by Executive spokesmen,
notably by the General Secretary, became less hostile to EKP. With time
Gardner grew enthusiastic. Even his first comments were favourable in
tone if not in substance. He thus noted the convening of the meeting
of the sixteen European states which were to form the OEEC, in order to
"frame a plan for recovery which would enable each country to lift it-
45
self out of the morass with American help". The difficulty of the
45. Journal. November 1947, p. 321.
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current situation, the primary importance of self-help in resolving it
and the secondary importance attached to foreign assistance all the
these themes are present in the statement, and all were fundamental to
the AEU leaders' discussions of Britain's place in the world, as we saw
in Chapter V. By fitting EHP into this framework, Gardner was already
attaching positive value to it, albeit not explicitly, A month later,
despite the fact that the British trade union movement had not taken a
formal decision on Marshall Aid, he remarked that the TUC General
46
Council supported it. On the whole, he seems to have adopted an
approach favourable to the plan but overlaid with a formal "wait-and-
see" attitude.
By the time Gardner came to write the "Editor's Notes" for the
January 1940 edition of the Journal, he no longer had to pretend that
the Union Executive was not in favour of the Plan, for the TUC General
Council had decided officially to back it. He now cast subtlety to the
winds and referred to the report drawn up by the conference of the
countries willing to accept EHP as "a European Five-Year Plan so vast
and intricate that it cannot be achieved without the direct ana
sustained effort of the working class in all the countries concerned".
It would be "unthinkable", he continued, for "the trade union movement"
to "shirk or shrink from carrying out each country's share" of the plan.
47
"Our own organised movement will assuredly respond." The hard sell
46. Journal, December 1947, p. 554.
47. Journal. January 1948, pp. 1-2.
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of the Marshall Plan and, with it, the shift in the image of the USA
were about to begin.
In making up his mind, or more precisely in helping, his readers
to make up theirs, about the Flan, Gardner gave great weight to the
attitudes and influence of American trade unions. In December 1947 he
had written that the opinions of the American unions on the issue were
"a little obscure", for although it was "announced that they are in
favour ... a recent visitor from one of the C.I.C. unions ... informs
48
us that the C.I.O. is against it, because of 'political implications.'"
The following month, however, when no longer required to observe
a formal neutrality on the issue, he set about removing any doubts
about the attitudes of the American unions. He pointed out that both
the American Federation of labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) were'represented on the Harriman Committee. This
was a committee of American notables set up by the Truman Administration
at the behest of Senator Vandenberg with the formal aim of gathering
information and studying the effects of the Plan. It had the additional
purpose of providing the Plan with a suitable imprimatur for its presen-
49
tation to Congress and the American public. The participation of the
American unions in .what was ostensibly an advisory committee (rather
like the ones proliferating in Britain at the time) was cited in order
to prepare the Union public for the official cleansing of the plan and
48. Journal, December 1947, p. 554.
49. Faterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp, 222-23.
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the discovery of the purity of American motives in making the offer.
After all, if the American workers' organizations were engaged in
formulating the scheme, it could not conceivably be detrimental to the
interests of the workers of other countries. The Executive's opinion
50
of the value of such bodies was forgotten. How the power of the
trade unions and American democracy were udemined by the Taft-Hartley
Act apparently was not considered relevant in this context. Now it was
useful to have US unions considered strong and the United States thought
democratic.
In the February issue of the Journal Gardner noted that his ear¬
lier statement about unease in the CIO with regard to the Marshall Plan
had been refuted in communications he had received from the United
States. His correspondent had stressed the "whole-hearted" and "staunch
support given to the Plan by both the American trade union
51
organizations". He then reproduced a lengthy extract from a speech
by CIO President Hiilip Murray explaining "the reasons for American
labour's support of the Plan. In this extract Murray (and in quoting
him, Gardner) stressed the USA's good intentions and goodwill in offer¬
ing assistance. He also developed the theme of American trade unions,
understood to be operating in a democratic context, as guarantors
against any American attempt to exploit the Plan for political purposes.
The American worker, Murray said, supported Marshall Aid because
50. See above Chapter IV-B-5.
51. Journal. February 1948, p. 33.
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of his traditional American sympathy for the underdog and his awareness
that "what helps our neighbors helps us". At the October 1947 conven¬
tion of the CIO, he continued, a resolution on US aid was unanimously
adopted by "more than 600 delegates ... from all the unions in the basic
industries and in the white collar field".
We said that "under no circumstances should food or any other
aid by any country be used as a means of coercing free but needy
people in the exercise of their rights or independence and self-
government, or to fan the flames of civil warfare."
That is a clear-cut statement from a great group of
American citizens who have a considerable voice in the conduct
of their government's affairs. (52)
As a careful reading of this statement shows, the resolution
passed by the CIO convention was not so much a statement of willingness
to render assistance as a warning to the Administration not to use aid
for political purposes. Even though George Meany, Secretary-Treasurer
of the AFL, and James Carey, his opposite number in the CIO, were
53
actively engaged in selling the Plan to the American public, there
was a great deal less unanimity in the US labour movement than Gardner's
correspondent would have had him believe. Before the October 1947 CIO
convention, the President, Hurray, had maintained in public a neutral
stance on the issue. Most of the relatively strong communist contingent
at the convention would have opposed a resolution of firm support for
EKP in the form it was taking in the summer of 1947, that is, over
52. Journal. February 1948, p. 53.
53. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, pp. 222-23; Goulden,
p. 135; Hero and Starr, pp. 33-35.
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Soviet opposition and without the participation of the eastern European
countries. The resolution passed was thus a lukewarm formulation which
did not deal specifically with Marshall Aid but called in general terms
"for aid for recovery while warning against infringement on the
sovereignty of European states". "So mild (was the resolution) that
even the communists and pro-Soviets ... spoke, or at least voted, in
54
favor of it". Indeed, only by making non-intervention a central
clause could the resolution obtain such broad support. It was not until
late January 1948, shortly before its representatives were due to testi¬
fy before the Senate Committee on the issue, that the CIOfs support for
the Marshall Plan became specific and explicit. The decision to support
ERP was made not by the Convention but by the Executive Bureau, the
55
counterpart of the General Council of the TUC.
Murray's statement and the extracts Gardner quoted from it were
thus misrepresentations of the actual state of affairs in the CIO. By
creating the impression of greater unanimity than in fact obtained,
they swept under the rug serious doubts about the Plan, doubts expressed
mainly by communists but by others as well. By denying, in effect, the
persistence of opposition in America, Hurray and his British colleagues
were trying to suppress opposition among their respective audiences.
For if the American workers had no doubts about the Truman Administra¬
tion's motives and purposes, there -was no reason for anyone else to be
54. Hero and Starr, p. 35.
55. The Times, 24 January 1948, p. 4.
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suspicious. As a reading of even the British press would have shown,
however, there were still doubts and opposition to the Plan in the
56
CIO. It thus hardly seems likely that the AEU leadership could have
been convinced of America's goodwill by the purported unanimity of union
opinion in favour of ERP. Nor could they have been convinced by the
unions' purported role as guarantors of non-intervention (particularly
in the light of their earlier expressions of opinion concerning the
state of American democracy). Rather, it seems that because they
considered the aid necessary and wished to convince their members that
it was, they sought to demonstrate the USA's honourable intentions.
This was the purpose of the references to the unions. At the same time,
in portraying the unions as able to safeguard the interests of.other
countries through their participation in the American political system,
the AEU's spokesman, implicitly at least, was revising the earlier more
hostile assessment of the United States.
The AEU leadership thus had embarked on a campaign in favour of
ERP, and the American unions were a useful element in it. Gardner made
the point sharper and more explicit two months later when he wrote that
"the bona 'fides of the Marshall Flan were guaranteed by all sections of
57
the American Trade Union Movement". The most important argument in
favour of Marshall Aid, however, was simply that it was considered vital
to the Union's primary objective of national reconstruction for full
56. The Times, 24 January 1948, p. 4.
57. Journal. April 1948, p. 98.
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employment. Thus Gardner wrote in the late winter of 1948: "if we do
not get some material help under (EHP), our position as a nation will be
desperate indeed. We shall be-fools and worse if we shut our eyes to
these facts. Whether we like it or not trade union policy must be based
58
upon these facts."
Tanner made the point even more forcefully when he faced the NC
that summer. The alternative to the Marshall Plan, he argued, was a
further cut in essential food and raw material supplies which could lead
only to hardship and unemployment and, consequently, to even greater
hardship.
No government dare refuse such aid, unless the terms of such aid
prevented our recovery or robbed us of our independence, and if
we did not have such aid we should be more at the mercy of the
U.3 Ji. anyway or any other power.
Furthermore, the European trade unions were agreed, and the American
unions ensured, that there would be nothing to fear from the United
States on that score. Again the unions of other countries were used to
establish the "bona fides" of ERP, and again the influence of the
American unions was deemed crucial. Tanner did not recant completely
his earlier opinions of the United States. The implications of such a
recantation are there, but, because his approach to the opponents of ERP
was more conciliatory, he avoided making the change explicit. Thus,
while expressing understanding for the suspicions, fears and motives
of the opponents of ERP, Tanner registered his disagreement.
58. Journal, March 1948, p. 66.
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The trade union representatives of the countries at the London
Conference of Trade Unions in March (1948) on the European
Recovery Programme recognised the dangers threatening the
economic life of all their countries including the U.S.A.
if U.S. aid was rejected. After a full and careful consideration
they found that the dangers were much less, and the benefits
greater, in accepting U.S. aid. ...
The American ... trade unions ... united and (threw) the
weight of their influence into all the stages of the discussion
of the Marshall Plan because they regarded it as the last hope
of maintaining world peace.
Not only were the unions of the Marshall countries and the United States
convinced of the greater danger of not accepting aid, but through their
and the American unions' active participation, any ill effects of the
Plan would be minimized.
Arrangements were made for the full co-operation of all the trade
union centres in the countries concerned, as well as the A.F. of
L. and the C.I.O. of America, for trade union participation with
Governments operating the plan and in safeguarding our collective
interest and the maintenance of at least the normal economic and
political freedom and personal liberty to which we are
accustomed. (59)
The discussion of the international trade union conference
~
expands the illusion of unity from the American to the western European
context, for this conference did not unite "all the trade union centres
in the countries concerned". The important communist-dominated centres
60
of France and Italy, for example, stayed away. It would not have been
helpful from the AEU leaders' standpoint to emphasize this fact. Unity
and unanimity among western unions about ERP was a useful propaganda
point for a leadership intent on selling the Plan to its public. Any
59. RPNG, 1948. pp. 215-16.
60. The Economist, 13 March 1948, p. 408.
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siga of disunity, therefore, had to be covered up, as it had been in
Murray's statement on the CIO. There was no room for any doubt in the
importance of the aid and the goodwill of the donor.
The AEU Executive thus used two arguments in favour of ERP:
sheer necessity and the lack of any ulterior motive on the Americans'
part. To demonstrate the latter point it was necessary to revise or,
more accurately, to forget, earlier hostile images of a United States
engaged in "dollar imperialism". The American unions were useful in
demonstrating the purity of Washington's motives and were presented as
guardians of the interests of the world's workers in the USA. The
attribution to them of such a role, however, implied an attack of
selective amnesia about earlier statements regarding America. The anti¬
democratic Taft-Hartley Act might never have existed, for, if the unions
were deemed to be playing a central role in the American political
process with respect to ERP, the Act could not have undermined American
labour or American democracy to any significant extent. An aspect of
the hostile image of the United States thus was quietly forgotten
because it was useful to do so. The tempering of the earlier image of
the USA was not explicit, but it was real enough.
In other sections of the British labour Movement the sale and/or
explanation of American benevolence during this period involved the
projection of an image in which the United States itself was beginning
its march to socialism. How else, after all, could Washington's
apparently disinterested goodwill be understood? Surely no capitalist
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state prone to dollar imperialism could act this way* None of the
AEEJ's official spokesmen ever went as far as this, but each in his own
way contributed to the rehabilitation of the United States.
In the summer of 1948 the internal Union debate about Marshall
Aid was officially closed. Hie National Committee of that year passed
a resolution in "appreciation" of American "material assistance" with
the standard reservation, to show that they had not abandoned their
principles, that *®ush aid is freed from any economic or political
62
conditions". IMs innocuous resolution dovetailed with the Executive
spokesmen's own statements and gave the appearance that radical opinion
had been taken into account. However, it also meant that, ocme what
might, as far as the AEU EC was concerned, there would be no conditions
of any kind attached, even, one suspects, if there actually were. From
now on Marshall Aid was taken for granted and, insofar as the matter was
raised at all, it was in the context of discussions of Britain's
63
progress under it.
61. Epstein, pp. 107-11.
62. Journal. September 1948, p. 275.
63. See above Chapter V-B.
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C• Reconstruction and the American Model
The AEU leaders* ERP campaign softened the image of America. As
a result, the inhibitions — which derived from ideology, nationalism
and the Unionts internal politics -— about using a favourable image of
the US to further other arguments, were breached, but not destroyed.
Although the AEU spokesmen continued to belittle the American experience
64
and to question its relevance to their problems, they did become
more willing to cite the United States* industrial experience as a model
worthy of study if not always of emulation. Within certain limits,
therefore, the rehabilitation of the United States, begun in the battle
over Marshall Aid, continued in the battle to boost production and
productivity.
Despite the fact that the outside world was conceived as the
source of the UK*s problems, the solutions proposed by the President
and General Secretary did not actually involve attempts to change the
international setting. Generally, they proposed domestic measures, the
most fundamental of which was increased production for export. This
suggestion, in fact, is the leitmotif of the recovery programme and was
65
stated and restated at every opportunity.
While it is easy to say that production must be increased, it is
64. See above Chapter V-B.
65. See above Chapter IV-B-1.
not so easy to achieve it. During the first part of the period under
review, when Britain still benefitted from a sellers* market for its
manufactures, AEU leaders saw the problem as getting the equijment,
66
materials and manpower to the important export industries. Hie
leadership understood that this was essentially a short-term, indeed, a
stopgap approach, although one might question if they made it clear
67
enough to the members at the time. With the end of the sellers'
market, the emphasis changed sharply; it was not only increased
production but increased labour productivity that had to be attained,
Tanner told the 1949 National Committee:
In the present crisis, increased productivity, reducing costs, is
essential to full employment. Hie end of the sellers* market
so long anticipated is now here and the demand for our goods
is shrinking. Buyers are becoming more independent and choosey
—- particularly as regards price and quality. We have to face
keener competition. (68)
The AECJ leaders* statements presented increased mechanization as
the best way of increasing productivity and singled out the United
States as the obvious model of the benefits of mechanized mass
production. As we saw earlier, there were certain difficulties in using
69
the American model, and they were never fully overcome. Still, the
acceptance of the Marshall Plan apparently made the US somewhat more
respectable. In July 1948 the General Secretary was moved to remark
approvingly on an American business consultant*s assessment of Britain's
66. The Times. 4 August 1945, p. 2; 27 August 1945, p. 5; 14 February
1946, p. 2; 7 October 1946, p. 5.
67. Journal. August 1945, pp. 225-26; Hie Times. 7 October 1946, p. 50
68. RBC. 1949. p. 245.
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economic problems, which the consultant "summarises ... by saying that
workers in this country work harder than their fellows in .America for
less money because they work less efficiently". Hie fault was not the
workers* but lay in their lack of power tools, the lack of standard¬
isation, the poor lay-out of work and the balance of flow technique to
70
ensure that everyone is working at the same speed".
Even so, Gardner's first reaction to the proposed Anglo-American
Council on Productivity was distrust and suspicion of the motives and
71
opinions of "American experts". To a great extent the AACP was able
to circumvent this prejudice against being studied and told what to do
by foreigners by doing away with the "American expert". Productivity
teams composed of British worker and management representatives were
sent to the US to examine the situation for themselves and to draw their
own conclusions. One excuse for minimizing the value and importance of
the AACP*s reports, thus, was neatly avoided. As a result of the
Productivity Teams, the United States was given more and more favourable
publicity in the pages of the Journal than it had had since the war. In
the period 1945-1951 a great deal of space was devoted to the Teams;
there were reports on the selection of participants, the involvement of
69. See above Chapter V-B.
70. Journal. July 1948, p. 193.
71. See above pp. 250-52.
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the AEU or other CSEU representatives and the Teams* findings.
The leaders' imagination was especially captured by the
Productivity Teams when they themselves were members. Bius, in
September 1949, Gardner announced that he was going to represent the
CSEU on one and embarked on a long disquisition on the importance of
73
circulating the Teams* findings as widely as possible in industry.
In the next issue of the Journal, the editorial was devoted to
demonstrating how crucial was the Gardner Team's area of study: the
use of power-operated tools and mechanical handling devices. To support
his contention, he cited some of the findings of the first Team to
74
complete its report, the Steel Founding Mission.
As Gardner pointed out, the Steel Founding Team's findings showed
that there is more to mechanization than machines. He did not stress
the point here, but in subsequent reports gave it greater and greater
prominence. For the present, he was content to note that the Steel
Founding Team'3 findings showed "that the fundamental causes of high
productivity are mainly psychological", a belief that everyone benefits
72. Journal. March 1949, p. 74; May 1949, p. 136; JUne 1949, p. 167;
July 1949, p. 199; September 1949, pp. 257, 266; October 1949,
pp. 289-90; November 1949, p. 328; December 1949, p. 363;
January 1950, p. 7; April 1950, p. 268; October 1950, p. 298;
November 1950, pp. 325-26, 331; December 1950, p. 366; February
1951, p. 43; March 1951, p. 74; April 1951, p. 104; May 1951,
p. 135; July 1951, p. 199; August 1951, p. 221; September
1951, p. 263; December 1951, p. 366.
73. Journal. September 1949, p. 257.
74. Journal. October 1949, pp. 289-90.
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from increased productivity. Another of the Team's conclusions,
similarly mentioned in passing, is that American foundry workers were
"conspicuously unskilled by British standards" and that there was
75
"greater economy in the use of skill". The first point is clearly
consistent with the leadership's "national" outlook. The second point
illustrates one of the corollaries of that policy, the progressive
de-skilling of labour in the industry. This issue, so vital to the AEO
"aristocracy", was not treated explicitly and fully by the leadership
who only hinted at it by speaking of the need not to obstruct progress.
A few months later Gardner cited the report of another Producti¬
vity Team, the one concerned with the cotton spinning industry. He
raised the same matters as he had in the earlier editorial but shifted
the emphasis. Now he dwelt on the psychological factors and their
consequences. The basic factor in the success of American industry was
that "the management, supervisory staff and operatives ... understand
that the higher standard of living and security of employment depend on
producing more at a lower coet rather than less at a higher cost". The
American unions recognized this, and they and the workers were
consequently willing to try out "new devices and set-ups". Moreover,
management cultivated this readiness on the part of the workers by trying
to maintain good relations, ensuring adequate two-way canmunication
between management and the shopfloor, particularly through "publicity at
75. Journal. October 1949, pp. 289-90.
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mill level" to keep the workers informed. However, there is little
76
joint consultation in Works Councils or Production Committees".
He stressed the same points even more forcefully in his
discussion of the findings of his own Mechanical Aids and Handling
Team* This Team was set up because earlier missions had
been impressed by the technical equipment of American industry,
the relatively higher standards of output, of wages, and
standards of life in America — and that, nevertheless, the
American worker does not work harder or for longer hours than
his British counterpart.
Mechanical handling devices cut costs and raised productivity and thus
77
contributed to raising "the workers' standard of life".
Gardner emjiiasized that the methods used in the United States
were known and available in Britain, but they were used in the USA
because those involved in American industry believed in the importance
of cutting costs and raising productivity. He noted that new techniques
were made acceptable to the workers "by a relatively simple wages struc¬
ture, the rate for the job, shorter working hours, and social security
78
provisions."
Gardner was enthusiastic about his Production Team's findings.
Indeed, given the tone of most previous statements about the United
States, the rather uncritical attitude expressed here is almost shocking.
Gardner himself seems to have been surprised by the American industrial
76. Journal. April 1950, p. 102.
77. Journal. June 1950, p. 165.
78. Journal. June 1950, pp. 165-66.
worker's high standard of living; he certainly gave it great emphasis
and remarked that workers in the USA "undoubtedly get more out of life
than do workers in this country." Evidently, getting more out of life
involved higher material standards and more leisure. The General
Secretary's enthusiasm was such that he did not try to deal with any of
the possible costs of the American system. Were the social security
provisions, deemed so important in making mechanization acceptable, a
hint that there was little job (as opposed to employment) security in
the advanced industries of the United States? Gardner emitted any
mention of the unskilled nature of most of the work in these industries,
although he had done so in other reports, and did not show what this
might mean for the skilled workers of the UK.
Seme time later Gardner reported on another Productivity Team in
which a member of the AEU Executive had participated. This Team was
charged with studying the role of the unions in attaining and maintaining
American industry's higher productivity. "Basically, the team recommends
the British unions to co-operate in the application of 'scientific
management*". The Team had found that some US unions were using the
techniques of scientific management themselves "as a means of protecting
and furthering the widest interests of their members". Gardner cited
the experience of a number of American unions in this field but dwelt
particularly on the achievements of the United Automobile Workers of
America (UAW). The UAW has "a tixae-study and engineering department at
its headquarters" and ^regards time study as the raw material for
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collective bargaining"# Gardner cited a case in which the UAW had used
its technical expertise and "reorganised (a) foundry# increased the
furnace capacity, and installed new moulding and core making equipaent"
79
in order to help a firm meet a wage claim# Clearly this was more
than the "pure and simple" business unionism, which the old ASE had
80
practised since its inception. This was the American version of the
"national" line in action,. It is little wonder, therefore, that
Gardner's approach was so uncritical.
In the last editorial in which he devoted extensive space to the
Productivity Teams and the industrial methods of the United States, the
General Secretary cited a statement by "our own President (Bro. Jack
Tanner) (who) put things in their right perspective". Tanner said,
inter alia;
New ideas end new methods are being introduced under the
stimulus of the (AACP's) activities -— not only, or even mainly
as a result of the study of America's "know how," but from the
interchange of ideas between British firms, industrialists and
Trade Union leaders.
The point of the statement iB made clear by Gardner's comment: "It is
in this sober and matter-of-fact way and not in the Tory Party's way,
81
that we shall win through#" Government policy was to seek reconstruc-
82
tion through a consensus of all the social groups. To defend the
Government and its policy against Tory attacks and the presumed Conserv-
79. Journal. August 1950, pp. 230-31,
80# Richter, pp. 32-33#
81. Journal. November 1950, p. 326.
82. See above Chapter II.
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ative policies of riding roughshod over the rights of the workers,
the AEU leaders once more had to stress the great progress Britain had
made in its own way, without relying on others.
With this in mind, the role of the lengthy atd uncritical
discussions of the Productivity Teams' findings becomes more under¬
standable. The US was not really being used as a model to be copied.
Hiere is no reason to doubt the Secretary's and the President's claims
that those involved in British industry were aware of all these things
before they went to America. Indeed, Tanner had been speaking of the
84
need to cooperate in technological change since at least 1942. The
purpose of the Productivity Teams and of the reports on their findings
was to show the workers and members a picture of their future, to
illustrate what life would be like if they helped realize the
leaders' productivity policy. Increased productivity was a corollary
of the "national" line and, as the American example showed, was possible
only if there were widespread acceptance of the collaborationist
approach (assuming, of course, that radical policies of either the left
or the right are out of the question). Since the purpose of the
exercise was to sell the active members a certain policy, the image of
the United States was necessarily a rosy one. Hie costs of change were
minimized or simply not mentioned. The fact that the Journal was the
medium for this sales pitch meant that there was no danger of en
83. See above pp. 160-61, 256.
84. Kmc. 1942. p. 300.
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immediate response which, might have added some shade to the image. It
is significant that Tanner did not deal with the AACP and the findings
of its Productivity Teams in his NC speeches. In those circumstances
he would have had to make balancing statements himself or heard them
made for him by one or more of the delegates. When, on one occasion,
he did mention the observations of an AEU delegation to the US, his
comments were more nuance.
During our visit to the United States, we were struck by
the drive to increase production and productivity by the
American Unions and workers. They employ their own production
efficiency experts. They co-operate with employers to increase
production and then go out after their share of the increased
earnings. Whatever we may think of such a policy we have, as a
nation, to face their competition to win our daily bread. (85)
The AEU Executive cannot have thought this policy too abhorrent since
they had been advocating it consistently for some time. Gardner could
admit this more freely and, therefore, could paint a glowing picture
of life and work in America. His primary objective was not to create
sympathy for the United States but to mobilize the members' support for
the Executive's policies. Such mobilization was all the more
necessary because the internal opposition was now assailing the policies
of cooperation which it had earlier supported and was attacking wage
restraint. Thus the same factors and, to some extent, the same
policies which had resulted in the development of the image of the
hostile world now helped to temper it somewhat with regard to the USA.
85. RHC. 1949. p. 243.
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D. Aid and the International Trade Union Movement:
Laying the Groundwork for Ant i-Sovietism
The American and western European non-communist trade unions
were not the only labour organizations that the AEU leadership used
as ammunition for propaganda on behalf of Marshall Aid. While those
unions were used to bolster the positive argument, to demonstrate how
good the Plan was, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was used
to press the negative argument, to discredit the opponents of ERP.
Moreover, as the Federation sank under the weight of unresolved
conflicts, power and organizational maintenance concerns reinforced the
need to discredit the international movement. In the course of these
arguments, the WFIU was associated with the USSR and its communist
instruments so that, on the one hand, the Soviet link was used to damn
the Federation and, on the other, the Federation became a vehicle for
attacks on the USSR and on communists in general.
In large measure the WFTU came to be used as a resource for
attacks on opponents of Marshall Aid because it could not be used as a
resource for support of the Plan. The imprimatur of the WFTU, the
confederation of most of the major national trade union federations
in the world, would have been a useful addition to the arguments in
favour of American assistance. The WFi'U's approval was unlikely, how¬
ever, just because it did group most national federations, communist and
non-communist, from communist-ruled states and from other countries.
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The proponents of Marshall Aid thus faced two unsavoury prospects:
that the Federation would take no position at all on the issue or that
it would declare open opposition to ERP.
In the tense circumstances of the period, the failure of the
WFTO to take a position would have been construed, not as a declaration
of indifference, but as evidence of deep division within the inter¬
national labour movement. Inaction by the WFTU would have meant, all
too clearly, that a significant proportion of the world's workers'
organizations had serious doubts about US aid. We have already seen
how, in their accounts of events in the United States and western
Europe, the EC's spokesmen suppressed information about trade union
disunity. A neutral stand by the WFIU would not have peraiitted such
suppression. There would have been no bland resolutions to reinterpret
and distort, no majority whose views could be played up while minority
opinion was ignored. Ihe prospect of an anti-ERP stance, particularly
by a plenary congress of the Federation, would have been even worse for
the AEU leadership's cause. Given the manner in which the Soviet trade
unions and their supporters had been exploiting the Federation apparatus
and framework to propagate their and the Soviet Government's policies
86
and ideas in various countries, such a defeat for Marshall Aid must
have seemed not only possible but probable. Given the Executive's
perceptions of communist influence in the AEU, it was important to
86. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp. 292-94.
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prevent the opponents of ISP from exploiting the OTTU for their own
propagandist aims. So the leaders chose to discredit the Federation,
to limit its usefulness as a weapon for the other side. As the mere
fact of conflict in the OTTO came to be seen as the basis of attacks on
the moderate leadership of the British trade union movement, it became
all the more necessary to discredit the international organization.
The need to discredit the OTTO led naturally to an acquiescence
in its destruction. This does not mean that the AEXJ's leaders were
firmly determined on the necessity of breaking up the OTTO. Nor does it
mean that their concern to fight for ERP and for their own standing in
the Union was the sole reason for the bitterness of their attacks on
the Federation. Other factors too were important; these involved, no
doubt, disappointed ideals and the frustrated attempts to integrate the
International Trade Secretariats (ITS) in the OTTO and the Federation
Secretariat's unilateral action in drawing up a statute for Trade
87
Departments which would compete with the ITS. Here, however, I shall
deal mainly with the political and organizational aspects and uses of
the OTTO.
Neither the TOO nor the AEU Executive seems to have come to the
conclusion as quickly as the Americans did that it was important to
discredit the Federation. One American attempt to undermine the Federa¬
tion came from outside its ranks and another from within. "Die external
87. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp. 289-312.
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actor was the American Federation of Labor which had not succumbed to
the heady atmosphere of the wartime alliance and victory, as had the
rival Congress of Industrial Organizations and the British TOT. The
latter two had joined in establishing a global trade union federation
that included the Soviet and other communist labour federations. The
AFL maintained its historical close links with the TUC but would have
88
nothing to do with the State-dominated unions like the Soviet ones.
The Marshall proposals presented the AFL with the opportunity to
destroy the World Federation. The AFL seized the chance and invited
the representatives of the national centres of the unions in countries
which had accepted Marshall Aid to a conference in order to have them
pledge their support to the programme. Attendance at such a conference
would have indicated a clear split between these unions and the
communist-dominated ones. At the very least, it would have demonstrated
the irrelevance of the WFTtJ to what, for many trade unionists, had
89
become the central issue confronting the movement.
The Soviet trade unions and their supporters were not idle either.
One of the regular meetings of the WFTU's Executive Bureau, a small body
roughly parallel to the EC in the AEU, was due to be held in November
1947. Just before this meeting, the Soviet trade union spokesmen and
the press in the USSR indicated that there would be "strong ... attempts
to have all 'moderate* or 'reformist' trade unionists removed from
88. Itelling, A History of British Trade Unionism, p. 230.
89, The Times. 17 November 1947, p. 5.
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influential posts" in the TSFTU and to use the organization to further
90
the Cominform programme of opposition to ERP. Nevertheless, the
Soviet organization was still not willing to countenance the break-up
of the Federation: that would have been playing into the AFL's hands
and would have robbed the Soviet unions of their access, through the
WFTO, to workers* organizations in many parts of the world, including
Britain's colonies. Nevertheless, the threat to remove reformists and
moderates cannot but have been seen as an attack on the CIO and TUC
representatives, among others, in the Executive Bureau.
Faced with these pressures from its rival American federation
and from the Soviet movement, the CIO leadership "recognized the
91
danger" and concluded that the WFTU could not be neutral on the
Marshall issue. The CIO, therefore, requested that the Executive
Bureau place the matter on its agenda. The communists tried to avoid
doing this, and the British, apparently not yet aware of the problems
involved, agreed with them. Gardner echoed the official TUC line in an
editorial. The differences over Marshall Aid and the deadlocked
negotiations with the ITS constituted threats so grave as to "imperil
the development of the W.F.T.U. on its present basis". Therefore, he
said, they were not fit subjects for discussion in the Bureau but could
92
be settled only by the full Congress.
90. The Times. 19 November 1947, p. 4.
91. The Times. 17 November 1947, p. 5.
92. Journal. December 1947, p. 354.
This apparent naivete may have been just that. Other factors
seem to have been involved in determining this attitude, however.
Firstly, when he wrote these words in late 1947, the AEU did not yet
have an official policy on ERP. Secondly, the British trade union
movement had invested a great deal in the WFTU and had a big stake in
its success, The TUC had invested in the Federation not only money but
a great deal of prestige too. It had rejected the advice of its old
ally, the AFL, in founding the WFTU. Walter Citrine, the General
Secretary of the TUC, had been the Federation's first president, and on
his translation to the National Coal Board in September 1946, he was
replaced by Arthur Deakin, General Secretary of the TGWU. Hie WFTO thus
constituted another field of action for the leading lights of the
British movement, and the honours that the latter reaped in the field
contributed to its prestige at home among its own members. Harrod's
analysis would imply that membership in the WFUJ was seen as a way of
reinforcing the status of the leaders vis-a-vis the general membership
93
and the British economic and political elite. Indeed, in an editorial
comment on the early meetings of the new Federation in 1945, Gardner
well expressed the pride in and defiance about the TUC's participation
in the international grouping:
The British TUC is manifestly resolved to co-operate in bringing
about a stronger and wider international organization of the
trade unions, and it is not to be deterred in the task by the
refusal of the (AFL) to countenance it in any way. However much
we may regret the attitude of the (AFL) the British Trade Union
Movement has nothing to regret or to apologise for in the effort
93. See above pp. 26-27.
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it initiated, which the Paris meetings have advanced a farther
stage towards completion. (94)
Great things had been expected and hoped for the WFTU, Most
important were its "claims ... to be closely associated with the work"
of the United Nations. Without the WF1U, Gardner had once argued, "the
work of the Economic and Social Council cannot proceed", nor can the
the imposition of economic sanctions by the Security Council succeed
"without the full consent and co-operation of the Trade Union Movement"
since "the burden of sanctions would primarily fall" on the workers.
The "close consultation and collaboration" of the unions through their
international organization in the work of the Trusteeship Council was
also considered vital. In short, Gardner and the official British
labour movement as a whole visualized an extensive political role for
95
the WFTO.
Given these investments, returns, expectations and attitudes it
could not have been easy for the British trade union leadership to
admit that the Federation was not even able to keep its own house in
order — that it could arrive at no agreement with the ITS or that its
Executive Bureau could not even discuss Marshall Aid. Hence Gardner's
assertion that a plenary session of the Federation Congress should
handle these issues -— an assertion that the Congress could handle and
resolve them, that it was still possible to achieve something within the
94. "Journal. October 1945, p. 290.
95. Journal. February 1946, p. 34.
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7TFTU. The prestige of the "reformist" and "moderate" British trade
union movement and its leadership was at stake. The expression of
continued faith in the WFTU and the desire to avoid an open breach in
the Executive Bureau were thus part of a concern to maintain the active
membership's commitment to the organization and support for their
leaders. Organizational maintenance and power considerations made it
hard to use the WFTU as a resource for argument.
Not for long, however. At the November 1947 meeting of the
Bureau, Deakin, the British representative, announced a change of heart.
He now supported a discussion of Marshall Aid "sooner rather than later".
The issue was not resolved at that meeting, and the TUC General Council
then announced that unless the Bureau thrashed the matter out by mid-
•February 1948 "it would consider itself free to meet the national trade
union centres of the sixteen countries which accepted the principle of
the Marshall Plan and to discuss it with them". Hie WFTU's General
Secretary said no meeting was possible before 1 April. Hie General
Council said that was too late "because it expected the American aid
legislation to pass through the United States Congress during the first
week of April and thought it important that the trade umion movements
in Europe should express an opinion on the proposed legislation before
it became law". The TUC then went ahead with an international
conference of its own, not the one the AFL intended to organize , in
96
March 1948 and ERP received the endorsement the British sought.
96. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, pp. 295-96.
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The change of heart by Deakin and the TUG seems to have derived
from the belief that any action or inaction by the 77FTU on ERP posed a
threat to a policy that the British labour leaders now considered vital
to reconstruction and full employment. The opposition could have used
the WFTU's response as an argument in its own behalf. The concern to
have ready a public endorsement of the programme before the US Congress
voted on the issue may have resulted from the same sort of beliefs that
97
led the Government to stress the "self-help" aspect of Marshall Aid.
Moreover, the General Council would have been just as humiliated by the
WFTU's inaction on or rejection of the TUC's ERP policy as by the break¬
up of the Federation. The world would have been treated to the
spectacle of an organization, in which the TUC had invested so much,
spurning the British movement's policy on an issue it considered vital.
Thereafter, relations in the WFTO continued to deteriorate; early in
98
1949 the non-communist members left the Federation.
The inhibitions about using the WFTO as a resource in arguments
over Marshall Aid, however, had lapsed a year before the final break.
The pretence that the issue might yet be resolved in the WFTU framework
was now dropped. Like the General Council , the AEU Executive accept¬
ed the necessity of a meeting of the OEEC union federations to endorse
the Plan. The Executive, however, had to avoid accusations of support¬
ing the splitting of the movement; splitting was and is, after all, one
97. See above pp. 55-60.
98. Allen, Trade Union Leadership, p. 311.
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of the more heinous crimes in the British code of trade union practice.
With organizational and personal considerations clearly to the
fore, Gardner expressed himself in the following manner in January 1948:
Can we expect the Executive Bureau of the W.F.T.U. to give the
necessary lead and undertake the necessary organisation of such
a conference? The W.F.T.U. is disabled by its own divisions.
That is the brutal truth. Can we afford to blink the truth?
Is it any use to keep up a pretence of unity or the possibility
of common action on this major issue of policy? {99)
The TUC and the moderate British leadership in general could not be
accused of splitting: the movement was already split and the movement's
organization was consequently irrelevant.
Gardner continued in this vein the following month as he again
defended the British trade union movement against the charge of split¬
ting. The TUC had been a loyal member of the Federation, had supported
it financially (to the tune of £15,000 a year) and had acted in accord¬
ance with its principles. It gladly would continue to support the
Federation if the WFTU were "making its full contribution to the main¬
tenance of world peace, to the recovery of nations from the exhaustion
and devastation of war, and to the formulation of a coherent policy of
co-operation among the nations". The Federation was doing none of these
things: it could not even agree to an Executive Bureau meeting "to
consider the implications of the European Recovery Programme from the
100
Trade Union standpoint."
After the London conference of European trade unions, Gardner
99. Journal. January 1948, p. 2.
100. Journal. February 1948, p. 34.
again denied that it was "a move to split the International Trade Union
Movement**. Hie TUC could not be accused of splitting the movement over
Marshall Aid because the movement was already "divided" on the issue.
The WFTU was thus immobilized. "Does that mean that nothing at all
could be done by the Trade Union Movement in the countries that are
101
prepared to co-operate in carrying out the Recovery Programme?"
The image of a divided and ineffective WFTU was thus exploited
for defensive purposes. By destroying illusions he himself had nurtured
about the possible extent and import of international trade union soli¬
darity, the AEU's spokesman was defending the TUC General Council and.
its supporters in the AEU Executive from charges of splitting and
abetting splitting.
The WFTU could be used as an offensive weapon too, however. By
examining the source and nature of the divisions in the Federation, the
Executive's spokesmen tried to discredit the opponents of ERP. In
February 1948 Gardner had written that the conflict between Britain and
the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other,
"raises the question of Anglo-Soviet relations" in the WFTU. The nature
of this "question" — which was reflected inside the TUC as well
was that of
A tug-of-war... between those who would swing the weight of the
British trade unions to the support of Soviet Russia and against
the Anglo-American policy of co-operation for Europe's economic
recovery; and those who believe that the policy of appeasement
101. Journal. April 1948, p. 98.
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will be of no avail and that the immediate responsibility of the
Trade Unions is to assist the effort to overcame the economic
crisis and set Europe on its feet again. (102)
Gardner thus imputed by innuendo ill-will to the opponents of
Marshall Aid in Britain and abroad. The use in the first clause of the
word "appeasement" to parallel the "support of Russia" cannot but have
evoked one image among that generation of trade unionists. Hie opposi¬
tion between "appeasement" and support for "the effort to overcame the
economic crisis and set Europe on its feetagain" is no less clear.
The argument was emotional, and there was no pretence of subtlety.
It used anti-Sovietism to discredit the opponents of Marshall Aid. The
opponents of ERP in the WFTU were supporters of the new nazi-type threat
posed by the Soviet Union. They were ranged against those who wished
only to reconstruct Europe with American assistance. If this was the
source of the divisions in the SFTU, no blame could be attached to the
leaders of the British trade union movement. On the contrary; morally
they could take no other stand. Moreover, since this conflict, as
Gardner pointed out, was reflected inside the British unions, the ill-
will of the AEU's internal opposition was demonstrated. The position of
the official leadership thus was enhanced while that of the opposition
was undermined.
This was the only occasion on which a clear link was established
between support for reconstruction and anti-Sovietism. The image of a
102. Journal. February 1948, p. 34.
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hostile USSR, useful as it may have been in discrediting the opposition,
was not used again in this context. For much of the next eighteen
months little at all was said for good or ill about the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Tanner, in his 1948 National Committee address, adopted a very
conciliatory tone towards the USSR and its internal opponents. While
he stressed the necessity of American aid and the manner in which the
unions of the United States guaranteed against abuses, he also called
for the involvement of Moscow in the economic development of Europe.
Soviet participation in ERP, as a guarantee against American interven¬
tion, was forgotten. Instead, the Russians were to be involved in
Europe's agricultural development through their proposed involvement in
103
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN.
It seems that the image of a hostile USSR was purposely avoided
--despite its usefulness and despite the fact that the Executive held
no brief for the USSR in order not to antagonize the communists and
fellow travellers in the organization. "Hie Executive seems to have been
intent not to burn its bridges. Perhaps the leaders thought reconcilia¬
tion with the communists possible. It is more likely that the real
object of the more conciliatory line adopted by Tanner was not the hard
core of communists in the Union but those, particularly the shop
104
stewards, who were deemed to be subject to communist influence.
Many trade union leaders in 1948 feared that an anti-communist offensive
103. RHJC. 1948. p. 218.
104. See above Chapter IV-C.
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105
by the Executives would backfire. An attack on communist union
activists, after all, could be construed (and, if the communists had
anything to do with it, would be construed) as an attack on shopfloor
autonomy. Thus it was felt best not to supply the communists with such
ammunition.
Anti-Sovietism, similarly, may have been considered as likely to
play into the hands of the internal communist opposition. Given the
undeniable link between pro-Sovietism and communism at the time, an
attack on the USSR could be construed as an attack on the CP and its
members. Pro-Sovietism was not, however, the exclusive province of the
communists. Indeed, the impression seems to have been strong in the AEU
and in the British trade union movement generally that pro-Sovietism had
been one of the hallmarks of the resurgent shop stewards * movement
during the war and had became a basic value of the British unionized
106
workers! Ifte Executive, therefore, may well have thought it best not
to temper with this attitude, the strength of which they probably over-
107
estimated.
It is tempting to argue that having once drawn explicit parallels
between inter-state, inter-union and intra-union conflicts and being now
inhibited from discussing the first and last of these, the Executive's
spokesmen used their continuing discussions of the problems of the WFTU
105. See above pp. 193-94.
106. Jefferys, p. 253; Epstein, pp. 89-90; Bill Jones, The Russia
Complex (Manchester, 1977).
107. Ehowles, Strikes, pp. 54-56.
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as vehicles for coded attacks on the USSR and the internal opposition.
■While the leaders of the AEU were not lacking in deviousness and subtle-
108
ty, such an analysis ascribes too much to them. Nonetheless, even
if Gardner had not drawn the parallels, would any politically attentive
and organizationally active Engineer not have read broader implications
into the leaders' statements on the deteriorating relations in the WFTU?
The question is of course unanswerable. It is safe to say only that
the implications are there for those who wished to see them.
At the 1948 National Committee it was resolved "to make it plain
that on no account will (the NC) tolerate any attempt to split or render
109
weakern the WFTU, In a discussion of the agenda for the forthcoming
Trades Union Congress Gardner piously recorded his agreement with this
statement. He expressed the hope that Congress would demonstrate the
"unanimous" wish of the British trade union movement "to preserve the
basis of the world organisation the T.U.C. took the initiative in
formulating three years ago"0
lie General Secretary did not stop at this bland statement of
goodwill, however. He returned again to the earlier defensive theme in
order to deny the British unions' responsibility for the condition of
the Federation. Following the maxim of the nature of the best defence,
he proceeded to affix blame elsewhere. In a tone more of sorrow than
108. See above Chapter IV-C.
109. Journal. September 1948, p. 271.
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of anger he said that the WFTU's original purposes had been perverted.
He did not name the culprits but proclaimed that it was up to the TOC
to "bring all sections of the international movement back to its prime
purpose", namely, "to unite ... the trade union bodies of freedom-loving
nations irrespective of race or creed, or of political, religious or
philosophical distinctions". The Federation, he claimed, was "meant to
be an industrial and not a political organisation". Such a statement
may seem odd in view of Gardner's assertions almost three years before
of the WFTU's rightful role in the UN, but "political" in the tradition¬
al trade union sense means "partisan" and should be understood in this
way here.
Gardner does not say who was using the international body for
partisan purposes but comments: "It is a thousand pities that trade
unionists in any country should have reason to fear its influence to
110
be detrimental to the movement's ideals of freedom and democracy."
The Vi/FTO was thus a subversive organization. Particularly after the
Czechoslovakian coup earlier that year, it could not have been hard for
any reader of the western press to identify the villains in the decline
of the WFTO as the USSH, the Soviet trade union movement and communists
and fellow travellers in all countries. Little subtlety of thought is
required to discern the anti-communist and anti-Soviet implications in
Gardner's statement, but the implications are just that, implications
110. Journal. September 1948, pp. 258-59.
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and no more, and they are clearly secondary to the defensive functions
of the argument•
By November 1948 Gardner's assessment of the TOTTU's chances of
survival were very pessimistic. Again he sprang to the defence of the
British trade union movement and its moderate leadership. It was
"obvious", he said,"that the usefulness of our International Trade
Union Organization is gravely compromised" by the deadlocked
negotiations with the ITS and the deepening and increasingly public
political rift within the Federation. Die General Council which, he
reminded his readers, had "Bhown much patience and skill in avoiding a
final breach", had been given a free hand, by the Congress at Margate,
111
to settle the matter as it saw fit.
After the split Gardner refrained from any mention of the issue
and it was left to Tanner to defend the General Council and the AEU
Executive — to the 1949 National Committee. Die "trouble", he argued,
stemmed from the same factors which had "immobilised previous Trade
Union internationals in times of crisis excessive nationalism and
the subversion of Trade Union activities to political objectives". Dae
identity of the subversives became clear when he noted:
The fact remains that the W.F.T.U. has been used as a vehicle of
political policy and propaganda and a study of its literature and
activities will reveal the nature of those polities. Die 1948
May Day Manifesto of the WJ.T.U. contained a condemnation of
national Trade Union movements which had supported Marshall Aid,
although the Chairman and members of the Executive Bureau and
Executive Committee represented such movements.
111. Journal. November 1948, p. 322.
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Despite such provocations the AEU Executive had worked conscientiously
and diligently within the ITS of engineering workers, the International
Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), to reach an agreement with the WFTCJ.
The door to a merger was not closed by the IMF or by any other ITS but
by the Federation which had tried to bypass the ITS by finalizing the
regulations for the proposed Trade Departments and writing "all the
National Centres asking for particulars of individual unions which
could supply delegates to represent various trades in the W F.T.U.
Trade Departments'*.
(Thus) the doom of the latest attempt to build a strong Trade
Union International was sealed, by the determination to subvert
— by fair means or foul —- a Trade Union organisation to a
political policy and objective upon idiich there can be no
agreement so long as the cleavage in world political ideologies
continues.
This international subversion had important domestic consequences
and implications since "freedom and independence (are) vital to all
Unions". Tanner warned the members: "Collectively we must recognise
that should our Union be captured by any group ... it must split off
into factions so that in the end -— as workers we shall be far
112
worse off than before."
While the implicit attack on the USSR is obvious, particularly
in the reference to the Marshall Plan, Tanner's main concern was to draw
a moral from the sad history of the World Federation that could be
applied to relations within the Union. The split in the WFTU was a
112. RH8C. 1949. pp. 248-50.
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warning against a similar subversion of the AEU. Although Tanner
113 114
attacked the USSR and communists in general explicitly for the
first time at this session of the KG, the parable of the WFTU was the
closest he came to a public attack on communist activities in the Union
before 1952.
However useful attacks on the tri'U had been in order to defend
Marshall Aid and the standing of the moderate trade union leadership.
it was not particularly important or useful to discuss the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). established by non-communist
and non-Catholic trade union centres after the collapse of the World
•federation of Trade Unions. The fact that the ICFTU existed and that
the TUC was involved in its work was not even mentioned until almost a
115
year after its foundation. In the context of the new Confederation
there were no charges of splitting that had to be disproved, nor did
relations in it provide illustrative material for other organizational
arguments.
It was only after the Milan Congress of the new body in 1951
that its existence led to any sort of commentary, not in order to defend
or praise it but to attack the WFTU and all it stood for. Gardner re¬
ported a message sent to Milan by the World Confederation suggesting
cooperation between the two bodies "for the defence of the workers*
vital interests". The General Secretary quoted at length from the
113. See below Chapter VI-E.
114. See above Chapter IV-D.
115. Journal. July 1950, p. 205.
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ICFTU's "blunt and emphatic" reply. He may thus have been giving vent
to his own pent-up hostility and bitterness towards the communists
(assuming he had any). Hie context of the discussion, however, was an
argument about the good or bad intentions of the Soviet Union in its
international policy. We shall try to determine in the next section of
this chapter why this argument came up at this point. Here it is
important to stress that in a reversal of the situation in February
1948 Gardner was now using the WFTU to discredit the Soviet government.
In other earlier statements the anti-Soviet implications of attacks on
the WFTU had been, in general, mere by-products and decidedly secondary
to the main purpose. Now the anti-Soviet campaign was explicit and
primary* While Gardner did not neglect the organizational and personal
defence aspects in assailing the WFTU, they were now the secondary
points. The hypocrisy and ill-will of the Soviet Union's puppet trade
union federation (that at least is how Gardner portrayed it) was used
to demonstrate the hypocrisy and ill-will of the Soviet puppeteer and
the evils of the Soviet system.
Gardner noted that the ICFTU's statement that the WFTU was now
seeking a rapprochement "with those who yesterday you (the WFTU) were
calling representatives of the 'yellow' international, and for idiom,
according to your press and the Communist radio stations, you have
nothing but contempt". If the World Federation is sincere, the
Confederation reply continued, it should admit "the dishonesty of these
statements in plain terms".
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But the (ICFTU) went further. It challenged the WJ.T.U. to show
what it had done, or is doing in the Communist-controlled
countries to improve the conditions of the workers. Instead of
trying to solve the problems of the free countries ... why don't
you do something for your own members in the Communist-controlled
countries? Why don't you do something to abolish concentration
end slave labour camps where they still exist? As a free organi¬
sation we take orders from no government — can you say the
same? We can only open discussions with free organizations which
are not under the tutelage of outside forces. Can you claim to
be such a free trade union organization? (116)
Thus the USSR, like its tools, was not only insincere but evil. It was
e land of concentration camps, a land in which trade unions operated not
for the good of the worker but in the interests of an evil regime.
By the time Gardner wrote this editorial, anti-Sovietism had
been adopted by the AEU leadership and was being used in its statements
to its members to advance objectives bearing directly on the basic func¬
tions of the Union. Although in this editorial 'the anti-Soviet intent
was explicit, attacks on the WFTU in earlier years had always had anti-
Soviet implications, and no great discernment was required to perceive
them. So even though there were strong inhibitions against taking
the anti-Soviet line for most of this period, the arguments about the
WFIU laid the groundwork for the later public adoption of this attitude.
The image of a Soviet Union whose friendship was vital to recovery thr
through the expansion of trade gave way to that of a USSR that was sub¬
versive, aggressive and cruel even to its own population. It is the
more explicit development of this theme that we shall now turn.
116. Journal. August 1951, p. 226.
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E. Aid, Rearmament and Anti-Sovietism
We saw in the previous section that Gardner had once used an
explicitly anti-Soviet line in attacking the opponents of Marshall Aid.
For various reasons this argument was then suppressed as a more concili¬
atory tone was adopted vis-a-vis the internal opposition. In 1949,
however, the anti-Soviet line was relaunched. From then on, attacks on
the USSR were used in two main types of argument: anti-communist ones
and pro-rearmament ones.
Gardner attacked the Soviet Union explicitly for the first time
in February 1948 in the course of a discussion of the American Labour
Movement's support for Marshall Aid and of the base nature of the oppo¬
sition to European recovery by the USSR's supporters in the WFTU and the
UK trade union movement. He took as his keynote Bevin's "blunt
and sharp analysis of the aims of Russian policy" and spoke sympathetic¬
ally of the Foreign Secretary's determination to conclude an alliance
with the western Europeans. It cannot be stressed too often that the
intention of the attack on the USSR was to discredit the opponents of
Marshall Aid in the WFTO and the TUC. Otherwise the lengthy discussion
of Soviet policy served little purpose from the Union leaders' stand¬
point . Gardner said that the importance of the Anglo-Soviet conflict
"from the Trade Union standpoint" lay in its implications for "the
question of Anglo-Soviet relations" in the WFTU and for relations inside
the British trade union movement with regard to US aid and European
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reconstruction. The attack was a defence of Government policy, but
Gardner did not defend the policy because it was the Government's or
the Labour Party's. As we have seen, that was not the AEU Executive's
way. Ihe Government, it is more logical to say, was defended because
of the policy which was considered useful by the AEU Executive. Ihis
is a very clear example of the way in which the convergence of Union and
Government interests resulted in a congruence of their public policies:
Gardner's support of Marshall Aid led to his support for Bavin's anti-
Sovietism and the proposed western European Union. On the other hand,
Bavin's anti-Soviet line and his plans for a western alliance were based,
obviously and naturally enough for a Foreign Secretary, on strategic
117
considerations.
Consequently, while voicing misgivings about the possible results
of the "division of Europe into two armed camps", Gardner went on to
point out that Bevln had placed the "responsibility for this menacing
aspect of international affairs ... squarely upon Soviet Russia".
Britain could not be at fault since "its aim was the exact opposite of
the policy that sought to cut Eastern Europe off from the West and to
turn the Eastern states of Europe into ... an exclusively self-con¬
tained bloc under the control of Moscow and the Communist Party".
The General Secretary rejected the view of those who maintained
that Britain's foreign policy was "at the same time anti-Soviet and
117. See above Chapter II.
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pro-American to such an extent that Socialist Britain is following at
the heels of capitalist America". He continued:
Biere is a simple and practical test, we suggest, that must be
applied, a twofold test: one is to ask how far the present
policy of Soviet Russia is to secure the domination of Europe by
bringing one after another of the Eastern States under its
influence and control? The other test is whether there is any¬
thing in America's offer of aid to Europe which justifies rejec¬
tion of the European Recovery Programme? (118)
As we have seen, the second question was soon answered in the
119 120
negative. As the tone and emphasis of this editorial make clear,
Gardner was inclined to answer the first question in the affirmative.
Indeed, given the wish to establish broad support for the Marshall Han,
these questions, once posed, could not be answered in any other way.
Subsequent consideration apparently indicated that the first question
ought not to have been asked, but that was a matter of tactics not
121
principle. Once Gardner had decided on the tactic of mobilizing
support for Marshall Aid by discrediting its opponents, however, this
questien, or one very like it, and this answer were inevitable. He had
to be a cold warrior. Tanner, on the other hand, by adopting a more
conciliatory line, by refraining from questioning his opponents* motives,
was able to evade the wider issue. Eventually, however, even he had to
come off the fence.
While the explicitly anti-Soviet line was suppressed, the projec-
118. Journal. February 1948, pp. 33-34.
119. See above Chapter VI-B.
120. See above pp. 287-88, 314-16.
121. See above pp. 316-18.
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tion of attitudes consistent with the cold war was not. Thus in a dis¬
cussion of the need for wage restraint later that year Gardner sought
to illustrate an argument by referring to the "difficulties and dangers"
the nation faced in its international relations. He spoke of the newly
announced rearmament programme as a sad necessity but a necessity
122
nonetheless. Implicitly, then, Gardner accepted and proclaimed the
inevitability of the antagonism between the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union and of the division of Europe into antagonistic military
camps. Again, this was not his intention. He wanted to tell his
members why they should restrain their wage claims. A oertain image of
international affairs fit in with his argument. In contrast to his
statement earlier that year, there was no attempt to apportion blame
this time. Nor was there, however, any mention of the possibility of
reconciliation.
The Executive's official spokesmen may have remained aloof from
the cold war fray, but the membership did not. The pages of the Journal.
for example, were opened to articles by rank-and-file members that dealt
with the developing Anglo-Soviet conflict. The articles were not all
critical of the USSR; pro-Soviet articles were published as late as
123
1949.
The tone of leadership communications began to change in the
122. Journal. October 1948, p. 290.
123. Journal. December 1948, p. 365; January 1949, p. 17; February
1949, p. 45; February 1949, p. 46; July 1949, p. 205;
November 1949, p. 329.
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summer of 1949 when policy, organizational and power concerns combined
to lead Tanner to assail the communists in his speech to the National
Committee. We have seen how he used the communist takeover of the
WFTO as a moral tale to warn the members of allowing the consequences
of allowing their Union to fall under communist control. The more
general attack on the communists was part of a discussion of the need
for the Union to educate the members to a "willing acceptance of self-
disoipline and loyalty" in the society as a whole and the Union in
124
particular. The explicit argument was that indiscipline and
disloyalty endangered peaceful social progress. The lead-in to this
part of the speech, a discussion of the need for wage restraint, and the
emphasis on the need for discipline in the Union, indicate that Tanner
basically was trying to mobilize support for the leaders' wages policy
and to reinforce the power distribution in the organization.
Hie communists in this context were lees the perpetrators than
the beneficiaries of indiscipline; they would exploit it for their own
125
violent and dictatorial ends, as they had done in Czechoslovakia.
Tanner was using the communists to scare his members back into line;
if they did not accept wage restraint and obey their leaders the
communist bogey would get them. One taboo thus was broken, but those
on attacking communist activists in the Union and the Soviet regime
124. On the manner in which the Union's education programme changed at
the time see above pp. 151-52.
125. RING. 1949. pp. 246-47.
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were still maintained. The leadership was willing to take some risks
against its opponents but not too many yet. It still feared that too
explicit an attack on the internal opposition or the USSR would be
126
exploited by the communists for their own ends.
The following year Tanner took the next step and delivered a
speech attacking the USSR, It should be noted that this took place
before the outbreak of war in Korea and the announcement of the massive
rearmament programme. Tanner's intention was to demonstrate the causes
of the arms expenditure which "is one of the chief hindrances to
economic recovery and higher standards of life everywhere". In this
context it suited Tanner's purpose to speak of rearmament as an evil
because he was looking for a scapegoat, deflecting attention from the
apparent failure of policies which he supported. Lest anyone suggest
that the obvious solution was to cut back on arms spending, he also had
to demonstrate that rearmament could not be avoided: it was the result
of international conflicts which were not of Britain's making. As long
as the USSR maintained its current policies, Britain had no choice but
to rearm, and its people had no choice but to accept the consequences
of rearmament for their economic and social progress. To demonstrate
the Soviet Union's aggressiveness, Tanner pointed to its treatment of
Yugoslavia: "It is deplorable ... that the Soviet leaders ... should
... apply the weapon of economic blockade to a small socialist country
126. See above Chapter 7I-D.
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purely because its leaders ana people want to build socialism in their
own way," Tanner concluded: "Ihese developments make it difficult to
believe in the sincerity of Soviet protestations about their desire for
peaceful relations with other countries, and respect for the
127
independence of other countries."
It must not be supposed that Tanner's behaviour was simply and
purely cynical. I have found no reason to doubt that he believed in
the threat of Soviet expansionism any more or less than his compatriots
and contemporaries. It is not his beliefs, however, that are important
here, for the mere holding of a belief is not a sufficient condition
for wishing to communicate it. (Nor, of course, is it a necessary
conditions) Tanner spoke about the "deplorable" nature of Soviet
foreign policy because it served a purpose to do so, because Soviet
policy could be shown to be responsible for the hardships faced by the
engineering workers and the difficulties of the British economy, while
the AEU and the Labour Government were absolved of all blame.
Tanner chose to present rearmament as an evil in his 1950 NO
speech, but, as we saw in Chapter V, the AEU leaders' attitudes to
rearmament were rather equivocal. Whatever else might be said against
it, at least rearmament assured the members of jobs. This consideration
can be said to have been the main factor which led the Union's spokesmen
never to question the fundamental need for rearmament. Indeed, they did
127. RISC. 1950. pp. 239-40.
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their best to justify the policy. The obvious way to do this was by
showing that rearmament was a necessary response to a hostile foreign
power the USSR. The AEU's leaders, therefore, became
cold warriors in order to justify rearmament; they became, in effect
if not in intention, proselytizers on behalf of the foreign policy of
Labour Party leaders who were rearmers because they were cold warriors.
Again we see how the statements of Union leaders, starting from
particularistic premises, could ccme to conform with the policies adopt¬
ed for very different reasons by the Government. Henceforth,
discussions of rearmament would call forth reiterations of the theme of
anti-Sovietism.
Shortly after the Korean War broke out, but before the Government
revealed its plans, Gardner spoke of nthe certainty that preparations
for war have to be made now by this country as a loyal member of the
United Nations", which was now, "with the exception of the U.S.S.R. and
its satellites" engaged in a "struggle to establish order and law by
police action". This new situation required "a rapid and sweeping
build-up" of conventional and unconventional arms:
Half of the resolutions (on the agenda of the TUC) under the
heading of international affairs deal with the use of atomic
weapons. The remedy proposed in most of them is that the
manufacture of atomic bombs should be prohibited or made unlawful,
and that all existing atcm bomb stocks should be destroyed. TShat
is to happen to the costly plant which has been set up for the
production of atom bombs and to the research organization which
is exploring the development of atomic energy none of these
resolutions proposes any answer. The worsening of the inter¬
national situation ought to bring the forthcoming Congress to a
more realistic state of mind on the problem of war and peace.
(128)
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The link between the image of the hostile Soviet Union and the
maintenance of the arms industry is obvious.
Later, in his September 1950 editorial, Gardner spoke again of
the necessity of rearmament, for, among other things, he doubted if the
people of Asia wished to substitute "for the colonial policy of
western capitalist imperialism the Communist imperialism of Soviet
1E9
Russia". He made the point sharper and clearer a few months later
in his review of the year's events.
The United Nations are intent upon large-scale preparations to
defend themselves against Communist aggression. The Communist
powers seem to be in no mood for conciliation .... In this
unstable situation the building up of the Western nations'
defences has been carried forward..,. We take the speeding up
of the defence organisation of the free nations as a contribution
to the easing of these (international) tensions, and as
fortifying the hope that war will not came in the new year. (130)
In his National Committee speech that summer Tanner dismissed the
North Korean regime as a Soviet puppet "which was established ... and
is still subject to control by Russia". The invasion of South Korea
was, therefore, a Soviet invasion by proxy. This conclusion had broad
ramifications:
When the attack on South Korea took place, the Western Nations
were forced to draw the conclusion that the same thing could
happen elsewhere. They had already been alarmed at the way in
which the independence of Czechoslovakia had been destroyed; and
ever since the summer of 1948 they had witnessed Socialist
Yugoslavia being subjected to threats and pressure of an unpre¬
cedented character by the Soviet Union and the European
128. Journal. August 1950, pp. 229-30.
129. Journal. September 1950, p. 261.
130. Journal. January 1951, p. 2.
-335-
"Cominform" countries ....
Hie Western Powers were, therefore, forced to conclude
that the only way to deter further aggression was to so
strengthen their defensive powers that any Government with
aggressive designs would hesitate to attack. (131)
Hie adoption of explicit anti-Sovietism on international issues
meant that this stance could be extended to domestic issues too. In
his attacks on British communists Tanner could now point to the USSR as
a model of what they hoped to achieve. Britain's present difficulties
were a result of the war, he warned, and must not be taken as a sign
that certain "people in our midst" are right when they "tell us that the
methods which have brought our movement thus far on the road to Socialism
are now outmoded, and ... say that we must now follow a different road
the road that leads to Moscow." Britain's workers' movement had
supported the Russian Revolution and what it promised the Russian people,
but
in recent years we have been forced, reluctantly, to doubt whether
what has been happening in the Soviet Union is not leading to
some new form of totalitarianism instead of to Socialism,
Certainly the system they have evolved is not our idea of
Socialism. (132)
The General Secretary also made special use of anti-Sovietism in
his attacks on those who came to be called the Bevanites. The AEU lead¬
ers* public hostility to Bevan and his group is all the more striking
when one considers the broad areas of public agreement between the
Executive and the Bevanites, Open disagreement revolved around
151. RH3C. 1951. pp. 283-34.
132• RPNC. 1951. p. 289.
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the issues of party unity and rearmament.
Immediately after the ministerial resignations, Gardner dealt
rather sympathetically with those of Bevan's arguments that came under
133
the heading of "economic realism", lhese included Bevan and Harold
Wilson's contention "that the immense amount of money provided for the
defence programme cannot be spent without wasteful, extravagant and
futile attempts to buy raw materials and essential equipment which is
simply not available". In addition, the budgetary "limits upon the
health and other social services" and the "general effect" of the 1951
Budget on the British economy gave rise to "grave misgivings in the
134
trade union and Labour Movement". At the 1951 NC Tanner criticized
the "speed and tempo" of the rearmament programme as well as the Health
135
Service surcharges, basic points in the Bevanite argument.
Nonetheless, there were differences between the AEU leadership
and the Bevanites. Gardner's first reaction to the resignations was to
assail them as a threat to the unity of the Party. As we saw earlier,
the AEQ Executive supported the idea of a Labour Government. This did
not lead them to support every Government policy; far from it. Even
now they were criticizing the Budget on the same grounds as Bevan and
his supporters. Ihe EC was not willing, however, to take its disagree¬
ments as far as an open breach with the Party leadership, and certainly
not on the issue of disarmament upon which they were in basic agreement.
133. See above pp. 68-69.
134. Journal. May 1951, p. 130.
135. RFNC, 1951, pp. 284-85.
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It was in order to rally support for the Rarty leadership, there¬
fore, that the General Secretary attacked Bevan and his colleagues.
This is perhaps the only occasion during this period, apart from
election campaigns, that Gardner sought fully and frankly to mobilize
the members on behalf of the Party leadership rather than merely on
behalf of a Party policy with which he agreed. The threat, he told his
members, was two-fold. Bevan*s criticisms of Government policy might
be right, but "it will be difficult to convince the main body of
opinion in our movement that (resignation) was the right step to take
... in the difficult and dangerous circumstances of the time". Any
resulting division would be "unforgivable". On the one hand, there
were purely partisan considerations: "The Opposition would dearly like
the Labour Movement split by the resignations that have taken place."
On the other hand, such a split would have grave implications for
the nation as a whole and for the course of its foreign policy. He
pointed to the United States as a warning to sowers of dissension in the
UK:
Most of us are justly critical of the way in which the vital
problems of international policy and especially the problems of
the Far East have been handled in the United States. Over there,
it is quite obvious that there is a split not only in the top-
level leadership but in the depths of the American nation. Here,
there is no such division, and it would be tragic beyond words
if disagreements inside our Government and within our Party
unloosed such controversies as those that distract and divide the
American Congress and people over the dismissal of General
MacArthur with all that implies.
Such divisions are bad, not only for the nation but, it seems, for the
nature of its foreign policy. Foreign policy, Gardner seems to be
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saying, is clearly a divisive factor, but national divisions can
also result in bad foreign policy, like that of the United States in
East Asia.
However useful the model of a United States at odds with itself,
a full-fledged anti-American line, given that the subject of Party
controversy was western rearmament to meet the Soviet threat, would
surely have been counterproductive. Indeed, Gardner did resort to the
more logical argument in order to prove his point: that given an
external threat the Government's policy was correct. He thus hailed
the TUC General Council's statement of support for the Government's
decision. It shows, he said, "that there is no weakening in the
determination expressed by last year's Congress to support the Govern¬
ment in a policy that is framed to resist aggression and to carry
through its basic and declared intention of preventing a further world
136
war".
The argument is implicitly anti-Soviet. When next he turned to
discuss Bevan and his followers, the argument was explicitly anti-
Soviet, By the late summer of 1951 it was evident that Bevan was as
137
concerned to maintain Party unity as anyone. Gardner, therefore,
could turn from this general issue to the more specific issue of policy
of concern to him and the AEU Executive: rearmament. Hiis was not the
only matter that divided Bevan from the EC at this time. Nationaliza-
136. Journal. May 1951, pp. 129-30.
137, See above pp. 68-69 and the material cited there in footnotes
103-105.
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ticm was another. Hie Engineers' Executive was not particularly
enthusiastic about this notion but was inhibited from saying so by the
138
constraints of official Union policy. Bevan, meanwhile, was one of
the main opponents of the "consolidationist" approach which suited the
139
AEU Executive so well. There were fewer inhibitions about
challenging Bevan on rearmament than on this issue, however.
In the August 1951 Journal Gardner discussed the agenda for the
forthcoming Labour Thrty Conference and noted the numerous anti-
rearmament resolutions which had been tabled -— all of them, he pointed
out frcm CLFte, and not one from a trade union. To mobilize the members
against the opponents of the rearmament programme he attacked the
Bevanite arguments head on. He summarized their position in four points:
The programme cost too much. It increased the demand for raw materials
to too high a level. Britain should worry less about American
isolationism than about "America's hysterical and headlong build-up of
its defence programme ... since it places our own country in jeopardy
as the base on which the North Atlantic defence system rests".
Finally, the emphasis of British policy should be on negotiation with
the USSR.
Gardner did not try to refute each of these points. Indeed,
given his earlier statements, he evidently agreed with some of them.
138. See above pp. 153-55.
139. See above pp. 47-48; Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan: A Biography.
volume II, 1945-1960 (New York, 1974), pp. 288-89.
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Kat-her, he remarked that they "have a strong appeal for those who allow
themselves to be influenced by what seems to be a new line in Soviet
propaganda". Apparent changes in the USSR's attitude to the west were
augured by a Soviet initiative at the UN, a Soviet publication which
propounded the thesis that would later become commonly known as
"peaceful coexistence", and the WFTU message to the ICF1U discussed
earlier. These developments could be interpreted in two ways, he said.
If they were unconnected, they were merely propaganda and indicated no
"change in the essential aims of the Soviet Union".
The alternative explanation is that the Soviet leaders are feel¬
ing their way towards a friendly understanding with the Western
Powers because they realise that their policy of aggression has
produced the massive reinforcement of the armed strength of the
Western nations, and a hardening of their resolve to bring
aggression to a standstill in all parts of the world. (140)
The possibility that the USSR might always have been seeking an
accommodation with the West, even before the latter embarked on its anas
build-up, was apparently so improbable that it was not worth mentioning.
The basic anti-Sovietism of the position, the assumption that the USSR
is aggressive and hostile, is patently obvious. Heads, Gardner is
saying, the Soviet Union is wicked; tails it is evil.
The General Secretary did not pursue this anti-Soviet line as an
end in itself. It had a purpose: the defence of the rearmament
programme against Bevanite arguments. Although he was inhibited from
saying that rearmament was a good thing, he could say that it was
140. Journal, August 1951, pp. 225-26.
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necessary. Thus his two "alternative" explanations of the Soviets'
recent behaviour lead to the same conclusion: rearmament must be
maintained.
If indeed the effect of rearmament has been to convince the
Soviet Union that the cold war no longer pays dividends, it
would seem to justify the defence policy of the western nations.
Any slackening of the effort to strengthen the system of
collective security and to defend them by force of arms if
necessary would be shortsighted, certainly until there are more
positive assurances of Soviet Russia's peaceable intent.
On the other hand, if all this suggested talk about
Russia's readiness to live at peace with its neighbours is
merely more propaganda, it is obviously playing into the hands
of the Soviet to slow down or halt the rearmament programme.
(141)
To sum up, a number of factors contributed to the propagation of
the image of a hostile Soviet Union by the leaders and spokesmen of the
A3J during the early cold war. Patriotism, ideology and partisanship
may well have contributed to the development of anti-Soviet beliefs
among them, but the dissemination of these beliefs (if that is what they
were) among the members stemmed from their relationship with more basic
and important objectives, values and needs of the organization as these
were perceived by the leadership. Anti-Sovietism played a useful part
in the arguments the Executive marshalled on behalf of Marshall Aid,
conventional rearmament, the UK's at cm bomb programme and the unity of
the Labour ftirty, all of which were deemed relevant to the leaders'
full-employment policy. For a time internal political divisions
hampered the use of this line, but eventually this impediment was
141. Journal, August 1951, p. 226.
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removed, perhaps because reconciliation with the fellow travellers was
no longer considered possible or because public opinion was already
hostile to the USSR and its supporters.
To some extent this anti-Soviet line was parallelled by a
developing pro-American one. Certainly the arguments on behalf of
Marshall Aid reconstruction helped to present a more favourable image
of the United States0 America's "good-guy" image was never as clear-
cut as the Soviet Union's "bad-guy" image became. After all, Britain
was the hero of the leadership's world view. National pride, internal
political and formal ideological constraints, as well as the usefulness
of attacks on the shortcomings of American foreign and domestic policy
and of its economic system and policies, all contributed a little more
shade to the portrait of the USA.
In the final analysis, then, for reasons which did not necessari¬
ly have any direct connection with the cold war, the AEU leadership
projected an image of the world largely consonant with the cold war




A. The International Setting as a Resource of Argument and Control
In this thesis we have seen how the organizational setting
determined the content of communication about international affairs in
a British trade union. Ihe interpretation of the outside world that
the AEU's leaders proffered to their members were mainly the function
of arguments about Union policies. Hiese policies were related direct¬
ly not to international political affairs, which still may have
influenced them, but to the leaders' main organizational concern, the
attainment of the Union's goals. Given the close relationship between
goal attainment, organizational maintenance and the distribution of
power in the AEU, arguments ebout the first one also served the
Executive's two latter concerns. Nevertheless, these aspects were not
generally explicit in the leaders' statements, which dealt expressly
with the best ways of maintaining and improving the workers * conditions
of employment and, more broadly, their standard of living.
Discussions about international affairs were but one facet of
the leaders' arguments. These arguments in turn were, as Chapters III
and IV have shown, but one of a number of modes of action used by the
leaders in pursuit of their ends. In very general terns, one may say
that they were part of the organizational control system. One cannot
know what importance the leadership attached to argument and persuasion
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as opposed to the other methods which comprised this system; it is
clear only that they used these means, which complemented the other
tools they used. Argument alone would have been insufficient, given
the complex power and authority structure of the Union, 'fliis same
complexity also meant that the other instruments in the hands of the
Executive were inadequate by themselves. As it was, moreover, the
Executive's control of the membership was uncertain throughout the
period under review. It is this context and system of organizational
behaviour and relationships that makes understandable the arguments
that the leaders used and the concomitant images of the outside world
that they projected.
Fran this standpoint the international system was a reservoir of
data, a collection of examples of various kinds of behaviour which
could be drawn upon to further or to illustrate an argument. Obviously
it was not an unlimited reservoir; the AEU's leaders were not
omniscient. Nor could the Executive's spokesmen be indifferent as to
which data they used. The suitability and usefulness of a given item
or event was determined not solely by its suitability to a given
argument but also by the manner in which it fit or was distorted by
nationalistic, ideological and internal power considerations. One
example of industrial efficiency was not necessarily as good as
another. For the first part of the postwar period, national amour
propre. socialistic ideology and considerations of the power and influ¬
ence of communists and fellow travellers in the Union made it difficult
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to demonstrate a point by drawing on the experience of the United
States. The "national" line also limited the Executive's ability to
use certain items from the international data bank. The notion of the
essential superiority of the British experience, *diich was an aspect of
this line, was maintained in part by downgrading and/or denying the
relevance of foreign actors and models. The limitations imposed by
these factors, which introduced biases into and skewed the process by
which information was selected for transmission, were the main bases
for the consistency of the images projected. In large measure,
consistency was derived from the limitation of inconsistency rather
than from the positive force of the course of argument.
Contrary to the expectations raised in Chapter I, only rarely,
with regard to the Soviet trade question and the role of the Union in
the IMF over the WFUJ affair, was argument related directly to the AEU's
own international activities. Indeed, discussion of these activities
was minimal; they were hardly ever thought worthy of cojament by the
President or the General Secretary. Sometimes, a brief notice might be
printed in the Journal that visits had been exchanged with engineering
unions in other countries or that international conferences had been
attended. Sometimes a visit to a foreign country by an EC member or a
1
rank-and-file member might even rate a full-page article. However,
1. See, for example, Journal, June 1946, p. 168; October 1946,
pp. 295 and 300; January 1947, p. 10; May 1947, p. 138;
July 1947, p. 203; January 1948, p. 18; October 1948, p. 305;
November 1948, p. 336; December 1948, p. 360; March 1949,
p. 74; August 1949, p. 237; September 1949, p. 261; June 1950,
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apart from very general statements of the importance of international
worker solidarity, the relevance of these exchanges to the concerns of
the Union and its members was not made clear. Furthermore, whatever
value such activity may have had for the TUC leadership in boosting its
prestige, the fact that the AEU leaders gave it so little prominence
in their discussions, would indicate that it was not very important to
them. That this should be so accords with the "aristocraticM or
2
"exclusive democratic" nature of the AEU. Blatant attempts to build
up the leaders* prestige were to be avoided.
If Chapter I was wrong in this regard, it was right with respect
to nationalistic and ideological concerns : only rarely did these
considerations prompt arguments which contained references to inter¬
national relations and affairs. Ihe image of a Britain triumphant,
overcoming all odds by its own efforts, did emerge directly from such
concerns. It will be recalled, however, that this was in fact a
secondary image which arose mainly in order to temper the arguments
which stressed Britain's helplessness and haplessness. Even so, the
image served a primary function in relation to the leaders* goal-
attainment concerns: it constituted an affirmation of faith in the
future of the nation and of the workers' identification with it, of
faith, that is, in the "national" line. Other instances in which
p. 178; December 1950, pp. 370 and 375; August 1951, p. 230;
2. See above p. 104.
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patriotism and ideology prompted such discussions are rare.
One might argue that the development of the "national" line in
itself constituted an elevation of nationalism, of service to the
nation, to the rank of a primary Union objective. Certainly patriotism
had been an important factor in the elaboration of the policy during
the Second World War. Nor can it be denied that the new conception
bound together the economic interests of the nation, the workers' jobs,
the organization's membership and the centralization of power in the
Union. It is equally undeniable, however, that during the period
under review these interests and concerns were not seen as bound
together inextricably and for all time. The AEU's post-1945 leadership,
after all, was of the generation which, between the wars, had turned
frcm collaboration despite the blandishments of the employers and of
large sections of the TUC leadership, when industrial and economic
developments turned against the engineering worker. It does not seam
logical to expect that a few short years of wartime collaboration should
have wiped out entirely the habits of thought and action of a generation
during which the proclaimed good of the nation was considered
detrimental to the interests of the workers and their organization.
The attacks on Tory interwar economic and industrial policy in Tanner's
speeches late in the war show that he was still aware of the possible
3
contradiction of interests between the workers and the "nation".
3. See above p. 240.
=348-
Indeed, in an early discussion of rearmament Gardner had implicitly
recognized that the economic welfare of the worker was not necessarily
synonymous with the the interests of the nation as a whole, that while
4
the latter might suffer, the former might well prosper. It thus seems
reasonable that the 1945-1951 Executive still regarded the link between
the "national" and the workers' good as contingent. From this stand¬
point, service to the nation was not an end in itself but a
strategy for the pursuit of other objectives.
It can be argued as well that the Executive's goals were the
function of an ideology and that, therefore, ideology played a greater
part than I have argued it did in determining the image of the outside
world contained in Executive statements. The ideology involved was
simply not the one contained in the rule book. Even if this were true,
one could indulge in a bit of hairsplittling and say that, insofar as
ideology dictates goals that dictate arguments, ideology is once
removed from the communication process. More serious objections can
be raised against this approach, however. The discussion in Chapters
III and IV would lead one to conclude that the AECJ leaders' behaviour
was derived not from an overarching conception of the world and of the
Union's place in it but from, the cumulative impact of historical
pressures and interlocking patterns of behaviour. If there was some
consonance between a leader's ideology and his trade union behaviour,
4. See above pp. 219-20.
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one may argue quite plausibly that it was practice which dictated
ideology rather than the reverse.
If one accepts, however, that ideology is "characterized by a
5
high degree of explicitness of formulation", then we are dealing in
this case not with an ideology at all but with a code of behaviour or
a system of role expectations. Ikese often clearly ana directly
contradicted the socialistic ideology that the leadership propounded.
There is nothing peculiar in such a contradiction. Nor is it
necessarily a sign of careerism, opportunism or cynicism. It is a
sign, simply, that the present is inescapable. In addition to the
historically determined patterns of role behaviour, the trade union
leader, even one "who hoped for the dissolution of capitalism ... had
6
to ccrne to terms with a capitalist society in his daily round". Jack
Tanner made a related point when he told the National Committee not to
confuse their econamistic demands with the socialistic principles they
proclaimed. Whether they were aware of it or not, socialist trad©
unionists can and will operate on one level intellectually and on
another in practice. It required a conscious effort to overcome the
7
contradiction. What, Hobsbawm argued in a similar vein, can trade
unionists, "even the most revolutionary", do but
5. Edward Shils, "Hie Concept and Function of Ideology", in
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 17 volumes
(New York, 1968), VII, 66-76 (p. 66).
6. Lane, p. 228.
7. See above pp. 146-47.
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fight the battle for improvement and reform according to the
nature of the terrain, which is that of 'realistic* calculation
in a capitalist economy and a capitalist state (?) That is to
say they must compromise, make allies, and in general act as
reformists. If he is to be effective in a stable capitalist
economy, even the communist trade union leader must do this,
whatever his private reservations and calculations. (8)
In general, therefore, it is most useful to regard nationalistic and
ideological considerations as less important direct incentives for
discussions about international affairs. Their importance lies, rather,
in the way in which they set the bounds in which argument may occur.
The most important incentive, goal attainment, for the most part
was expressed in terms related to the "national" line and its
corollaries. The leaders' primary consideration, collaboration with the
Government and the employers in order to further national reconstruction
and thus maintain full employment through the expansion of production
and exports, was at the root of most of the images of Britain and other
countries and of the relations among them. The primacy of this concern
and of the concomitant organizational and power considerations is
demonstrated by the way in which they outweighed the wish to placate
the internal opposition, national amour propre and the proclaimed
socialist ideology in the struggles over Marshall Aid and rearmament.
The leaders produced an image of a hostile world which saved the
system of collaboration from criticism by diverting attention away from
any responsibility the employers (and the Union) might have had for
8. Quoted by Lane, pp. 234-35.
-351-
Britain's precarious economic standing. More specifically, the image
was used in arguments to justify the corollaries of the "'national" line,
the personal sacrifices that had to be made and the suffering that had
to be endured —■ principally wage restraint. The importance of trade
to national recovery led first to the development of a favourable
attitude to the USSR and later, as the Soviet market became of increas¬
ingly doubtful value, to the disappearance of statements in this vein®
Hie American offer of aid evoked expressions of suspicion at first, but
when the Executive began to promote ERP as a vital element of the
"national" policy, the United States' image was rehabilitated. Hie urge
to collaborate with the employers in the modernization of British indus¬
try, another function of the "national" line, helped carry rehabilita¬
tion even further. The threat posed to Britain's recovery by the USSR's
supporters in the UK and {©t&te©i&e the mainstream of the "national" line
but still within the terms of the concern for full employment) the
perception of the importance of rearmament led to the development of a
more hostile image of the USSR.
In these communications from the leaders to the rank and file the
international setting was a resource for the furtherance of policy rather
rather than the subject of policy. It is, perhaps, surprising,
therefore, that only rarely were models drawn from this reservoir. The
outside world provided a significant model only in relation to the US
system of industrial production. Even so, the use of the model in this
way was strictly limited. This tendency not to look abroad may reflect
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a generalized ethnocentrism. It can be seen also as a function of the
"national" line, as another reflection of the concern to maintain the
members' faith in Britain and their identification with the UK« In the
circumstances, one might have expected greater use of negative foreign
models. Apart from a very few cases, however, any inclination the
Executive's spokesmen may have had to point to foreign horrors as a
warning to the members was inhibited by other factors. Thus it was
only quite late in this period that conditions in the USSR were used to
demonstrate the objectives of communist activity in the Union.
E. Societal Conformity
The leaders' outside world was populated by very few countries of
any significance. Indeed, a member with no other source of information
would have to be forgiven if he thought that there were only two: the
Soviet Union and the United States. It is not surprising that these two
should have dominated the discussion. Their policies and behaviour had
a greater impact on the global economy, either directly or indirectly,
than those of any other country. Still, the countries left out of the
leaders' projected image of the world constitute amissions as striking
as the highlighting of the USA and the USSR.
Other countries were mentioned only fleetingly in the spokesmen's
statements, if they were mentioned at all. Britain's colonies and such
momentous developments as decolonization in South Asia, which could not
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but be of major importance to the British economy, were not the subject
of major discussions. Perhaps the AEU leadership, like the political
elite, could not really comprehend the significance of these moves.
Pterhaps they were so caught up in other matters that they could not
take the time for a discussion of the short and long term effects.
Tanner told the members that as socialists they had to accept that the
people of the developing countries would raise their raw material
prices in order to improve their own standard of living and that the
9
industrialized countries would suffer as a consequence. He also
mentioned that the United States was contributing to the develomient
10
plans for the British colonies. At no point, however, did he mention
that the newly independent states and the colonies might not be content
to remain mere suppliers of raw materials to the United Kingdom and that
they would thus constitute a threat of another kind to the British
worker. The leadership, thus, cannot be said to have helped the members
prepare for and adjust to change in. this sphere.
Burope was not the subject of more than the occasional verbal nod.
Even the Schuman Plan went unrecorded by the Executive's spokesmen.
This low level of apparent concern also fit in with the tendency of the
political elite to place Europe relatively low on its list of priorities.
In general, in only one of the "three circles" did the image
projected by the AEU's leaders indicate that Britain had to cope with
Tl RPNC, 1949. p. 242.
10. RPWO, 1950. pp. 240-41.
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drastic changes; that image related to the North Atlantic or, more
accurately, to the trilateral UK-US-USSR sector. Because of the wish
and need to maintain faith in Britain and, perhaps too, because of an
inability to understand the depth of the changes that had taken place,
even these developments in Great Power relations were deemed to be
temporary. The silence about the Imperial and European circles and the
nature of the discussion about this third one thus did nothing to shake
the solid substratum of complacency about Britain's present and future
place in the world. Tacitly and explicitly the AEU leaders' interpreta¬
tions of international affairs tended to converge with the policies of
recovery and reconstruction pursued by the Government in international
affairs.
The convergence of voiced attitudes presents some complexities
that the silences do not. As we have seen, the AEU's leaders did not
preach cold warriorism because they believed in the cold war. They may
have held such beliefs but the preaching stemmed directly from percep¬
tions of the members' welfare, the needs of the organization and
competition from other power centres in the Union, Economic considera¬
tions were undoubtedly a factor in the Labour Government's anti-
Sovietism and pro-Americanism, notably in relation to ERP, and the Union
leaders and the Government had to contend with the same potentially
disruptive communist opponents at hone. Nevertheless, defence and
national security concerns seem to have been far more basic and crucial
11
in the formulation of these Government policies. For their different
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reasons the Union and Party leaders came to support the same policies
ris-h-vis the USSR and the United States. Their agreement was based
less on a community of interests than on a convergence of interests.
It is important to emphasize the basis of this agreement because
it indicates the fragility of the relationship. Different interests
lead very easily to different conclusions. Of course, exchanges and
trade-offs can be arranged but they are not always possible. Thus,
before the development of the Marshall Plan, the AEU leaders* concerns
led them to stress close ties with the USSR and to condemn Government
policy in relation to Greece, Spain and the USA. For a time thereafter
the Union leaders' organizational and economic calculations led them
to voice their agreement with Government policies based on security
considerations„
The contingent nature of the agreement between the organization
and the Government means that such processes as those discerned by
Chittiok in the United States may well have been far more complex than
his analysis would lead one to think. Since, as Chittick found, an
organization seeks State Department information in order to serve its
12
own interests, the nature of these interests determines the
suitability of the propaganda supplied. Since there is no guarantee
that the interests of one will converge with those of the other, the
passive propaganda-channelling that Chittick found is not as passive as
11. See above Chapter II,
12. See above pp. 23-24.
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it seems and therfore requires rather more explanation than he was able
to give* Even in the United States, as we have seen, the CIO did not
come out publicly and firmly in favour of ERP until it was forced to do
so by a conjunction of factors, including pressures free the API, and
13
from the communists in the WFTU. In the context of organizational
communication the underlying unity of societal values and the inter¬
locking of channels of communication thus may be less important than
14
they are in relation to the press. The autonomy of systems and
organizations in a wider society must therefore be taken into account
in studying the bases of any societal uniformity and conformity of
messages about international affairs, and the contingent nature of the
process must be recognized.
C. A Note on Influence
One subject which surely has been noticeable by its absence in the
the discussion thus far is that of the influence of the AEU leaders*
communications on the members of the Union. The simplest response to
any question about influence is that the answer is unknown and
unknowable. No surveys were made of the knowledge and attitudes of AEU
members on international affairs, so we have no material to correlate
with the expressed opinions of the leaders. Even if surveys had been
13. See above pp. 286-90, 308-09.
14. See above pp. 30-33.
conducted, one would have been faced with the insuperable difficulty of
separating the influence of one source from that of another. All that
can be said is that members were exposed to the information and their
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour may have been changed as a result of
this exposure.
The role of organizations in shaping popular attitudes has been
considered to be very great by sane scholars. Powell, for instance,
wrote that "the economical way to reach large numbers of people is
through their associations" and cited Bernays's claim that "it is of
primary importance to influence 'the key (group) leaders as a medium
15
for reaching large groups of the population*". Chittick found support
among US State Department officials for an analysis posited by Rosenau.
Hie officials saw nongovernmental organizations as excellent channels
for "informing" greater sections of the public and thus engaging more
16
popular support for their policies. Halebsky noted that "intermediate
structures", particularly interest groups, can offer "means of mobiliza¬
tion and communication" and provide "motivation and legitimation" for
17
political mass movements.
Itapirical studies in many countries have tended to confirm the
the thesis that organizations can exert influence over members with
15. Norman Powell, Anatomy of Public Opinion (New York, 1951), p. 155.
16. Chittick, pp. 221-24; James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy (New York, 1961), especially pp. 83-96.
17. Sandor Halebsky, Mass Society and Political Conflict (Cambridge,
1976), p. 87.
-358-
regard to matters which are not among the organization's primary
functions. For example, Halebsky cites evidence drawn from "community
studies in regard to local issues, research on the Social Credit Fhrty
in Quebec, the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan, Rmjadism in France and
18
Goldwaterism in the U.S.". Campbell and his colleagues found that
members of trad6 unions which had long been active and insistent in the
their support of the Democratic Party in America were more likely to
19
support the Democrats than were members of other unions.
Hero and Starr studied the foreign policy opinions of local, that
is, branch, officials of the United Automobile Workers of America. The
UAW's
national leadership has taken more vociferously liberal inter¬
national stances, has made more vigorous efforts to communicate
its foreign policy views to its local leaders, and has placed
greater emphasis on union education for local influentials in
this field than have most other unions ....
It was found that, while "officers and other active members of the
U.A.W. locals did not differ from their counterparts in other unions" on
same foreign policy issues, when it came to such matters as
cold war stance, arms control, trade with the Soviet Union,
economic aid -— U.A.W. local influentials were at least some¬
what more liberal than their equivalents in either old AJ.L.
or C.I.O. locals. In fact, as many of the responses show,
generally more liberal stances increased between 1964 ... end
1966 .... (20)
Using data about France and Germany, Puchala found that the
18. Halebsky, pp. 87-88.
19. Angus Cambell et_ al., The American Voter (New York, 1960),
pp. 311-16.
20. Hero and Starr, pp. 97-98.
-359-
establishiaent of intergovernmental institutions tended to be followed
by the proliferation of nongovernmental transnational organizations,
which was in turn followed by increased public support for European
political integration. He suggests that the change in popular attitudes
21
was a product of increased organization along transnational lines.
Unfortunately, the term "nongovernmental transnational organizations"
and the statistical analysis are so broad that, while the study is
is suggestive of influence, it provides little hard evidence for it.
In the United Kingdom, as Kordlinger points out, the association
between trade union membership and support for the labour Party is one
of the commonplaces of political analysis. He questions the commonly
drawn conclusion that trade unionists tend to vote for Labour because
of their union*s influence over them. Since there is a strong associa¬
tion between the electoral choices of fathers and sons, Nordlinger
maintains that party choices are determined before people are of an age
to join unions. He therefore suggests that it is support,for the labour
Party that leads people to join trade unions rather than "the reverse
"because of the ideological affinities, common aims and organizational
22
interconnections" between the Party and the unions.
Nordlinger is not alone in denying any great influence in this
area by British trade unions. McKenzie and Silver found that
21• Donald J. Puchala, "Patterns in West European Integration"
Journal of Common Market Studies. 9 (1971), 117-42.
22. Eric A. Nordlinger, The Working Class Tories (London, 1967),
pp. 198-204.
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fdembership in trade unions is not strongly related to working class
23
voting choice." Butler and Stokes found no evidence that "union
journals are a major source of political indoctrination" or "that the
shopfloor is a significant forum of political activity". On the other
hand, they did find that unionized workers in highly unionized
surroundings tend to be more politically active and to be stronger
24
supporters of the Labour Party. Furthermore, Crewe and his colleagues
found, in a panel survey conducted over the period 1970-1974, that among
respondents who in 1970 had been strongly identified vrith the
Conservative Party, those who were also trade unionists were more likely
to have abandoned this position of strong identification with those who
were non-unionists.
One interpretation that might be put on this finding by Crewe
is that the Heath Government's dismal economic and political performance
led many people who had identified strongly with the Conservative Fhrty
to waver in their allegiance to it. Union members may have wavered more
than others because their disappointment with the Tories was reinforced
by the opinions held and voiced by their fellow unionists and union
leaders, opinions to which they were more likely to be exposed simply
because they belonged to the Union.
23. R.Tc McKenzie and Allan Silver, Angels in Marble (London, 1968),
pp. 97-98.
24. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain
(London, 1969), pp. 160-62.
25. Ivor Crewe, Bo S&rlvik and James Alt, "Partisan Dealignment in
Britain 1964-1974", British Journal of Political Science,
7 (1977), 129-90 (pp. 158-59).
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These findings should be treated warily since the sample involved
is small and other variables may account for the difference in the
degree of alienation from the Conservative Party between trade unionists
and others. However, the most obvious such variable, class, can perhaps
be ruled out; Crewe and his colleagues found that there was very little
difference between the social classes in the degree to which their
26
support for the parties shifted between 1970 and early 1974.
Thus one may conclude that British trade unions may not have an
overwhelming influence on the electoral choices of their members or on
other matters not directly related to their primary organizational
purposes, but can have a significant supportive or reinforcing role.
In other words, the projection of a certain attitude by a union, its
leaders or its members, may reinforce an already existing tendency on
the part of an individual member to adopt that attitude. One can,
perhaps, expand this conclusion in the following manner: given the
transmission of information and opinions by non-union sources, similar
information and opinions transmitted by union leaders may reinforce a
tendency to accept the information among the membership. The parallel
between this hypothesis and the two-step flow of communication theory,
according to which new ideas are spread by a mutually reinforcing
27
combination of mass and interpersonal communications, is quite evident.
26. Crewe et al.. p. 167.
27. Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York,
1955); Anne van den Ban, nA Revision of the Two-Step Flow of
Ccmmunications Hypothesis", Gazette, 10 (1964), 237-49;
Rogers with Shoemaker, Chapter 6.
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Still, this is merely a hypothesis. We do not and cannot know that any
member of the JiEU in the years 1945-1951 was confirmed in the foreign
policy opinions he garnered from other sources by the convergence
between this information and that he received from the President and
General Secretary of his Union. Hie most that can be said is that such
communication was a potential secondary influence of this type and that,
insofar as it converged with Government policy, it tended to reinforce
public support for British foreign policy in this and later periods.
Particularly after 1947 the messages transmitted by the AEU
leaders to their members tended to agree with and thus perhaps to
reinforce popular support for the specific lines of Government policy.
More broadly, however, and even before 1947, the messages also tended
to reinforce certain of the premises upon which British policy was based
in this and later periods, principally those premises concerning
Britain's capacity to act independently and influentially in the world.
To put it in negative terms, the messages transmitted, by the AEU's
leaders did not help their public adjust to the changing international
system which limited Britain's capacity as an international actor; did
not help than adjust to the fact that given its narrow and narrowing
resource base Britain could not be a power on the scale of the USSR or
the United States; did not help to create a public opinion that
questioned the practical as opposed to the moral bases of such policies
as the independent nuclear deterrent and the maintenance for so long of
British forces east of Suez. I do not wish to imply that, had public
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opinicn been different, the national leadership of either major party
might have followed or advocated different foreign policies. Current
conventional wisdom on the subject holds that public opinion does not
determine what foreign policy shall be but, at most, what it shall not
26
be. Furthermore, far from cultivating mass public opinion on
foreign affairs and trying to mobilize support for its policies, the
British foreign policy officialdom has generally been indifferent if not
29
hostile to informing the public on such matters. Some official
information is passed on to a small, select "public", who may then
30
interpret it for wider sections of the population. British foreign
policy makers have thus been able to maintain a public opinion which
has generally been acquiescent if not unquestioning. Hie images of the
outside world projected by the leaders of the AEG did nothing to
disturb this acquiescence and may even have helped to perpetuate it.
28. See, for example, David 7ital, The Making of British Foreign Policy
(London, 1968), p. 81; William Wallace, Hie Foreign Policy
Process in Britain (London, 1975), p. 88; "Hie Role of Interest
Groups", in Hie Management of Britain's External Relations,
edited by R. Boardman and A. J. R. Groom (London, 1973), pp. 263-
37 (p. 282); Kenneth Younger, Tublie Opinion and British
Foreign Policy", International Affairs. 40 (1964), 22-33 (p. 31).
29. See, for example, Wallace, Hie Foreign Policy Process.... pp. 89-90,
113-16, 279-80; Peter G. Richards, Parliament and Foreign
Affairs (London, 1957), p. 19n; D. C. Watt, "Foreign Affairs,
the Public Interest and the Right to Know", Political Quarterly,
34 (1963), 121-36.
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